

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY

CENTRAL ARCHÆOLOGICAL
LIBRARY

Call No.

954.4205/J.P.H.S.

Acc. No.

31310

D.G.A. 79.

GIPN-84-2D. G. Arch. N. D./57.-25-9-58-1,00,000.



570(5)

Journal

OF THE

Panjab University Historical Society

(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society.)


Vol. I.]	APRIL 1932.	[No. I.
----------	-------------	---------

31310 EDITORIAL.

In 1911 a group of scholars, which included Sir John Thompson, Dr. Vogel and Mr. A. C. Woolner, the present Vice-Chancellor of this University, formed the Panjab Historical Society. During the next twenty years this Society achieved a deservedly high reputation in and beyond India, on account of the excellence of the contributions of many of its members to its Transactions, which were published in its Journal. Unfortunately during the second decade of its existence the early vigour of the Society declined progressively, until, during the last few years, its maintenance became a question for the anxious consideration of its few surviving active members. By the end of 1931, when the Society had with difficulty completed the second decade of its existence, the few survivors reluctantly decided to dissolve it before it perished of mere inanition.

The sad spectacle of the decline and fall of a Society, which in its apostolic period had achieved so nobly, hastened a project which was already being entertained within the University. In consequence, a few persons in Lahore at the beginning of the present year witnessed an unusual phenomenon—the very process of transmigration of spirit. The death-throes of the Panjab Historical Society and the birth-pangs of the Panjab University Historical Society exactly coincided, and, upon what may justly be described as an historic occasion, the Hon. Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp announced the final dissolution of the

954.4205
J. P. H. S.



(561)

Panjab Historical Society—of which he was the last President—and the translation of its spirit and other surviving elements to the then new-born Panjab University Historical Society.

The new Society is thus a prodigy, though this may not appear in its first essay at publication. But it has emerged under the shadow of a great name, and hopes, nay, intends, to revive the original spirit of its ancestor, and to continue its offering to the cause of sound learning.

There is little need in this long-storied land, and especially in this corner of it, which stretches from Delhi to Taxila and Mohindjardaro, to justify another attempt to add to the record of its exact and impartial history. The aim of the Society is simple and definite—to promote historical research and, as far as possible, to provide a modest avenue for the progressive publication of its results. We demand the help of those mature scholars of the Province who still pursue their labour, and we hope much from the enthusiasm of younger students, who realise that the India of yesterday is the memory and experience of the India of to-day. Mr. H. L. O. Garrett, Keeper of the Public Records of the Province, has already imparted a stimulus to their interest, and the work of certain of the senior students during the past twelve months will be justified, we hope, in future numbers of this Journal.

This Society is not restricted merely to graduates of this or of any other University. It welcomes to its membership all serious historical students who are beyond the immediate circle of the University, and incorporates all active members of the Panjab Historical Society who retain their interest in its purpose. It holds monthly meetings, from October till April, for the reading of contributed papers, and will publish two numbers of its Journal annually in December and April, to which the Editorial Committee invite contributions based upon original research.

**CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.**

Acc. No. 21310
Date 9.5.57
Call No. 954.4205/J.P.H.S

THE TRIAL OF BAHADUR SHAH II.

BY PRINCIPAL H. L. O. GARRETT.

[Paper read on 19th January, 1932.]

PART I.

1837—1857.

Before proceeding to survey the main events in the trial and condemnation of the last Timurid King of Delhi, and the circumstances leading thereto, it might be as well to give some account of his relations with the British Government in the twenty years of his nominal reign, which preceded his final exit.

On September 28th, 1837, Akbar Shah the Second died in the palace at Delhi at the age of 82, after a nominal reign of 21 years, and was buried by the side of his ancestors in the vicinity of the Kutab.¹ The period of his reign had witnessed a steady diminution of the shadowy royal power. In 1813 the offering of ceremonial presents—*nazrana*—by the higher British officials had been stopped by Lord Minto, a presentation by the Resident at Delhi only being substituted. In 1816 Lord Hastings had abolished the Imperial mint at Delhi. Further the movements of both the King and the enormous horde of *sulatin* (members of the royal family) who filled the palace and its environs were restricted, and they were unable to move about the country without permission.

The royal income was partly a stipend from the British Government and partly the revenue of a small territory on the bank of the Jumna, which was administered in trust by the British.

On the death of Akbar Shah, his eldest son, Mirza Abu Zafar quietly succeeded him, taking the title of Abul Muzaffar Siraj-ud-Din Mohammed Bahadur Shah Badshah Ghazi, and his accession was notified by a royal salute being fired both at Delhi and Agra,² the latter being then the capital of the North-West Province, under the Government of which Delhi was included, the Lieut.-Governor

NOTE.—My authority for this period is the file of manuscript papers of the Delhi Residency, preserved in the Punjab Record Office. The relevant papers are known as case I and are referred to as D. R.

¹ D. R. Case I 15.

² D. R. Case I 15.

being represented at the court of the King by a Resident. Sir Theophilus Metcalfe held the latter office during the earlier part of the period and was succeeded later by Mr. Simon Fraser, destined to fall a victim in 1857.

Bahadur Shah the Second, as he is usually called, was born in 1775, and was therefore a man of 62 when he ascended the throne. He seems to have been a weak and harmless individual, with a taste for writing somewhat mediocre poetry, and very much in the hands of his favourite wife, Zinat Mahal, and Mahbub Ali Khan the chief eunuch.¹

Most of the correspondence between the King and the British Government is to be found in the Delhi Residency papers, which are deposited in the Punjab Record Office. It mainly consists of a series of demands for more money and complaints of his heavy expenditure. In 1811 the Court of Directors had fixed the royal stipend at 12 lakhs,² which was subsequently proposed to be increased to 15 lakhs in 1833.³ This increase was accompanied by a condition that the King should execute an agreement, by which he consented to forgo any further claim on Government, while the disbursement of allowances to the various members of the royal family was to be made under government supervision. This offer the old King had refused shortly before his death.⁴ On his accession Bahadur Shah also made application for the increase, and was told that he could have it on the same terms as his father, a proposal which he too refused to adopt, and followed up his refusal with a long list of grievances, with which the Government of India declined to have anything to do.⁵ In 1843 he sustained a further shock, as the offering of *nazrana* and the bestowal of *khilats* (robes of honour) were brought to an end by Lord Ellenborough in a strongly worded despatch. The Governor-General at the same time directed that no successor to the throne was to be recognized without his specific authority.⁶ Compensation for the loss of the *nazrana* was ultimately given at the rate of Rs. 883 a month,⁷ which the King declined to receive, but ultimately accepted, though a claim to arrears was disallowed.⁸

¹ D. R. Case I 63.

² D. R. Case I 1.

³ D. R. Case I 6.

⁴ D. R. Case I 14.

⁵ D. R. Case I 16.

⁶ D. R. Case I 21.

⁷ D. R. Case I 24.

⁸ D. R. Case I 73.

The question of the succession was also a bone of contention. Under the influence of Zinat Mahal, the King pressed for the recognition of their young son Mirza Jiwan Bakht as heir, to the exclusion of his older brothers,¹ a proposal which the British Government declined to entertain.² In the same despatch the Court of Directors gave directions as to the continuance of the royal title, and proposed that, on the death of Bahadur Shah, the palace should be evacuated and the royal family removed to a residence at the Kutab—the royal family being limited to the immediate descendants of the King. In 1852 these terms were accepted by Fakhr-ud-din the King's eldest son, who was thereupon recognized by the British Government as heir to the throne.³ At the same time the Resident submitted a tabular statement of the persons who would be affected by the removal from the palace.

From this it appears that there were no less than 2,101 members of the royal family in residence there—many of them illegitimate. The descendants of Shah Alum, alone, totalled 815.⁴ Apart from living free in the palace, and drawing pensions from government, all these persons were immune from the ordinary laws, and, on their removal from the palace, it was proposed that this immunity should disappear.⁵ Lord Dalhousie, who was Governor-General at the time proposed to garrison the abandoned palace, and utilise it as a magazine, and, had Bahadur Shah, who was then very ill,⁶ passed away, 1857 would have found the British in a far stronger position in Delhi.

It was not the old King, however, who died but the heir-apparent, Fakhr-ud-Din, who succumbed to an attack of cholera on July 11th, 1856, at the age of 40. Lord Canning, who had just succeeded Lord Dalhousie, now took a very strong line.⁷ He decided that the time had come to put an end to the "sham" of the royal title.

Mirza Mohammed Koeash Shikoh, the eldest surviving son, was to be regarded as head of the family, on the death of the old King and established as such with a liberal allowance, but "the nominal

¹ D. R. Case I 45.

² D. R. Case I 64 & 71.

³ D. R. Case I 54.

⁷ D. R. Case I 87.

² D. R. Case I 54.

⁴ D. R. Case I 67.

⁶ D. R. Case I 70.

and now unmeaning title of sovereignty with all its inconvenient and unsuitable pretensions should be discontinued." ¹

This brought Zinat Mahal into the field in defence of the claims of her son Jiwan Bakht, who appears from the evidence at the trial to have been a thorough young scoundrel, and she prevailed upon the King to send one Mr. T. C. Fenwick—an out-at-elbows individual, who appears more than once upon the screen of later Punjab history—to Calcutta as his agent with a memorial. This document was couched in—such improper language² that the Government of India declined to discuss it, and informed the memorialists that "the pretensions of Mirza Jiwan Bakht to be recognized as heir apparent had long since been rejected by the Governor-General."

This summary action ended Mr. Fenwick's credit and career, so far as the King's service was concerned, but the old man made one more effort on his favourite son's behalf.³ To this, in January 1857, Government directed that no reply should be sent,⁴ and, thus matters remained till the outbreak of the Mutiny in May.

PART II.

The outbreak of the Mutiny.

On May 11th, 1857 the drowsy indolence of the Delhi palace was rudely interrupted by the arrival of the mutineers from Meerut, and the bewildered old man of 82 found himself forcibly installed on the throne as King *de facto*, his accession being notified by royal salutes in various places. Much of the evidence put in during the earlier stages of the trial was intended to prove that he did actually discharge the kingly functions. Nominally he did so. But he was a mere puppet in the hands of a Committee of mutinous officers and royal princes. The actual Military operations were directed by Bakht Khan, on whom a royal decree conferred the title of Commander-in-Chief. Bakht Khan was formerly a Subedar in the 8th Foot Artillery at Bareilly. He is thus described by Captain Waddy of the Bengal Horse Artillery—his Commanding officer. "He is 60 years of age and is said to have

¹ D. R. Case I *Ibidem*.

² D. R. Case I 89. No. 96.

³ D. R. Case I 89. No. 5762.

⁴ D. R. Case I 89. No. 55A.

served the Company for 40 years ; his height 5 feet 10 inches ; 44 inches round the chest ; a very bad rider owing to large stomach and thick thighs but clever and a good drill." ¹ Colonel Bouchier, also of the B. H. A., says of him " Bakht Khan, like the Nana, was always very fond of English society. At one time, when studying Persian, he used to come twice a day to my house to read and talk to me. He was a most intelligent character but a more dreadful hypocrite never walked the earth." ² When the 8th Foot Artillery mutinied at Bareilly, Bakht Khan took away the guns to Delhi, but lost them all in the action with Nicholson at Najafgarh, after which he fell somewhat out of favour. When Delhi fell he fled southwards and was killed at Nawab Gunj in 1858.

Being mainly concerned with the capture and trial of the king it is unnecessary to enter into any actual details of the progress of the siege of Delhi. They have been related by many authors from many different points of view. So far as Bahadur Shah is concerned his brief tenure of power, if it can be so called, began with the arrival of the Mutineers from Meerut on May 11th and ended with his capture by Hodson on September 22nd. Within the city itself during that period the evidence at the trial affords ample proof that all was confusion and disorder. Despite an attempt at a levy on property there was no money to pay the troops and it was frequently necessary to pacify them with promises. Life in the beleaguered city cannot have been pleasant and most of the civilian inhabitants must have been unfeignedly relieved when the British attack was successful.

PART III.

The fall of Delhi and the capture of the King.

The attack on Delhi began on September 13th, 1857 and ended on September 20th with the capture of the palace, the king and the royal family fleeing to the neighbourhood of the Kutab. ³ On Septem-

NOTE.—My principal authority for this section is the selection from the Mutiny papers, printed by the Punjab Government and known as "Punjab Mutiny Correspondence." They are referred to below as P. M. C.

¹ Quoted in Gimlette's "Postscript to the Indian Mutiny."

² *Ibidem*.

³ P. M. C., Vol. VII—II—62.

ber 22nd he surrendered himself to Captain Hodson, on condition that his life should be spared. His two sons and his grandson, who were with him, and who were known to have been implicated in the murder of several Europeans, were as is well known, shot by Hodson personally. Bahadur Shah was kept in safe custody in Delhi together with his wife Zinat Mahal, though it was at first proposed to send him to Meerut.¹ Then came the question of the trial, General Wilson proposing a court of officers.² This proposal was approved by Sir John Lawrence. "By all means try him by a Commission and have an opinion recorded of his guilt or innocence. But pass no sentence".³

At this stage the Government of India began to move and directed that, if the king had been promised his life he was to be sent to Allahabad under a strong escort. If not he was to be brought to trial under Act XIV of 1857 before a special Commission, composed of Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Barnes, and Major Lake.⁴ If found guilty the sentence was to be carried out at once without further reference to the Governor-General. He was to be allowed a week to prepare his defence and was to be given counsel.⁵

To this John Lawrence objected as he could not spare the officers mentioned. In the meantime Jiwan Bakht—who is described by General Penny—General Wilson's successor—as "but little removed from a young viper"—had been confined with his father and mother, while several other members of the royal family had been tried by court-martial and put to death. At this stage there was some dispute between the Military and the Civil authorities. Hodson had arrested the king and guaranteed his life under General Wilson's order. The Civilians contended that Mr. Saunders, the Commissioner of Delhi was the proper authority. Mr. Saunders, however, disclaimed all responsibility, and ⁶ it is clear from the correspondence on the subject that the guarantee—which included both Zinat Mahal and Jiwan Bakht—was entirely Hodson's affair ⁷ and that, in giving

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

³ P. M. C., Vol. VII—II—pp. 187 and 188.

⁴ *Ibid.* 322 *et seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁶ Three senior members of the Punjab Commission.

⁷ P. M. C., Vol. VII—II—p. 311.

it, he was acting under definite instructions from General Wilson, who confirmed this when approached on the subject.¹ A long correspondence followed but as Hodson was killed at Lucknow in the meantime, nothing came of it.

In November 1857 preparations for bringing the king to trial were commenced. General Penny was asked to nominate a Military Commission and it was suggested that the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General of the Division—Major Harriott—should frame the charges and conduct the prosecution.² John Lawrence was somewhat doubtful about framing charges and was more inclined to get as much evidence as possible.³

But the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General pressed for the framing of specific charge and was supported in this by both General Penny and the Military Commission, and the latter took the responsibility of the trial going forward.⁴ John Lawrence finally left matters in their hands and the Government of India gave their approval in January 1858.⁵ Indeed no other course was now possible, as the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General had somewhat indiscreetly communicated copies of the charges framed against the king—a copy of which had been sent him—to the various newspapers of Upper India,⁶ an action much deprecated by both John Lawrence⁷ and the Government of India.⁸

At this stage Bahadur Shah fell seriously ill and it appeared likely that death would prevent further action. But he recovered sufficiently to be put on his trial and the proceedings commenced on January 27th, 1858. As will be seen by a perusal of the actual trial itself, matters had gone far beyond the specific charges against the king, and the proceedings really resolved themselves into a general enquiry into the Mutiny and its causes.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 375.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

⁶ P. M. C., Vol. VII—II—p. 367.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 376.

PART IV.

A Summary of the Proceedings at the Trial and the sequel.

The actual trial opened on January 27th, 1858, and lasted, with intervals, for 21 days. The following account is largely derived from contemporary histories of the Mutiny.

The trial was to have commenced at 11 a.m.; but, owing to delays caused by a sudden change in the constitution of the court, in consequence of Brigadier Shower's departure on an important command, it was half-past twelve o'clock before the prisoner was brought before his judges, although he had been kept waiting in attendance outside the Dewan-i-Khas, under a strong guard of the Rifles, from the hour first appointed.

At length the order was given to bring in the prisoner; and to those assembled in the grand audience chamber of the Mughals, the appearance of the old man as he tottered into court, supported on one side by his only remaining son, and on the other by one of his attendants, was an event of intense interest; and it became especially so when the proud antecedents of his race were compared with the wretched position of their miserable descendant. As soon as the prisoner had reached the place assigned him between the president and the government prosecutor, he seated himself on cushions placed for his accommodation, having his son Jiwan Bakht standing on his left; the background being filled up by a strong guard of the 60th Rifles, who had charge of the prisoner.

The proceedings commenced by the members of the court, the prosecutor, and the interpreter taking the customary oaths. The prosecutor then read the charges against the prisoner, and addressed the court in explanation of them; concluding by stating that, although the prisoner might be fully convicted by the court, no capital sentence could be passed upon him, in consequence of his life having been guaranteed to him by General Wilson, in a promise conveyed to him by Captain Hodson. He then, through the interpreter, put the formal question, "Guilty or not guilty?" but the prisoner either did not, or affected not to understand the meaning of the inquiry and

there was considerable delay before he could be got to reply. He at length, however, declared himself profoundly ignorant of the nature of the charges against him, or of the authority by which he was then questioned, although a translated copy of the charges had been delivered to him some twenty days previous. After some further delay, and a great deal of persuasion and explanation through the interpreter, the prisoner at last pleaded "Not Guilty," and the business of the court proceeded.

A number of documents of various descriptions, and of varied importance, were then read by the prosecutor. These chiefly consisted of petitions from all classes of natives addressed to "The Shelter of the World." Some of them were curious; many related to outrages perpetrated by the sowars and sepoys in the city and suburbs; others related to certain delinquencies of the princes, sons of the ex-King, who had seized the opportunity to extort money and valuable property from the wealthy inhabitants; a considerable number related to matters connected with the establishment of the "new reign"; and all concluded with a prayer that it might endure as long as the world lasted. Most of these State papers bore the autograph orders and signature of the prisoner, written in pencil at the top; and, his handwriting being sworn to by competent witnesses, incontrovertible proof was furnished of the active co-operation of the prisoner in the rebellious movement.

During the greater part of the day, the royal prisoner appeared to consider the proceedings as perfectly unimportant, and merely tiresome; and he occasionally found relief from ennui by dozing. His son appeared more animated, and laughed and chatted with his father's attendant without appearing at all embarrassed. In fact, neither of the personages most interested appeared to be at all affected by the position in which they were placed, but, on the contrary, seemed to look upon the affair as one of the consequences of their fate, to which they could offer neither resistance nor regrets.

Each paper, as it was read, was shown to the prisoner's vakeel, and identified by him, although the king himself professed utter ignorance of the existence of such documents—denied his signature,

and endeavoured, by gestures of dissent, to impress the court with an idea of his entire innocence.

On the second day, a document was read, which purported to be a remonstrance from the one Nubbee Bux Khan to the prisoner, urging him to reject the request of the army for permission to massacre the European women and children who had sought shelter in the palace. The writer submitted that such massacre would be contrary to the Mohammedan religion and law; and stated that, unless a *Fatwa* (a judicial decree or sentence) could be procured it should not be put in execution. This document, it was observed by the government prosecutor, was the only one, of an immense heap before him, in which the spirit of mercy and of kindness to Europeans could be traced; and it was remarkable, that it was the only one of the mass upon which the prisoner had not made some comment.

On the third day, the proceedings commenced at eleven o'clock, the prisoner being brought into court in a palanquin, attended by his vakeel, Gholam Abbas, and two servants; the prince, Jiwan Bakht, having been ordered into confinement for his indecorous and disrespectful conduct towards the court during the first day's trial. A portion of the day was again occupied in reading a mass of documents, of which the prisoner took little notice—dozing, and apparently regardless of what was passing around him. Occasionally, however, when some particular passage was read, the dull eye would light up, and the bowed head would be raised in marked attention for a few moments—only to relapse into a state of listless indifference.

The sittings of the court occupied several weeks, in consequence of various adjournments rendered necessary by the failing health of the aged prisoner. On the tenth day of the trial, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe (Civil Service) gave some important evidence relative to the state of feeling amongst the natives before the outbreak on the 11th of May; and stated that a rumour was current in the city, for six weeks prior to the outbreak, that the Kashmir Gate would be attacked and taken from the British; that this rumour was communicated to the civil authorities, and that no notice was taken of it. Another witness, Buktowur, a peon in the service of the late Captain

Douglas, gave details of the occurrences of the outbreak on the 11th May, from the first appearance of the mutinous troopers from Meerut, to the murder of Mr. Fraser (the Chief Commissioner), Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchinson (Civil Service), and the Rev. Mr. Jennings and his ill-fated daughter. From the evidence of this witness, it appeared that Captain Douglas, Mr. Hutchinson, and Mr. Nixon, were all near the Calcutta Gate leading to the bridge of boats, when four or five of the troopers rode up and fired upon the little party—killing Mr. Nixon, and severely wounding Mr. Hutchinson. The Europeans, alarmed, jumped down from the road into the dry ditch surrounding the palace, Captain Douglas being much hurt in his descent. They then ran along the ditch, and reached the Palace Gate, which they entered and closed after them. Mr. Fraser came up soon afterwards, and was admitted; and at one period of the attack, he appears to have taken a musket from one of the sepoys at the gate, and shot a trooper, which had the effect of driving the others off for a short time. At the suggestion of Mr. Jennings, Captain Douglas was taken up to his own apartments over the gateway; and soon after this a number of people from the interior of the palace came rushing forward, shouting "Deen, deen," and a crowd gathering; they were headed by a native officer of the palace guard, and, under his guidance, Captain Douglas and his companions were sought out and brutally murdered.

On the eleventh day of the trial, a news-writer named Chuni, corroborated the evidence of former witnesses as to the deaths of Mr. Fraser and Captain Douglas; and stated that the Mohammedans of the city were in the habit of boasting that the Persians, aided by the Russians were coming to drive the English out of the country; and averred that the chupatties which preceded the outbreak were used to bring together large bodies of men, for some business then to be explained to them, and that the distribution began at or near Karnal, a town about seventy miles north-west of Delhi. He also stated that about five or six days after the city had been in the possession of the mutineers, he heard there was a great disturbance in the palace, and on going to ascertain the cause, found a number of sepoys, and some of the prisoner's armed servants killing the

European men, women, and children. There was a great crowd collected, and he could not see distinctly through it; but after the slaughter had been completed, he inquired of the sweepers who were removing the bodies, and heard that, in all, fifty-two persons had been killed: of these, only five or six were males, the rest being females and children. The bodies were removed in carts, and thrown into the river. When he saw them lying dead, they had been collected in a circle. A number of Mohammedans were on the top of Mirza Moghul's house—spectators of the scene; and the prince himself was among them.* From the 11th to the 16th of May, when the massacre took place, these unfortunate persons were confined in a cellar or receptacle for rubbish, where the king's lowest class of prisoners were usually kept, and in which it would have been considered an insult to place respectable persons. On the twelfth day of the examination, one Chuni Lal, a pedlar who was in Delhi on the 11th of May, but left a few days afterwards, confirmed the statement of the previous witness; and added, that the prisoner was proclaimed king by beat of drum, and that a royal salute was fired in the palace at midnight of the 11th of May. Gulab, a messenger, gave further details of the massacre of the Europeans within the palace, of which event he was an eye-witness. He said that it was known two days previously that the European prisoners were to be slaughtered on that day, and a great crowd had in consequence assembled. The prisoners were all ranged in a line on the edge of the tank, and, at a given signal the mutineers and palace servants, by whom they were completely surrounded, rushed in and hacked them to pieces with swords. Shots were fired at them at the commencement; but one of the bullets happening to strike a sepoy, the sword was resorted to, and the barbarous work was soon over. The murderers engaged in this cowardly deed numbered from 100 to 150 persons. When the sanguinary act had been accomplished, the spectators were turned out of the place, and the bodies were carried away by sweepers. No one attempted to interfere to prevent the massacre; no messenger from the king came to stop it; and the witness said he heard nothing which could lead him to believe that the deed was not gloried in by

*NOTE.—Mirza Moghul was shot by Capt. Hodson on Sept. 22nd, 1857.

the Mohammedans. The witness further stated that he was present at the murder of the Beresfords (Mr. Beresford was the manager of the Delhi Bank). This gentleman was badly wounded at the onset, one arm being broken by a shot; but having a sword and his wife being armed with a spear, they contrived to keep the ruffians at bay for some time, Mrs. Beresford herself killing one and wounding another. They were at length overpowered, and with their five children (all girls), were ruthlessly murdered. The Rev. Mr. Hubbard, and another missionary, who had gone to the bank for protection, were also killed at the same time. "The house," said the witness, "where they were all slaughtered, still bears the marks of the struggle, and of the closing scene of horror."

An important piece of evidence was given on the thirteenth day of the trial, by a half-caste woman, the wife of Mr. Alexander Aldwell, formerly in the civil service of the Company. Mrs. Aldwell was a prisoner in the Fort but escaped the general massacre by pretending to turn Mohammedan. Her evidence absolved the regular sepoys of the murder of the captives, the "privilege for the latter being particularly reserved for the king's own servants."

The most conclusive evidence against the prisoner, in reference to his alleged complicity in the rebellion, was produced by Mukand Lal, the private secretary of the ex-king. Upon the first appearance of this individual before the court, he exhibited a degree of insolent assurance that drew from the judge-advocate a sharp rebuke and admonition. The prisoner, on his part, took no notice of and appeared perfectly indifferent to, the presence or the behaviour of his secretary; and only once in the course of the evidence of that functionary, did he exhibit the slightest token of recognition. Mukand Lal, a short and stout Hindu, after a slight interval allowed him to recover his equanimity, which had been seriously disturbed by the caution he received, took his station in the place allotted to the witnesses, and in a very humble attitude, and with clasped hands, proceeded to give his evidence. He declared that, for more than two years previous to the outbreak at Meerut, the prisoner had been disaffected towards the British Government—a circumstance he ascribed partly

to the discontinuance of the pomp and ceremony to which the inmates of the palace had been accustomed, and partly to the refusal of the government to recognise whoever the prisoner pleased to nominate as heir-apparent to the throne. The arrival of some of the royal family from Lucknow, about the time referred to, he stated, was closely connected with the prisoner's correspondence with Persia. The growing disaffection of the native army had been the common subject of conversation in the private apartments of the prisoner for some months previous to the outbreak; and preparations for that event had been arranged by the native officers sent from Delhi, to form part of the court-martial upon the mutineers of the 3rd Cavalry. The witness also stated that the guards of the palace, changed weekly from the three regiments in cantonments at Delhi, were to a man, adherents of the king. The secretary then described the incidents of the outbreak as connected with the personal acts of the prisoner: and with regard to the subsequent massacre of European prisoners said, that when the mutineers become clamorous for the slaughter, Mirza Mogul, eldest son of the prisoner, with another of the princes, went to obtain the consent of the king, who was in his private apartment; and were admitted to an audience, the mutineers remaining outside. After the lapse of about twenty minutes the two princes returned; and Mirza Mogul announced with exultation, that the prisoner had given his consent: the slaughter accordingly commenced, the princes looking on from a terrace immediately above the scene of the outrage, and encouraging the murderers by their gesticulations and laughter.

On the following day (the fifteenth of the trial) Mukand Lal was further examined; and stated that the then late prime minister, Mahboob Ali Khan, was the only person he knew of in the prisoner's entire confidence, and that he himself was not admitted to the secret conferences of his master. That at such private conferences, Mahboob Ali Khan, Hassan Askari, the Begum Zinat Mahal, and generally two of the prisoner's daughters, were present, and that by their counsel he was guided.

During the trial the king displayed a singular line of conduct, not at all in keeping with the serious position he occupied.

Occasionally, while the evidence was progressing, he would coil himself up in his shawls, and, reclining upon the cushions placed for his convenience would appear perfectly indifferent to the proceedings around him ; at other times he would suddenly rouse up, as if from a dream, and loudly deny some statement of a witness under examination ; then again relapsing into a state of real or assumed insensibility, he would carelessly ask a question, or laughingly offer an explanation of some phrase used in evidence. Upon one occasion, he affected such utter ignorance of a question before the court, in reference to his alleged intrigues with Persia, as to inquire, "whether the Persians and the Russians were the same people." He several times declared himself perfectly innocent of everything he was charged with, and varied the wearisomeness of his constrained attendance, by amusing himself with a scarf, which he would twist and untwist round his head like a playful child.

The following facts were ultimately established by these proceedings :—(i) that the intended revolt was known to, and encouraged by, the Shah of Persia, who, at the request of the king, promised money and troops to ensure its success, his proclamation to that effect being posted upon the gate of the Jumma Musjid, whence it was taken down by order of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who himself was informed by a Christian Ressaldar very popular with the natives, that he had been warned to fly, as the Persians were coming, and the Mussalmans were exceedingly excited. Unfortunately Sir Theophilus considered the information from such a quarter of no importance. (ii) It was proved that a paper was addressed to, and received by, the late Mr. Colvin (Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces), by Mohamed Dervish, revealing the whole plot six weeks before the rebellion actually broke out and that this warning also was considered so unimportant, that it was neither acted upon by the party to whom it was given, nor reported by him for the consideration of the supreme government: and, (iii) that the murders of Europeans in Delhi were committed by order of the king, in the presence of his sons and other persons connected with the royal family, and by means of the Khassburdars, his special body-guard.

Of the assumption of independent sovereignty in defiance of existing treaties, and the levying of war against the British Government in India, there could be no question; and the prisoner was found guilty upon each of the four charges alleged against him, whereby he became liable to the penalty of death as a traitor and felon.

After the verdict the proceedings were forwarded to Sir John Lawrence who reviewed them in a lengthy despatch to the Government of India,¹ and recommended the transportation of the ex-king overseas, Zinat Mahal and Jiwan Bakht being given the option of accompanying him or of being confined in Bengal. The Government of India agreed and ordered Bahadur Shah to be sent to Calcutta under a strong escort. His future destination was to be intimated to him on his arrival.²

In October 1858, accompanied by Zinat Mahal and Jiwan Bakht the last of the Timurids departed from Delhi. On reaching Calcutta, the party were at once placed on board a warship and conveyed to Rangoon where the ex-king finally ended his days in 1862 at the age of 87.

(¹) P. M. C., Vol. VII—II, p. 391.

(²) P. M. C., p. 409.

THE REVOLT IN KASHMIR, 1846.

By R. R. SETHI.

"It would be no unpleasant theme to dilate on the Kashmir Campaign, on the extraordinary fact, never before witnessed, of half a dozen foreigners taking up a lately subdued mutinous army through as difficult a country as is in the world to put the chief, formerly their commander, now in their minds a rebel, in possession of the brightest gem of their land. Roman History tells no such tales, shows no such instantaneous fellowship of the vanquished with the victors."

By the terms of the Treaty, which in March, 1846, closed the First Sikh War, amongst other things, the Sikhs ceded to the British all the hill country between the rivers Beas and Indus, "including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara;"¹ and "in consideration of the services rendered by Raja Gulab Singh, of Jammu, to the Lahore State towards procuring the restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British Governments," the British agreed to recognise "the independent sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Raja Gulab Singh, by separate agreement between himself and the British Government, with the dependencies thereof, which may have been in the Raja's possession since the time of the late Maharaja Kharak Singh;" further the British Government, "in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Gulab Singh," agreed "to recognise his independence in such territories, and to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty with the British Government."

A week later, on March 16, 1846, was signed this separate Treaty² with Gulab Singh, by which the British Government "transferred

¹ The Lahore Government being unable to pay the one-and-a-half crores of rupees as an indemnity for the expenses of war, or to give security satisfactory to the British Government for its eventual payment, the Maharaja ceded to the Honourable Company, as an equivalent for one crore, his possessions in the hill countries between the Beas and the Indus including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, engaging to pay the remaining fifty lacs on or before the ratification of the Treaty—vide *Treaty between the British Government and the State of Lahore, concluded at Lahore, on March 9th, 1846.*

² *Vide Treaty between the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh, concluded at Amritsar, on March 16th, 1846.*

and made over, for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly and mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the river Indus and westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahoul, being part of the territories ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State." In consideration of this transfer Gulab Singh was to pay the British Government seventy-five lacs of rupees (*Nanakshahi*), fifty lacs to be paid on ratification of the Treaty, and twenty-five lacs on or before October 1, 1846, and in token of the supremacy of the British Government, was "to present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl-goats of approved breed (six male and six female), and three pairs of Kashmir shawls." He further engaged "to join with the whole of his military force the British troops when employed within the hills, or in the territories adjoining his possessions;" and on their part the British Government engaged "to give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in protecting his territories from external enemies."

Thus it was that Gulab Singh, the great-grandfather of the present Maharaja, became the ruler of Kashmir. But he did not acquire actual possession of his new province without much difficulty.

The Revolt of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, Governor of Kashmir.

One can easily imagine the jealousy which would be felt by a *power* at giving over, "in sackcloth and ashes," a rich tract of its territory to one who, only lately, was a subject of its own—a powerful subject, all but independent, but still a subject acknowledging, perhaps, a more perfect allegiance than he paid. Hence began intrigues, and month after month passed away without Gulab Singh being in possession of Kashmir. We shall examine concisely to what this was due.

Kashmir was annexed to the Sikh dominions in 1819, and had thenceforward been administered by Governors from Lahore who were frequently changed. In 1846, the Sikh Governor, in charge of Kashmir affairs, was one Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, who is thus described by a contemporary writer :

"The Shaikh is, perhaps, the best mannered and best dressed man in the Panjab. He is rather under than above the middle height; but his figure is exquisite, as far as it goes, and is usually set off with the most unrivalled fit which the unrivalled tailors of Kashmir could achieve for the Governor of the Province. His smile and bow are those of a perfect Courtier, whose taste is too good to be obsequious; his great natural intelligence and an unusually good education have endowed him with considerable conversational powers; and his Persian idiom would do no dishonour to a native of Shiraz. Beneath this smooth surface of accomplishment and courtesy lies an ill-assorted and incongruous disposition: ambition, pride, cruelty and intrigue, strangely mixed up with indolence, effeminacy, voluptuousness and timidity. From such *pluses* and *minuses* what result can be expected but a moral cypher?"¹

Deeply engaged in the intrigues and revolutions of Lahore, Shaikh Imam-ud-Din was never to be found at the cries of any of them; and so completely were all his aspirations negated by indecision, that he spent the six months of his Kashmir government in wavering between three different schemes for his own personal aggrandisement: doubtful whether to accept Gulab Singh's offer, and continue Governor on a salary of one lac per annum; to oppose the transfer of the Province to that Prince, which Raja Lal Singh told him should be a receipt in full for his Kashmir accounts; or to try to buy over the British, and make himself independent sovereign of the loveliest valley in the world. We shall see presently that he chose the most senseless of the three; and to save himself from the consequences, on the first appearance of danger, he turned "King's evidence," and sacrificed his accomplice.

In his choice he was urged, it is said, by the influence of a wife, the daughter of the Khan of Kohistan, "proud of her kin and blood," and bigoted in her Mohammedan faith.² Imam-ud-Din with the aid of feudatories took up arms to oppose the entry of Gulab Singh, and his troops obtained some advantages.

¹ Herbert Edwards's "*Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*," Volume II, Page 72.

² *Ibid.*

Gulab Singh could not himself drive the recalcitrant Shaikh out by force of arms and the British Government had to intervene and coercive measures were resorted to. Without an hour's hesitation, the Governor-General declared that the clause of the Treaty of Lahore by which Kashmir was to be transferred to Gulab Singh must be enforced and "that the British Government would give every possible support to the Maharaja Gulab Singh in compelling the servant of the Darbar, the Shaikh Imam-ud-Din to evacuate Kashmir, holding the Darbar responsible for the acts of their officer, in this gross violation of the Treaty."¹

The Lahore Darbar was asked to place at Maharaja Gulab Singh's disposal from one-half to two-thirds of the force at any or all of the stations between the Ravi and the Attock and to desire their Officers Commanding within that tract instantly, on receipt of the Maharaja's requisition, to move on such points as he might desire and to act on his instructions.² The Darbar was further instructed to proclaim to their border subjects that the property of persons taking up arms against Maharaja Gulab Singh would be confiscated.³ The Maharaja was advised to combine mercy with energy in coercing the rebels and to offer an amnesty for submission up to a certain date.⁴

In the meantime a letter was addressed to the Sikh officers and soldiers in Kashmir, informing them that an English army had been ordered to support the Maharaja.⁵ "As it was the practice of the English," wrote Henry Lawrence, "I warn you that if on receipt of this order you separate from the Shaikh and return to the Panjab, your lives will be spared and your arrears will be paid."⁶

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 217, dated Simla, the 25th September, 1846. From Frederick Currie, Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, to H. M. Lawrence, Agent to the Governor-General, North-West Frontier.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 193, dated the 12th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 899, dated the 15th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Lieut. H. B. Edwards, on deputation to Jammu.

⁵ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 439, dated the 24th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to the Sikh officers and soldiers in Kashmir.

⁶ *Ibid.*

The Governor-General on September 15, 1846, ordered six Regiments of Native Infantry, two Regiments of Irregular Cavalry, and twelve Field Guns, under Brigadier Wheeler, commanding the Jullundur Doab, to be held in readiness to move fully equipped for field service from Jullundur towards Jammu, for the purpose of protecting the Maharaja's rear in his absence.¹

The Maharaja did not wish British troops to go to Kashmir but was anxious that they should hold Nowshera (above Bhimbar) for him for the double reason, that it was a troublesome country, and that by so forward a movement, people might be led to suppose that they should advance into Kashmir.²

Accordingly, the Governor-General on September 22, 1846, addressed the Commander-in-Chief, requesting him that the Brigadier might be ordered to advance.³ "The object of the movement," the Governor-General wrote, "is to enable Maharaja Gulab Singh to move all his disposable forces on Kashmir, by protecting his rear from the confines of our frontier up to Jammu, a distance probably of between 60 and 70 miles, in the country between the Ravi and Chenab rivers at the foot of the hills which divide the Maharaja's territory from the plains."⁴

The troops selected by the Lahore Darbar for the Kashmir expedition were :—

Under Sardar Sher Singh—his own troops, the Kohistani (mountaineers), about 5,000 in number ; four guns.

Under General Doab Singh—two regiments.

Under General Kahan Singh—two regiments.

Lahore Troops, under General Imam Singh—two regiments ; two guns.

Moreover ten other guns and all necessary munitions were got ready at Lahore under the direction of Captain Brind. Various

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 200, dated the 17th September, 1846. From the Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Vol. IX, Serial No. 213, dated the 24th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Vol. IX, Serial No. 205, dated the 22nd September, 1846. From the Governor-General to the Commander-in-Chief.

⁴ *Ibid.*

officers were despatched to collect carriage and supplies in Rawalpindi, Jhang, etc.¹

And then was seen the very remarkable spectacle of the British Agent marching at the head of the Sikh troops, supported by British forces, to wrest Sikh territory from Imam-ud-Din in order to hand it over to the last of those Rajput brothers, who had always inspired the Sikhs themselves with intense jealousy.

These vigorous measures had the desired effect of showing not only to Gulab Singh, but also to the Shaikh in Kashmir, and the *Vazir* in Lahore, that no difficulties which could be created by hostile combinations, or intrigues, would be allowed to stand in the way of carrying out the Treaty. The very first fruits were the revelation of Raja Lal Singh's treachery. No sooner did Puran Chand, the Shaikh's *Vakil*, find that the British were in earnest, than with admirable decision he chose his side, and determined to save his master by throwing Raja Lal Singh overboard.

The surrender of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din.

Lieut. H. B. Edwardes, the Assistant Political Agent, who had been deputed by the Governor-General to keep Government informed about the proceedings in Kohistan and Kashmir and to advise Maharaja Gulab Singh 'at the present juncture,'² reporting the substance of conversations he had held with Puran Chand, the Shaikh's *Vakil*, in a letter dated the 17th September, 1846, observed that the *Vakil* repeatedly asserted that his master, the Shaikh, had been secretly instigated in his resistance to Maharaja Gulab Singh in Kashmir, by communications sent to him by the *Vazir*, Raja Lal Singh, and that the Shaikh possessed letters to that effect, written by his *Vakil* and signed by Raja Lal Singh at Lahore.³

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 237, dated the 29th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

At the request of Dewan Jowala Sahar (Maharaja Gulab Singh's *Vakil*) the following officers were asked to go with the Sikh troops to Kashmir:—Sardars Tej Singh, Sher Singh and Mangal Singh. Generals Kahan Singh, Lal Singh Moraria, Amir Chand Topi, and Cortlandt; and Colonels Khan Ali Khan Gobarchi and Gardens.—*Ibid*.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 878, dated the 4th September, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Lieut. Edwardes.

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 217, dated Simla, the 25th September, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

It must be noted here that the *Vazir*, Raja Lal Singh, up to this time had by public letters and assurances led the Agent of British Government to believe that he was taking every measure in his power to cause the Shaikh to withdraw from Kashmir.—*Ibid*.

"If these suspicious circumstances shall subsequently be verified," wrote F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence, "Lieut. Edwardes may assure the Shaikh that if he (as his *Vakil* declares, he can) does prove the truth of the *Vakil's* declarations, the British Government will visit the offence of a Lahore servant, acting under the orders of his Government upon that Government, and not upon him, and will ensure his personal safety, if without further resistance he abandons his desperate enterprise and delivers himself up to the British Political Agent."¹

Negotiations were then opened between Lieut. Edwardes and Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, and the latter expressed his willingness to evacuate the valley and come over to Lahore but he was afraid that his Jullundur *Jagirs* would be confiscated and that he would be charged for the arrears of his troops. Hence he wavered and sought assurances before he finally gave up.² He was assured that if he left Kashmir immediately with the property he possessed, either with or without his troops, his life would be spared and his past conduct forgiven, and that if he could prove that he had resisted at the instigation of the Lahore authorities, he would retain his property and would be exempted from rendering any account to the Darbar.³ But he was told that his *Jagirs* in Jullundur could not be restored, for as a resident in the British territory and as a *Jagirdar* under the British Government he had disobeyed its orders.⁴ This caused the Shaikh to pause.

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 217, dated Simla, the 25th September, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1156, dated the 30th September, 1846. From John Lawrence, officiating Agent at Lahore, to F. Currie.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "Lieut. Edwardes will not encourage the Shaikh to believe, because the British Government do not visit upon him offences committed by him, in consequence of orders received from his own Government, that he is to be reinstated in his *Jagirs* and property in Jullundur. The Shaikh must be aware that he holds that property as a subject of the Company and is consequently responsible so far to the British Government that by acting in defiance of their injunctions and in violation of a Treaty he has justly subjected himself to the penalties which have already been ordered to be inflicted by the preliminary act of attaching all his property within their territory." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 217, dated Simla, the 25th September, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

On October 6, the Adjutant-General of the Army ordered Col. Reed, commanding at Ferozepur, to march Her Majesty's 62nd Regiment, three regiments of Native Infantry, two regiments of cavalry and twelve guns to Lahore.¹ Major-General Sir John Littler was ordered to move Her Majesty's 80th Regiment, three regiments of Native Infantry and twelve guns on to Sialkot.² Lieut. Lumsden was to join the Sikh troops, which had already left Lahore, at Rajourie, lest they should halt short of their destination.³ On October 11, Brigadier Wheeler was ordered to move the forces under his command so far as Bhimbar, but was instructed on no account to proceed beyond that.⁴ He, however, received instructions from General Littler, on October 19, ordering him to cross with his forces to the right bank of the Chenab,⁵ the forces under Littler being stationed on the left bank ready in 24 hours to form a junction with Brigadier Wheeler to advance on Bhimbar or Nowshera, whenever required to do so.

This mobilisation of troops further proved to the Shaikh, the hopelessness of his resisting any longer, and detached from him some of his most valuable adherents.

Reports now, from different quarters, confirmed the news that the Shaikh was yielding to the persuasions of the deputies and had made preparations for his departure to Lahore.⁶ Puran

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 950, dated the 11th October, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Brigadier Reed, Commanding at Ferozepur.

² *Ibid.*

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 259, dated the 7th October, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

⁴ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 951, dated the 11th October, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Brigadier Wheeler, Commanding Field Forces.

⁵ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 982, dated the 19th October, 1846. From Sir John Littler, Commanding the Panjab Division, to H. M. Lawrence.

⁶ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1132, dated the 10th October, 1846. From Lieut. Edwardes to H. M. Lawrence.

Chand and Fateh Khan arrived in Kashmir on October 1, and delivered the written pledge of Lieut. Edwardes to Imam-ud-Din. No sooner had the Shaikh read this encouraging letter, than trusting entirely to the leniency and generosity of the British Government he raised the siege of Hari Parbat; called in his men to their respective camps, exhorted the Kings of the Kohistan to put down the rebellious spirit they had raised and set himself to work in earnest to write similar orders to every part of the country.¹ Maharaja Gulab Singh's servants imprisoned in Kashmir were released and Mirza Faqir Ullah was ordered to set free those in confinement at Rajourie.²

Before leaving Kashmir, Imam-ud-Din wanted still to make sure of the action the British Government would take against him. So he sent Fateh Khan and Puran Chand and two of his confidential agents, Rattan Chand and Mirza Ahmed, with a letter to Lieut. Edwardes, whom they met at Seyouth, ten kos from Rajourie on October 15.³ Edwardes had already promised to meet the Shaikh on his way to Lahore. Imam-ud-Din requested him to come up to Bairangulli, Edwardes offered to meet him at Thana, 8 or 9 miles from Rajourie, and wrote to him not only promising to spare his life but also assuring him that the British Government would not interfere with his Kashmir property, nor allow the Lahore Darbar to call him to account, if he could prove the complicity of the Lahore Darbar in the

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1132, dated the 10th October, 1846. From Lieut. H. B. Edwardes to H. M. Lawrence.

² On October 23, 1846, the Governor-General informed the Secret Committee that "Shaikh Imam-ud-Din has put a stop to all hostile operations against the Fort of Hari Parbat, occupied by the Maharaja's troops; he has formerly declared his submission to the Lahore Government and his intention of surrendering himself to Lieut. Edwardes who is accompanying the troops of Maharaja Gulab Singh." Parliamentary Papers (1844—47).

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1133, dated Camp, Seyouth, (10 Kos from Rajourie) the 15th October, 1846. From Lieut. Edwardes to H. M. Lawrence.

rebellion.¹ Arrangements would also be made to save any possibility of a collision between Imam-ud-Din's troops issuing from Kashmir and the Maharaja's and the Sikh forces marching into the valley.

In the meanwhile, on October 12, Mirza Faqir Ullah of Rajourie, the mainstay and ally of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, had written a humble letter of submission to Edwardes, wherein he declared his readiness to submit as soon as the latter reached the Rajourie border.

The Mirza wrote another letter to the Maharaja's Moulvi, offering to submit provided the Moulvi got him "the Maharaja's necklace as a pledge of good faith." Taking on himself the responsibility of his safety, Edwardes asked Faqir Ullah to come at once and the Maharaja too agreed to the request of the Mirza. On October 18, at 10 a.m., attended by about thirty followers, this master mechanic of the Shaikh's plans, the firebrand of the rebellion, the 'Lord and leader' of the insurgents and the deadly enemy of His Highness came and made his submission to Maharaja Gulab Singh.²

The army still advanced, and had reached the fort at the Bairamgulli Pass into Kashmir.

¹ This particular promise of Lieut. Edwardes gave rise to controversy. F. Currie writing to H. M. Lawrence, in a letter dated Simla, the 12th October, 1846, observed: "His Lordship does not think that he (Lieut. Edwardes) was warranted in promising to Shaikh Imam-ud-Din that, under any circumstances, we would interfere to prevent the Lahore Government from demanding from him a settlement of the accounts of his administration for the period that the province has been under his management. This is a question with which we can have no concern. The Governor-General observes, moreover, that this promise of indemnity from the Government demand and settlement of the accounts of his Revenue administration is made in the event of his proving the delinquency of Raja Lal Singh—but the misconduct and underhand intrigue of Raja Lal Singh (assuming it to be capable of proof) may not necessarily involve the Lahore Government itself, and the redemption of Lieut. Edwardes' promise to hold Shaikh Imam-ud-Din free from all claim by the Government on account of his long administration (notoriously a most dishonest one in the matter of rendering accounts) may be found embarrassing." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 209.

The Governor-General, however, agreed to "maintain the terms and conditions offered by Lieut. Edwardes to Shaikh Imam-ud-Din as far as possible, if he shall establish satisfactorily the facts upon which these promises were founded, and upon the establishment of which the conditions rest." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 326, dated the 2nd November, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1134, dated the 18th October, 1846. From Lieut. Edwardes to H. M. Lawrence.

This event was not only valuable as a key to the intentions of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, but also with reference to the effect it was likely to produce on the Kohistan and the countries at the foot of the hills, throughout which his name was celebrated for enterprising courage and deadly enmity to Maharaja Gulab Singh.—1642.

Soon it was reported that the Shaikh was making ready for departure, having promised to start on the 9th Katak 1803 (October 23, 1846). He hoped and also believed that no crime would be "proved against him." "The British had ordered him to leave and leave he would," he gave out, "he would not stay another moment in that place, though he should be forced in consequence to halt a day or two on the road to collect coolies."¹ On October 23, the Shaikh finally communicated, "I have this day departed from the city of Kashmir, though my preparations for the march were far from complete."²

He proceeded about three miles from the city where it took him a day or two to complete his arrangements. He wrote to Maharaja Gulab Singh, "My Lord, I have ever been your servant and son. The reply which you sent to my humble epistle has inspired me with confidence. May God keep you on your throne to all eternity! You tell me to come and make my submission. I am honoured by receiving your commands and I hasten to obey them. You have taken me by the hand, now deal with me as you think I deserve. My good and bad qualities I have confided to you. It is for you to estimate the sum of them."³ Leaving the valley on October 25, and proceeding *via* Shopian the Shaikh, worn out with a forced mountain-march of forty miles, in the course of which he had been drenched in a snow-storm, reached Bairamgulli on October 31, and surrounded by his officers made his submission to Lieut. Edwardes, who on the following day, conducted him to the camp of Henry Lawrence at Thana, the latter having a few days earlier come up with the army. On the next day the forces under the command of Major-General Sir John Littler were ordered to withdraw and so were Brigadier Wheeler's soon after.⁴ Thus ended this bloodless rebellion.

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 443, dated the 28th September, 1846. From Malik Fateh Khan and Rattan Chand to Lieut. Edwardes.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 444, dated the 23rd October, 1846 or 9th Katak 1803. From Shaikh Imam-ud-Din to Lieut. Edwardes.

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 446, dated the 23rd October, 1846. From Shaikh Imam-ud-Din to Maharaja Gulab Singh.

⁴ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 1001, dated the 2nd November, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Sir John Littler.

Maharaja Gulab Singh entered the city of Kashmir about 8 a.m. on November 9, 1846, (it had been declared the auspicious time by the astrologers) and found his *sowars* in entire possession of the place; Sardar Sujan Singh, with the garrison of Shergurhi, about 3,000 men, and the family of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, having moved off two days previously. To avoid their line of march, the Maharaja made a detour on his road from Shopian, and fell in with Henry Lawrence at Pampur on the evening of the 8th. It was thought that His Highness would prefer entering his capital by himself, and therefore he was given the opportunity of doing so, but the meeting at Pampur led the British Agent to imagine that the Maharaja was willing to sink his dignity in the increased opinion of the British support that his formal accompaniment would afford His Highness.¹

Maharaja Gulab Singh having been established in power, Henry Lawrence, "with his usual energy" as Lord Hardinge describes it, returned at once to Lahore.² The next thing to be done was to bring Raja Lal Singh to solemn trial and exposure before all the Sikh Chiefs, for secretly instigating Shaikh Imam-ud-Din in the treacherous opposition to Gulab Singh; the defeated Shaikh, having turned "King's evidence" against his late accomplice. He placed in Henry Lawrence's hand at Thana, three original documents, purporting to be instructions from Lal Singh to the Shaikh to oppose Gulab Singh; and to the officers and soldiers in Kashmir, to be faithful and obedient to the orders of the Shaikh. These papers were put in as evidence at the subsequent trial of Raja Lal Singh for his complicity in this affair.

It would not be out of place here, before we close, to review the more striking features of this Kashmir expedition.

One cannot help noticing here that the Sikh troops, who had only very recently fought against the British under the same officers who now led them, unwilling as they were in their hearts to support Gulab Singh, whom the Khalsa hated thoroughly, acted admirably in these operations, and thus

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 335, dated the city of Kashmir, the 12th November, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

² The Governor-General to the Secret Committee, dated the 4th December, 1846. Parliamentary Papers (1844-47).

drew warm commendations from Lord Hardinge.¹ Moreover, these operations afforded to the Sikh troops an opportunity of manifesting the improved state of their temper and discipline, by the alacrity with which they obeyed the order they received at Lahore, and the cheerfulness and patience with which they endured the privations of scanty supplies and long marches in a mountainous country. This service had been performed on the requisition of the British Government. "His Lordship," writes F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence, "will be much gratified by having the opportunity of acknowledging the services rendered in so admirable a manner by an army whose military qualities were last year experienced in the field on the banks of the Sutlej—and this year have been displayed in maintaining by the most zealous co-operation with the British forces and those of Maharaja Gulab Singh, an important article of the Treaty of Lahore, the violation of which was threatened by Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, employed by the Lahore Darbar in the Government of Kashmir."²

Properly considered this feat of compelling the culpable Lahore Darbar, with its chief conspirator, Raja Lal Singh, at its head, to make over, in the most marked and humiliating manner, the richest province in the Panjab to the one man most detested by the Khalsa, was the real victory of the campaign; and its achievement must continue an enigma to every one who remembers that it was performed by 10,000 Sikh soldiers at the bidding and under the guidance of two or three British officers within eight months of the battle of Sobraon.

This conjuncture was described by Henry Lawrence in a letter to Kaye (published in his *Lives of Indian Officers*, Volume II, page 298) as—"that ticklish occasion when I took the Sikh army to Kashmir, and when I was obliged to tell Lal Singh's *Vakil* that if anything happened to me, John Lawrence was told to put the Raja (Lal Singh) in confinement. The fact was, I knew he was acting treacherously, but trusted to carrying the thing through by expedition, and by the conviction that the British army was in our rear to support and avenge us."

¹ The Governor-General, writing to the Secret Committee from Camp Nairae, on November 21, 1846, remarks "The conduct of the Sikh troops, under the same officers that led them so lately in their invasion of our provinces, now employed in carrying out the conditions of the Treaty of Lahore, (and perhaps the least palatable part of those conditions) under the instructions of British officers cannot but command your admiration." Parliamentary Papers (1844-47).

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 332, dated the 9th November, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

THE MULTAN OUTBREAK AND THE TRIAL OF DIWAN MUL RAJ.

By

PROFESSOR SITA RAM KOHLI.

The outbreak at Multan and the subsequent trial of Diwan Mul Raj, the ex-Governor of the Province, are events that possess a peculiar interest for a student of the modern history of the Punjab. These events, as we know, fall within the transitional period when the old Sikh regime was being replaced by British rule. A study of the papers and documents connected with the trial¹ will reveal the circumstances under which the outbreak in the city of Multan took place on 19th April, 1848; how the revolt of Mul Raj developed into the Second Sikh War; and how eventually it led to the absorption of the Sikh Kingdom into British Empire in India.

Maharaja Ranjit Singh conquered and annexed Multan to his expanding Kingdom of Lahore in 1818. The province was, however, not quite happy in its governors during the early years of the new regime. The administration changed hands quickly, as many as five governors, Sukh Dial, Sham Singh, Mitha Mal, Sewa Ram and Badan Hazari holding office in succession—within four years (1818—21). On the removal of the last-named, Diwan Sawan Mal was installed in the government of Multan and retained this charge for twenty-four years till his death in 1844.

At the time of his appointment, Sawan Mal was in the prime of life.² He was a good scholar of Persian and Arabic, and had already acquired considerable experience in the art of government. By his energetic, firm and just government of the province, Sawan Mal

¹ The present writer has collected all these papers and is shortly expecting to bring out an annotated edition of the trial of Mul Raj.

² He was born in 1788 and was 33 years of age, when he was selected to hold charge of the newly acquired territories.

succeeded in raising the province of Multan to a state of prosperity to which it had, perhaps, never before attained. Robbery, and lawlessness were put down with a stern hand; even-handed justice was dealt out to the rich and the poor alike; cultivation was extended, trade and industry flourished, and the inhabitants of Multan became happy under the new ruler. He is still remembered by the people with affection and his memory is cherished in popular songs and ballads.¹

Sawan Mal's life had a tragic end. On the 16th September, 1844, he was shot by a prisoner under trial, who had
Sawan Mal's death. concealed a pistol under his waist-cloth. The bullet struck the Diwan on the left side of his chest and broke some of his ribs. After lingering for a fortnight he died on the 29th September.

At the time of his death, Diwan Sawan Mal's charge comprised the present districts of Multan, Jhang, Dera
Mul Raj, Governor of Multan. Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan, together with portions of the district of Mianwali and a few sundry estates. The territory administered by the Diwan was estimated to yield an annual revenue of thirty-five lacs of rupees, for which he paid to the Lahore Government a sum of twenty-three lacs, the difference being allowed for the expenses of management and his own emoluments. It was to this important charge that Mul Raj, the eldest amongst the five surviving sons of Sawan Mal, succeeded his father in October, 1844.² Mul Raj was fully qualified for the post. He was now thirty years of age and had gained some experience and training in the work of administration during the life-time of his father. He had been Governor of two important districts, namely, Shujabad and Jhang, and had in both cases won the unqualified approval of his exacting father.

Diwan Mul Raj's task, it seems, was beset with difficulties from
Mul Raj's early the very beginning. Raja Hira Singh, son of troubles. the late minister, Dhian Singh, was now in power at the Lahore court, and between the Diwan's family and Hira Singh's

¹ *Sawan Mal lala tera bol bala-tein uje mulk sun pher usaygi hai.* (Great may thy name be, Lala Sawan Mal, thou hast repopulated a ruined country).

² Sawan Mal's eldest son, Ram Das, died in 1831.

family there had existed a long-standing enmity. Hira Singh imposed a heavy Nazrana, or succession fee, of about thirty lacs on Mul Raj. The Diwan was very much embarrassed and opened negotiations with the Lahore Government. Fortunately for him while the negotiations were still pending, Hira Singh was murdered by the Khalsa army in January, 1845. The demand was reduced to eighteen lacs by Hira Singh's successor, Sardar Jawahir Singh. The Diwan paid a part of it and bided his time to see if he could not get the balance remitted. Meanwhile, matters were going from bad to worse in Lahore till, in December, 1845, the Khalsa army crossed the Sutlej and war with the British commenced. Early in 1846, when the war was over and Raja Lal Singh was appointed Prime Minister at the Lahore Darbar, Diwan Mul Raj's real troubles began. The Raja was jealous of the position of Diwan Sawan Mal's family and now that he came into power he could not miss his opportunity. He despatched a force against Mul Raj to realise the balance of the Nazrana as well as the revenue for the current year. An encounter took place near Jhang, and Raja Lal Singh's troops were defeated.

As soon as the news of the discomfiture of his troops reached Lal Singh, he summoned Mul Raj to Lahore, but the Diwan would not proceed to Lahore without an assurance of safe conduct from the Resident, Major Henry Lawrence. That assurance being given, the Diwan started for Lahore in company of Raja Dina Nath who had been sent to escort him from Multan. The party arrived at Lahore on 8th October, 1846, and after no small trouble and delay it was finally arranged that Mul Raj should give up the district of Jhang, being one-third of the province heretofore held by him; that he should pay altogether twenty lacs on account of the succession fee and for his arrears; and that the revenue of the districts still left under his charge should be raised in amount by more than one-third. In other words, Diwan Mul Raj was now asked to pay nearly rupees 19,68,000 for the same territory for which his father used to pay only 13,74,000. The new engagement commencing with the spring crop of 1847 A.D. was, in fact, in the nature of farming out of the province for three years for a fixed annual payment. Diwan Mul Raj expressed himself to the

The collection of tribute; Mul Raj's financial difficulties.

British Resident as well pleased at the arrangement, since, in spite of the rather heavy annual tribute which he was now called upon to pay, he felt secure both about his life and office from the caprices of his merciless enemy, thanks mainly to the intervention of the British.

Mul Raj tried to govern the province as well as he could, but he was not destined to have an undisturbed career for long. Fresh difficulties arose in his way, which he could not have anticipated at the time of concluding the new agreement with the Lahore Darbar. The treaty of Bhairawal, 22nd December, 1846, placed the administration of the Panjab in the hands of a Council of Regency composed of eight leading chiefs acting under the control and guidance of a British officer. This new government abolished the old system of octroi duties in the Panjab and also rendered duty free a number of minor articles of trade.¹ The Multani merchants also now insisted that the new Panjab system of import and export be introduced in place of the old town and transit duties then in force in Multan. This would inevitably have reduced the revenues of the Diwan still further.

The second difficulty which embarrassed the Diwan, involved what he considered his personal honour. The Council of Regency, at the initiation of the Resident, had introduced the practice of appeals from the decisions of the district officers being heard by the Lahore Darbar. By the Darbar, and by the minister Lal Singh especially, this right was also extended to cover Diwan Mul Raj's province of Multan. Now Mul Raj did not expect a fair review of his decisions by the Lahore Darbar, which was then dominated by his enemy, Lal Singh. In fact a few decisions had already gone against him and were calculated to lower his prestige in the eyes of his subjects.

The third disturbing cause was a domestic quarrel in the Diwan's own family. On account of certain differences, his brother, Karam Narain, had left Multan and settled down at Lahore.² The Diwan was thus deprived of his brother's valuable advice and assistance in

¹ *Vide* pp. 58-60, Panjab Blue Book.

² Page 227, Lahore Political Diaries, Volume 111, and also Mul Raj's letter, *vide* pp. 90-91, Panjab Blue Book.

his administration. Besides, now that Karam Narain was away from him, he found that his influence at the court of Lahore was not invariably exerted to his advantage.

The diminishing revenues, the never-ending clamour of merchants and trading classes for the abolition of the town
 Submits his resignation. and transit duties, the adverse influence of his brother at the Lahore Darbar and, above all, the right of appeal against his judicial decisions claimed by the Darbar were some of the circumstances which the Diwan considered too embarrassing to enable him to carry on the government of his province. Accordingly, he came to Lahore in November, 1847, to secure a modification in the terms of his appointment or, in the alternative, to resign his post.¹ Unfortunately for the Diwan, he arrived a day too late to see Major Henry Lawrence who was sympathetic towards him and on whose support he mainly depended. That officer had just left for England and the Diwan failed to get any substantial help from his younger brother Mr. (Sir) John Lawrence who was now acting as Resident. Accordingly Mul Raj submitted his resignation (December 18, 1847), but the Resident would not accept it on the ground that the new governor would not be able to realise the revenues from the country in the middle of the harvesting season. Another reason which prompted the Resident to postpone the acceptance of Mul Raj's resignation may be gathered from his correspondence with the Government of India. "I should prefer," writes John Lawrence, "that Diwan Mul Raj continued to hold Multan for another year, for the rest of the Panjab will afford ample occupation for all our energies for that period. Hereafter it will be well to get rid of the Diwan."²

His resignation not accepted, Mul Raj was persuaded by the
 Mul Raj returns to Resident to continue to act as Governor
 Multan. for some time more. It was arranged that he should be relieved in March, 1848. At the request of Mul Raj, it was further agreed that his resignation should be kept a secret even

¹The Diwan arrived at Lahore, 30th November, 1847. He had expressed his wish to resign a week before in his letter to the Resident, dated 21st November: pp. 90-91, Panjab Blue Book.

²Page 94, Panjab Blue Book (1847-49).

from the members of the Council of Regency, as otherwise he might have additional difficulties in the administration of his province. Mul Raj had also requested that, on being relieved of his charge, he might be provided with a *jagir* so as to enable him to maintain his position in life. The Resident could not, of course, give him a definite promise, but he was given an assurance that he would be taken on the Council, the members of which were, as a rule, rewarded with *jagirs*. The third and last condition of the agreement was that, a couple of months before Mul Raj was actually relieved, two British officers should be sent to Multan to be instructed by the Diwan in the state of affairs, before they took over the administration of the country. After making arrangements with Mr. John Lawrence, satisfactory to both parties, Mul Raj returned to his government in the last week of December, 1847.¹

Mr. John Lawrence was relieved of his officiating charge in March, 1848, and Sir Frederick Currie was appointed Resident at Lahore. Before handing over charge of his office to him, Mr. John Lawrence told him all about his interview with Diwan Mul Raj. Sir Frederick at once wrote requesting Mul Raj to reconsider his decision, but the Diwan was anxious to be relieved of his heavy and troublesome charge. The Resident then proceeded to make arrangements for the new government of Multan and Sardar Kahan Singh Man was selected for the post. He was to be assisted by two British officers and for this purpose Mr. Vans Agnew and Lt. Anderson were nominated by Sir F. Currie.²

The three officers with a number of attendants proceeded by the river Ravi (April 5th), while their escort, comprising about 1,500 troops, horse and foot, and two companies of Gurkha soldiers and six guns, marched by land. The party reached Multan on 17th April, 1848.³

¹ We come across the following note, dated 23rd December, 1847, in Lahore Political Diary, Vol. III, page 96: "A *Khillat* (robe of honour) of 15 pieces, three descriptions of jewellery and an elephant and horse are given to Mool Raj. Nazim of Mooltan it being the occasion of his taking his *rukhsat* (leave)."

² Mul Raj's resignation was accepted, March 24th, 1848. Kahan Singh Man was appointed as Governor on March 31st. For details see page 123, Panjab Blue Book.

³ Panjab Blue Book, p. 131, gives April 14th as the date of arrival—obviously a misprint.

Diwan Mul Raj gave them a very friendly reception. He had sent an officer of rank, Diwan Jowala Sahai, to receive them at Tulamba, almost at the borders of his territory with a present and Rs. 700 in cash as *ziyafat* or entertainment. He deputed a number of officials, both of the Civil and Police Departments, to look to their comfort. The new Governor and the British officers took up their residence (18th April) in the Idgah—a spacious building described as 'a village and fort' outside the city walls, and less than a mile from Mul Raj's own residence at 'Am Khass.

On the morning of the 18th April there was a short formal interview at the Idgah with the customary exchange of ceremonies and inquiries after health and so on. The same afternoon there was another interview at the same place for the transaction of serious business. The preliminaries having been settled at this meeting, it was arranged that the new Governor and his party should pay a visit to the fort the next morning to take over formal charge of the administration from the Diwan.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 19th April, the Diwan came to escort the party, which proceeded to the fort on elephants. The Diwan showed the officers all over the fort including the granaries, the barracks, the munition depots and a building which he told them was proof against shot and shell. The keys were handed over to the new Governor, who posted his sentries at different places from amongst the Gurkha regiment brought from Lahore. The old garrison were mustered and were addressed by the British officers who endeavoured to allay the sullen feelings of which they gave evidence at being thrown out of employment.

The charge of the province having been formally transferred, the party set out on horseback to return to their camp. Now begins the sad drama which forms the subject of the trial—a story of barbarity lacking sense, plan or purpose. As the small procession emerged out of the Sikki Gate of the fort and was crossing the bridge over the ditch, an unfortunate occurrence took place. One Amir Chand, a member of Mul Raj's

The ceremonial visit—
18th April, 1848.

Mul Raj makes over
charge.

Attack on Messrs.
Agnew and Anderson.

garrison stationed in the fort, attacked Mr. Agnew with a spear and wounded him on the left shoulder. The blow knocked him off his horse, but he soon jumped up and struck his assailant with the riding whip in his hand. After receiving one or two blows, Amir Chand drew his sword, rushed on Mr. Agnew, and inflicted two or three severe wounds on him, and then escaped by leaping into the ditch. Immediately on Mr. Agnew being wounded, Mul Raj pushed forward his horse and proceeded to his residence, leaving word, as Major Edwardes tells us, with his chief, Bhagwan Das, to bring the assassin before him. Almost at the same time, Lieut. Anderson too rode off rapidly and after passing through one of the gates of the town turned towards the Idgah, but he was followed by some horsemen who cut him down wounding him severely.

In the meantime, Sardar Kahan Singh and Ram Rang, the brother-in-law of Mul Raj, dressed Mr. Agnew's wounds and placing him on an elephant conveyed him to the Idgah. Lieut. Anderson was also picked up, placed on a *charpai*, and carried to the same place.

Having made arrangements for the safe conveyance of the wounded British officers Ram Rang himself proceeded to the 'Am Khass to see Diwan Mul Raj. After some consultation, it was decided that they should go to visit the wounded British officers in their camp, but as soon as they mounted their horses, one of the soldiers rushed forward and cut down Ram Rang wounding him severely on the arm and on the forehead. Mul Raj escaped into his garden-house and after some time managed to send his confidential officer, Raizada Tulsi Ram, to wait upon Mr. Agnew with a letter of *excuse* and *warning*, saying that he had wished to come in person, that as they were about to leave his house, Ram Rang had been attacked by a soldier and wounded, that there was a riot among the Hindu and Muhammadan soldiery, and that Mr. Agnew and his party should be upon their guard to protect themselves. This happened on the afternoon of the 19th.

This scene may be said to close the first act in the sad drama at Multan. For the right understanding of the situation that was now developing, it is necessary to know what was happening in the

camp of the Lahore party and at the garden-house of Diwan Mul Raj, during the 30 hours from the afternoon of the 19th to sunset of the following day when the two gallant British officers were again attacked in their camp by a body of soldiers, overpowered and mercilessly done to death.

As soon as Mr. Agnew and Lieut. Anderson arrived at the Idgah, the native surgeon of the Gurkha regiment dressed their wounds. Mr. Agnew then proceeded to report the serious occurrences to the Resident at Lahore. He also sent express messages for assistance to General Cortlandt and Major Edwardes, who were at that time at Bannu settling the frontier districts.¹ In the meantime, the two Gurkha companies of his escort which had been posted inside the fort by Mr. Agnew were turned out by the insurgents and joined their officers in the camp at the Idgah.

¹ We reproduce below, Mr. Agnew's letter to Sir Frederick Currie which has the melancholy interest of being his last communication.

"Mooltan, 19th April 1848.

"My dear Sir Frederick.

You will be sorry to hear that, as Anderson and I were coming out of the fort gate, after having received charge of the fort from Diwan Mul Raj, we were attacked by a couple of soldiers, who, taking us unawares, succeeded in wounding us both pretty sharply.

"Anderson is worst off, poor fellow. He has a severe wound on the thigh, another on the shoulder, one on the back of the neck, and one in the face.

"I think it most necessary that a doctor should be sent down, though I hope not to need him myself.

"I have a smart gash in the left shoulder, and another in the same arm. The whole Mooltan troops have mutinied, but we hope to get them round. They have turned our two companies out of the fort.

"Yours in haste,
(Signed) P. A. VANS AGNEW."

Postscript in pencil.

"My dear Sir,

"You have been ordered to send one regiment here. Pray let it march instantly, or, if gone, hasten it to top-speed. If you can spare another, pray send it also. I am responsible for the measure. I am cut up a little, and on my back. Lieutenant Anderson is much worse. He has five sword wounds. I have two in my left arm from warding sabre cuts, and a poke in the ribs with a spear. I don't think Moolraj has anything to do with it. I was riding with him when we were attacked. He rode off, but is now said to be in the hands of the soldiery.

"Kahan Singh and his people all right.

"Yours, in haste,
"P. A. VANS AGNEW."

"19th, two p. m.

"To General Cortlandt, or

"Lieutenant Edwardes
Bunnoo."

Mr. Agnew also wrote to Mul Raj expressing his disbelief in the Diwan's participation, but asking the Diwan to seize the perpetrators of the outrage and to come himself to the Idgah. In the meantime, Raizada Tulsi Ram, evading the mutinous troops, succeeded in reaching the Idgah in the early afternoon of the 19th, where he delivered Mul Raj's message to Mr. Agnew. In reply that gentleman reiterated what he had said in his previous message to the Diwan, expressing his conviction that the Diwan was in no manner to blame for the unfortunate events, but added that the best method for the Diwan of exculpating himself was to come in person to the Idgah. Tulsi Ram went away, but as no reply was received from the Diwan, Mr. Agnew sent two more messages during the remainder of the 19th April, but none of them reached their destination since the insurgents had prevented the Diwan's communication with the British officers. In the evening Mr. Agnew ordered a battery of guns to be placed in position ready for action and also took other measures for the defence of the Idgah. Late in the evening news was received in the camp that some of their camels and bullocks which had gone out to graze and water were carried away by the insurgents. Nothing of importance occurred on the side of the Lahore party during the night of the 19th or the early hours of the following morning.

We now return to Mul Raj in his garden-house at the 'Am Khass.

Beginning of the outbreak.

The troops were in a state of great excitement in front of the Diwan's garden-house, and as we have learnt before, had wounded Ram Rang when he and Mul Raj were getting ready to proceed to the Idgah to see the wounded Englishmen. They had even fired a couple of shots on the messengers sent by Mr. Agnew to Mul Raj. When Raizada Tulsi Ram returned to the Diwan's residence, (he tells a similar story in his evidence before the court), he found the Diwan 'a prisoner in the hands of his turbulent soldiers.' The insurgents had gathered together and had called a council of their chiefs at Mul Raj's residence and, after some deliberations, proceeded with the ceremony of investing Mul Raj with leadership of the revolt. The Muhammadans took oath on the Koran and the Sikhs on the Granth Sahib to stand by

him, while at the same time a *kangna* or bracelet was fastened on his wrist.¹ This happened before the evening of the 19th. Nothing of much importance occurred during the night of the 19th. During the early hours of the morning of the 20th, the War Council—if we may so call it—considered it expedient to remove the families and valuables of the Diwan into the fort from his residence at the 'Am Khass. At 7 o'clock the same morning proclamations were issued in the name of Mul Raj exciting the country to a general revolt.² A couple of hours later the guns of the fort as also those at the 'Am Khass commenced firing. Mr. Agnew then despatched messengers to endeavour to put a stop to the firing and to explain the object and circumstances of his mission, but his envoy never reached Mul Raj, being repulsed by the insurgents on the way. The cannonade continued in a desultory manner throughout the day and by Agnew's direction it was answered by fire from his guns. The loss of life and property on either side was, however, but trifling. In the Idgah camp one *sowar* received a serious wound in the leg, while amongst the rebels one man was killed and a gun was put out of action by a cannon shot.³

About this time Kahan Singh's troops (that is, the Lahore troops)

Lahore troops desert the British officers and join the insurgents, 20th April 1848.

began to show symptoms of disaffection. The gunners refused to work their guns and began to desert, even going over to join the insurgents.

So also did the troopers and the infantry. Towards the evening, between 4 and 5 p. m., Mr. Agnew again sent a deputation to Mul Raj, but the insurgents would not allow the envoys a private interview with the Diwan. The party was, however, admitted to the Conference, and after some discussion it was agreed that the Lahore force and the British officers should leave Multan; their cattle, etc., should be restored to them; and the firing both from the fort and the 'Am Khass

¹ Mul Raj, it appears to us, was unwilling to join the rebels and lead the revolt. It is probable that, as a contemporary balladist mentions he was persuaded to accept the leadership by the taunts and curses of his mother.

² Several of these proclamations were issued at the time of the outbreak and during the war by Mul Raj, Sher Singh and others, and are preserved among the papers in the vernacular section of the Record Office, Lahore.

³ Captain Hamilton, Counsel for Mul Raj, lays particular stress on this incident in the latter's defence. According to his version the man who was killed, was the son of a Mazhabi Sikh and it was these Mazhabis who led the attack on the Idgah on the evening of the 20th, and brutally murdered the British officers.

should cease. A party was accordingly sent with Mr. Agnew's messengers to put a stop to the cannonade and to arrange for the restoration of the cattle and then for the march of the Lahore troops. But before the party could accomplish much, the desertion at the Idgah was complete and the Lahore troops had joined the insurgents.¹ As soon as this became known, a band of the lowest rabble headed by some fanatic ruffians, including Godar Singh and his friends, rushed towards the Idgah, and cruelly murdered Messrs. Agnew and Anderson.² Kahan Singh Man and his (young) son were made prisoners. This completes the sad story of the murder of the two English gentlemen for which Mul Raj was put on trial.

In an introductory note like this, it will be out of place for me to enter into minute details of the rebellion itself. All that I propose to do in the following pages is to present to the reader a bare outline of the outbreak at Multan up to the time of the surrender of Mul Raj and his trial.

It has been mentioned before that on his arrival at the Idgah, Edwardes and Cortlandt in Multan—June—August, 1848. Mr. Agnew had sent express messages to Lieut. (Major) Edwardes in the Derajat country and to the Resident at Lahore reporting the occurrences of the morning of the 19th and calling for help. Lieut. Edwardes was camping at Dera Fateh Khan when Mr. Agnew's message reached him on the 22nd April. He lost no time in making the necessary preparations. After raising new levies, both horse and foot, from the border tribes of the Suleiman Range and also calling Von Cortlandt to his assistance from Bannu, Edwardes crossed the Indus with a strong army on the 24th April, but finding that Mul Raj's army under the command of his younger brother, Diwan Sham Singh, had advanced as far as Leja to meet him, he was forced to recross and fall back on the right bank of the river. Edwardes and Cortlandt remained in the Derajat country till the middle of June. They were not idle during this time. Taking advantage of the forced leisure, they had seized Dera Ghazi Khan and raised fresh troops in the district for the impending struggle.

¹ Two days after their desertion the Lahore troops issued a proclamation setting forth the circumstances under which they had joined Mul Raj and calling upon their brethren to follow suit.

² Godar Singh was put on his trial, 2nd March 1849.

In the meantime, the Nawab of Bahawalpur, an ally of the British Government, was persuaded to cross the river Sutlej with a view to advance on Multan and co-operate with Edwardes, who was moving from the right bank of the Indus.¹ Edwardes and Cortlandt crossed over on the 14th June and marched post-haste towards Khangarh where they had to cross the Chenab and join the Bahawalpur force marching towards Shujabad. Mul Raj's army had already strengthened the garrison at Shujabad and had Ram Rang, the Diwan's officer commanding, been alert, he would have attacked the Daudpotras before Edwardes could effect junction with them. But Ram Rang was neither prudent nor perhaps very zealous in his master's cause. He wasted a whole day, precious on such an occasion, so that on the morning of the 18th June Edwardes was able to join his allies, and to engage in and win the famous battle of Kineyri. Cortlandt's accurate artillery fire, synchronising with a dashing charge by the raw Pathan levies, created confusion in Mul Raj's army. This was the first decisive action and it cost Mul Raj his provinces between the Indus and the Chenab.

The victorious army then marched on Multan, and by the end of June it encamped near Suraj Kund about four miles from the city. Here Edwardes was joined by the Lahore troops, some 4,000 strong, under the command of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din. In spite of the intense heat of July and August, Edwardes did not consider it prudent to give more resting time to his enemy. He engaged wherever he could find them and even gained a couple of important victories.

Both the town of Multan and the citadel were very strongly fortified and it was not possible to reduce them without a regular besieging arms. Edwardes therefore lay in waiting, occupying himself meanwhile in fortifying his position till the arrival of sufficient re-inforcements from Lahore.

The Lahore contingent was, however, very slow in coming to the
 Vacillation at head- succour of Edwardes.² As we have already
 quarters. seen, Mr. Agnew sent a report of the assault to
 the Resident, Sir Frederick Currie, simultaneously with the despatch

¹ For reference see letters from the Resident to the Nawab and to the Native Agent at the Court of Bahawalpur in vernacular section of Record Office, Lahore.

² The reason for this is fully discussed in Dalhousie's Minutes. See also "Private letters of Lord Dalhousie," pp. 24-27.

of an express messenger to Herbert Edwardes for help. Sir Frederick received this message on the 21st April and decided to send help at once, but a couple of days later, when the more disquieting news of the murder of the British officers and of the desertion of their escort reached Lahore, the Resident changed his mind. He could not entirely depend upon the Lahore troops to fight against Mul Raj. Nor was it considered prudent to despatch the European troops on a long day-to-day march to Multan—the hottest part of the province—since the summer season had already fairly advanced. Such was the opinion of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. This caused great vacillation and delay at Headquarters in sending the troops from Lahore.¹ Edwardes was pressing for help and, since he had succeeded in shutting up Mul Raj within the narrowest possible limits of the city of Multan, the Lahore Darbar was at last persuaded to shake off its lethargy and gave a free hand to Edwardes and also moved from Lahore (June 1848) a few thousand troops under Imam-ud-Din, Jawahir Mal and Raja Sher Singh as the first instalment, postponing the despatch of British troops to a later date. Imam-ud-Din's Mussalman troops joined Edwardes, as we have seen, by the end of June at Multan. Sher Singh did not appear till the 5th July. Edwardes was by no mean over-anxious for his arrival. The fact is he had no faith in the co-operation of the Sikhs in fighting against the Diwan.

By this time, the Multan outbreak had assumed quite a threatening aspect. Bhai Maharaj Singh (also styled *General Whisk* in Multan: August—December, 1848. —Dr. Gurur) had accepted Mul Raj's invitation early in May, and was now stirring up rebellion in the country. A large number of Sikh soldiers—especially those who had been discharged from service since 1846—now flocked to his standard and the Bhai with his 5,000 troops was on the move towards Multan. The Diwan had also entered into correspondence with Amir Dost Muhammad of Kabul and with some leading Sikh Sardars. Sir Frederick Currie, it seems, realising the gravity of the situation, was forced to exercise the emergency powers vested in him, as the Resident of the Lahore Darbar. He

¹ The reason for this is fully discussed in Dalhousie's Minutes. See also "Private letters of Lord Dalhousie," pp. 24-27.

accordingly ordered General Whish to march to Multan with British troops 6,000 strong and a siege train of 30 guns. Owing to the presence of a large number of camp-followers the movements of the troops were rather slow and it was not till the 3rd September, that is no less than six weeks after the marching orders had been issued, that the entire force arrived at Multan and the British army was in a position to commence the siege.

The siege operations commenced on the 7th September, but the British artillery failed to make any appreciable impression.¹ The defection of Raja Sher Singh with his 4,000 cavalry on the night of the 14th September further weakened the position of the besieging army, so that before long General Whish was compelled to raise the siege and wait for the arrival of further adequate reinforcements.

It will be outside the scope of my subject to go into the causes which brought about the desertion of Sher Singh. Suffice it to say that it was the result of a series of unfortunate happenings at Lahore and elsewhere. Sher Singh's father, Sardar Chattar Singh Attariwala, was the Governor of Hazara. He fell out with Major Abbot, the British officer posted there as the adviser and counsellor of the Sardar. Colonel Canora, a European in the service of the Sardar, was shot dead by his orders for disobedience. The matter being referred to the Resident at Lahore, Sardar Chattar Singh was degraded from his office and his *jagir* confiscated. On receiving these orders from Lahore, Chattar Singh rebelled about the end of August.² At Lahore, about the same time, Rani Jindan, the Queen mother, was divested of all authority and eventually banished from the Panjab as she was believed to be fomenting disaffection amongst the chiefs and the Sikh soldiery. There was revolt in Hazara, revolt in Bannu, and revolt in Peshawar. Sher Singh in obedience to a summons from his father suddenly broke up his camp on the 14th of September and went over to join Mul Raj. Diwan Mul Raj, on his own part, did not quite believe Sher Singh to be sincere, but suspecting him of complicity

¹ Diwan Sawan Msl, during his governorship of 24 years, had rendered the citadel of Multan one of the strongest forts in India.

² It may be added that some recently discovered letters of Chattar Singh show that he had all along intended to rebel at the first favourable opportunity.

with the British, would not let him enter within the walls of the city.¹ Sher Singh consequently quitted Multan on the 11th of October to join his father, who had advanced from Hazara as far as the Jhelum river. All over the province, the Sikhs were flocking, to the standard of the Attariwala chiefs who had declared a Dharm Yuddh or religious war against the English. Thus in three weeks' time the whole Panjab was ablaze and the local disturbances at Multan rapidly developed into the second Sikh War.

To resume the thread of our story. As we have seen, the siege of Multan was raised owing to the defection of Sher Singh and it was not considered safe to undertake further operations unless more reinforcements were available. The besieging force retired once again to Suraj Kund where they remained encamped till the end of December. It was on the 26th December that the Bombay division, commanded by Brigadier Dundas arrived with a siege train and the siege was resumed. After a heavy bombardment and severe fighting of nearly a week, the city of Multan was carried by assault on the 2nd January, 1849. The Diwan now shut himself up in the citadel. A great misfortune had already befallen him. A chance shell from one of the English batteries accidentally fell into the magazine and proved to be the turning-point of the siege. The magazine contained 5,000 maunds of powder which when exploded 'shook the whole earth for miles around the fort.' Five hundred of the garrison perished in the explosion. It was an irreparable blow and further resistance seemed hopeless. Nor was the fort now in a fit state to afford proper shelter to the troops. Most of the buildings had been badly damaged if not turned into a mere mass of ruins by the explosion of the powder-magazine, while a constant storm of shot and shell, which still continued day and night, rendered it impossible for man or beast to move from one part of the fort to the other. In this desperate condition Mul Raj was left

¹ Major Edwardes, it seems, had no small share in intensifying the feelings of suspicion in the mind of Mul Raj. By means of a letter which he contrived should fall into the hands of Mul Raj, he conveyed to him the suspicion that Sher Singh was playing him false. "Pages 631-32, Vol. II.—A Year on the Punjab Frontier" by Herbert Edwardes.

no alternative but to surrender.¹ At nine o'clock on the morning of the 22nd January, 1849, he rode out of the fort and placed himself at the mercy of his conquerors. The scene of the surrender has been described by Major Dunlop in the following words: "At length Mul Raj appeared with his brothers, Sham Singh and Ram Singh, and several of his Sardars, riding on a Arab charger, covered with a rich scarlet saddle cloth. He was gorgeously attired in silks and splendid arms, he looked round without the smallest emotion and showed in his countenance neither defiance nor dejection but moved along under the general gaze, like a man conscious of deserving the admiration of even his enemies for having done his duty to the last."²

Exactly a month after the surrender of Mul Raj, Chhattar Singh and Sher Singh, after the famous actions at
 Annexation of the Panjab, March 1849. Chillianwala and Gujrat, laid down their arms near Rawalpindi on the 21st February, 1849, and on the 29th of March, the Panjab was declared annexed to the British Empire.

In the meanwhile, Diwan Mul Raj had been brought to Lahore
 Mul Raj's trial, 31st (20th February). It was decided that he should
 May, 1849. be tried for the murder of Messrs. Agnew and
 Anderson. And he was accordingly put on his trial on the 31st of
 May, 1849.

(To be concluded.)

¹ It will not be without interest to read Mul Raj's letter of submission which we reproduce below. [The original is in Persian.] The English translation will also be found on page 552 of the Panjab Blue Book. My translation given below is almost the same except in slight verbal alterations here and there.

"You yesterday ordered me to come in, and surrender before nine a.m., but I was prevented by sickness from complying sooner. I am now ready to come in, and for this purpose have sent my *wakil* to arrange with you; I desire only protection for my own life, and the honour of my women. The whole of this disturbance was set on foot only by my soldiers, and all my endeavours failed to quell it; now, however, I surrender myself. I ask only for my own life, and the honour of my women. You are an ocean of mercy—I end with my respects. (NOTE.—The letter apparently was intended to end here, but is continued in the margin.)

"May your dignity and prosperity be ever on the rise. This whole affair was ordained by Providence, and my own force attempted to kill and insult me; of my deliberate will I would never have done what I have; nevertheless, I confess myself an offender in every way. If you grant me my life, and protection to my women, I surrender; otherwise

"It is better to die with honour than to live with disgrace.

"You are a sea of compassion; if you forgive me, you very well can, if you do not, I am resigned to my fate."

² "Mooltan during and after the siege, by J. Dunlop."

THE SANGALA OF ALEXANDER'S HISTORIANS.

By

DR. J. HUTCHISON.

The Sākala of Sanskrit literature and Sāgala of the Buddhists has now been definitely identified with Siālkot, but much uncertainty still exists regarding the Sāngala of Alexander's historians. Some, like Cunningham, regard it as identical with Sākala, while others consider that the names refer to two distinct places. Cunningham believed that Sāngalawala-Tibba, or Sāngala Hill in the Jhang District, was the place indicated, but this identification is now abandoned as untenable.

In the *Mahābhārata* Sākala is spoken of as the capital of the Madras, and situated on the Apaga rivulet to the west of the Hydraotes or Rāvi. The Apaga here referred to is doubtless the modern Ayak Nāla, a small stream which takes its rise in the low hills to the east of Jammu and flows past Siālkot. It contains little water at ordinary seasons, but in a heavy rainy season it may become a swollen torrent and overflow its banks.

By the Buddhists Sākala (Siālkot) was called Sāgala or Sāgal, and is referred to chiefly in connection with Buddhism. It is undoubtedly a very ancient city and was a place of great importance in early times. Shortly before the beginning of the Christian era it was the capital, or one of the capitals, of Menandar, one of the later Indo-Greek Kings, called Milinda in Buddhist literature. At a later period (c. A. D. 510) it was subject to Mihirakula, king of the White Huns; here he established his capital, whence he ruled over Northern India.

In A. D. 633 Sākala was visited by Hiuen Tsiang, the Chinese pilgrim, who has left an account of it in connection with the kingdom of Tsekia, in which it was situated.¹ Hiuen Tsang came down from Kashmīr by Punch and Rajauri and reached the plains after crossing the Chināb, probably near Aknur. He halted at some place not yet

¹ *Si-yu-ki*. Beal's trans. Vol. I. 163 f.

identified, which he calls Jayapura and the following day reached Sākala. It has been suggested that Jayapura was the modern Jammu or Jambu. Of Sākala he writes: "To the south-west of the capital we come to the old town of She-kie-lo, (Sākala). Although its walls are thrown down its foundations are still firm and strong. It is about 20 *li* ($3\frac{1}{2}$ miles) in circuit. In the midst of it they have built a little town of about 6 or 7 *li* (1 mile) in circuit. The inhabitants are prosperous and rich. Some centuries ago there was a king Mo-hi-lo-kia-lo (Mahirakula), who established his authority in this town and ruled over India. In the old town of She-kie-lo is a *Sangarāma* (monastery), with about 100 priests who study the Little Vehicle."

Alexander must have passed close to Sākala, if he did not actually visit the place, on his march from the Akesines (Chināb) to the Hydrāotes (Rāvi), but his historians do not mention it. At that time, as we know, it was the capital of a large kingdom, extending along the foot of the hills from the Biās to the Chināb, in which the tribe of the Kathaiō held the first place. They were a brave people, very daring and skilful in war, and with them were associated two other tribes, brave as themselves. A short time previous to this they had been attacked by Porus, the ruler of the country between the Hydāses (Jhelam) and Akesines (Chināb), in co-operation with Abisares, the king of the outer hills, between the same rivers, who were defeated.

The classical notices of the Sāngala of Alexander are confined to the two historical accounts of Arrian and Curtius, and a passing mention by Diodoros. Curtius calls it a great city defended not only by a wall but also by a swamp. Arrian calls the swamp a lake, but adds that it was not deep, that it was near the city wall and that one of the gates opened upon it. He describes the city as strong, being defended by a brick wall and also by the lake.

Outside the city there was a low hill, which from the description one would call a mound, close to the city wall, and connected with it as a kind of outwork. From it the defenders, if hard pressed, could easily make their escape into the city.

No mention is made of a fort on the mound, but the allied tribes had surrounded it with a triple line of carts, forming a triple barricade.

one outside the other. The number of carts, which fell into Alexander's hands on the capture of the mound, was about 300, and though this may not have been the total number, we may conclude that the circumference of the mound was very limited. As the side of the mound next the town was close up to the city wall, we may assume that the carts were placed only on three sides. Cunningham calculates that, allowing 100 carts for each barricade, the innermost line, next the foot of the mound, cannot have been much more than 1,000 feet long, that is, about 330 feet on each of the three sides. At a distance of 50 feet outside the inner line, the length of the second line of carts would be about 1,200 feet, and that of the outer row at the same distance, about 1,400 feet, or about a quarter of a mile.

After the defenders of the mound gave way and retreated into the town, the carts fell into Alexander's hands, and he used them to encircle the lake, so as to prevent the besieged from escaping that way. The lake extended up to one of the city gates, and the rest of the city was surrounded by the Greek Army. From this it is evident that the city was small, having a population of probably not more than 12,000 to 15,000 in permanent residence, though the garrison might have been largely increased by auxiliaries.

We thus have in Sāngala, as described by Arrian and others, these three outstanding physical features; viz., a walled city; a mound outside the walls but so closely adjoining as to be used as an outwork; and a lake or swamp of no great depth, reaching close up to one of the gates of the city. Sāngala is said to have been three forced marches, that is, about 60 miles, from the point where Alexander crossed the Rāvi.

Several places have been suggested but without any definite identification. Cunningham sought to show that Sāngalawala-Tibba, a hill in the Jang District, was the place referred to, but this view has now been proved to be incorrect. The weight of evidence points to Alexander's route having lain much nearer the foot of the hills, and it therefore is in that quarter we should look for a solution of the problem.

The historians who refer to Sāngala have all been read as meaning that the place was situated to the east or south-east of the Rāvi, but no place has yet been identified as possessing any of the physical conditions already described. There were only two directions in which Alexander could march from the banks of the Rāvi, where he crossed,—either south-east to the Biās, which is only 16 or 20 miles distant, or south-west towards Lahore. It cannot have been in the first direction, as we are told that he did not advance to the Biās till after the capture of Sāngala. In the Lahore direction, too, there is no place bearing the smallest resemblance to the Sāngala of Arrian, and it is impossible that a large town with a high mound and a lake could have disappeared, even in more than two thousand years. The lake may, indeed, have silted up in that long period, but the other physical features must remain.

As these are not to be found anywhere to the east or south east of the Rāvi, it seems proper to enquire if the common reading of the old authors is correct. We must bear in mind that the works of all the original Greek writers have long since perished, and that later writers, like Arrian and Quintus Curtius, wrote several centuries after the events they recorded, and had no personal knowledge of India. It would thus be easy for them to mistake the direction indicated and convey a wrong impression. Thus regarded, there is nothing in Arrian's narrative inconsistent with the construction that the dangerous combination against Alexander threatened his rear, and that he recrossed the Rāvi in order to deal with it. Cunningham points out that on three previous occasions Alexander had been compelled to turn aside in a similar manner from his direct course, in order to meet a similar danger. He remarks as follows :—

“ Both Curtius and Arrian agree that Alexander had crossed the Hydrāotes (Rāvi) before he advanced against Sāngala, which should therefore be to the east of that river. But the detailed measurements of Hsien Tsiang are too precise, the statement of the Māhābhārata is too clear, and the coincidence of name is too exact to be set aside lightly. Now the accounts of both Arrian and Curtius show that Alexander was in full march for the Ganges, when he heard ‘ that certain free Indians and Kathaeans were resolved to give him battle,

if he attempted to lead his army thither.' Alexander no sooner heard this than he immediately directed his march against the Kathaeans, that is, he changed the previous direction of his march and proceeded towards Sāngala. This was the uniform plan on which he acted during his campaign in Asia, to leave no enemy behind him. When he was in full march for Persia, he turned aside to besiege Tyre; when he was in hot pursuit of Bessus, the murderer of Darius, he turned to the south to subdue Drangiana and Arachosia; and when he was longing to enter India he deviated from his direct march to besiege Aornos. With the Kathaeans the provocation was the same. Like the Tyrians, the Drangians and the Bazarrians of Aornos, they wished to avoid rather than oppose Alexander: but if attacked they were resolved to resist. Alexander was then on the eastern bank of the Hydrāotes or Rāvi, and on the day after his departure from the river, he came to the city of Pimprama, where he halted to refresh his soldiers, and on the third day reached Sāngala. As he was obliged to halt after his first two marches, they must have been forced ones, of not less than 25 miles each, and his last may have been a common march of 12 or 15 miles. Sāngala therefore must have been about 60 or 65 miles from the camp on the bank of the Hydrāotes. . . I believe, therefore, that Alexander at once gave up his march to the Ganges, and recrossed the Rāvi to punish the people of Sāngala for daring to withhold their submission." *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 187, ff.

Sir A. Cunningham believed that Alexander recrossed the Rāvi near Lahore to march upon Sāngala Hill, but there can now be little, if any doubt that his line of march eastward, after crossing the Hydaspes, was along the foot of the Himalaya, and not through the plains.¹ This was the common line of advance of invading armies in ancient times, being the shortest and easiest, and the passage of the great rivers least difficult.

Assuming this conclusion to be correct, we are in a position to suggest Siālkot as presenting local physical conditions very closely resembling those described by Arrian.

¹ *Early History of India*. V. A. Smith, pp. 72 to 78, and *Journal, Panjab Historical Society*, Vol. IX, Pt. I, p. 10 ff.

The central or ancient portion of Siālkot stands on high ground, composed of the debris of former cities. That it was a walled city in former times is certain, as this is attested by the Chinese pilgrim, though few remains of the former ramparts are now to be seen. To the north of the ancient city, and in close proximity to it, is a hill or mound on which the fort, now in ruins, formerly stood. It was dismantled after the Mutiny of 1857, but the main gateway is still in existence on the east side. The mound is square on the top, each side being about 200 yards. The sides slope at an angle of about 45° to the ground beneath and are about 50 feet above the level of the plain, each side at the bottom being about 800 feet.

The mound must always have been outside the city, as it continued to be till quite recent years, when the railway was opened and building began towards the north; and its eastern side must have abutted on the city wall. It could thus be used as an outwork, as described by Arrian, from which the defenders could easily escape into the town in case of need. Arrian makes no mention of a fort on the hill, though it may have been and probably was there, and the fact not recorded. Indeed it is improbable that a mound of such a nature could have been formed on the plain, unless by successive accumulations of debris over a very long period, anterior to Alexander's time.

Two physical features referred to by Arrian are thus proved to have existed in Alexander's time, viz., a walled city, and a hill or mound outside the city but in close proximity to the walls. As regards the lake there is no permanent accumulation of water at the present time in the vicinity, and indeed one could hardly expect to find anything of the kind on a level plain after more than 2,000 years.

The lake was shallow and might have been formed in low-lying ground, as the result of heavy rainfall. The siege took place in the middle of the rainy season, probably in July, and Strabo records that the rainy season of that year was very severe. That there was a lake at one time is probable, from the fact that the ground, to the south of the fort and west of the Civil Hospital, is still low-lying, and even at the present time there is often an accumulation of water during the rains.

A friend resident in Siālkot has made full inquiry with the following result. "The length of one side of the fort from one corner to the other is about 800 feet at the bottom, and along the top about 600 feet, the difference resulting largely from the debris thrown down on the demolition of the walls. The enquiry about the low-lying ground is much more interesting. Apparently down to within the last century the Ayak, instead of flowing in a comparatively straight line to the east of the city, took a sharp bend in at the suburb of Rangpura, the bend reaching nearest to the city at the point not far from the Government School. Then when the river overflowed, a channel was filled right to the north of the fort, that is, along the line where the road runs past the American Mission Hospital, and right down through Mīanapura. There are still a very few old people who remember this happening, and there are still signs of an embankment built to keep the water back. These old people speak as if they had heard tales of still greater flooding in previous times. When the water got through the narrow channel, to which it was confined in the city, it used to spread out over a large area, just to the west of the Civil Hospital. Apparently this water never got back to the Ayak in a single channel. An interesting proof of the water from the Ayak having passed down to the north of the fort is, that when a well was dug on the road from the main bazar to Mīanapura, they had to dig through roots of trees, rushes, etc., which would suggest that it had once been the bank of a stream. An amusing legend is, that when the Ayak flowed on the north side of the fort it flowed milk instead of water, probably a figurative way of saying the water was full of mud. It would be interesting to know whether there is any trace of this channel having ever been the normal course of the Ayak."

An important and interesting confirmation of the above was furnished in 1925, when the Ayak overflowed its banks and came down the old channel. I quote my friend's words:—"On my return from holiday I heard that during abnormally heavy rainfall the Ayak stream overflowed its banks and came through the city, along the road running past the fort and the American Hospital, beyond which it was diverted by digging to prevent extensive flooding, and the waters

reached by artificial channels the fields to the west of the Civil Hospital. It seems to me that artificially it followed a course and had a destination very close to the old natural one."

From the above it is clear that in former times and indeed down to quite recent years, there was an accumulation of water in the rainy season, in the low-lying ground to the west of the Civil Hospital; when the Ayak overflowed its banks, into what is still remembered as an ancient channel to the north of the fort. This channel extended to the low-lying ground west of the Civil Hospital already referred to, which must have been in close proximity at one point to the city wall. It seems, therefore, highly probable that a permanent lake actually existed in the locality in Alexander's time, especially if the overflow channel referred to was, as suggested, the original bed of the Ayak. One old lady consulted actually affirmed, that the accumulation of water in the rains in former days reached to Ugoki, five miles away. This is hyperbole, but it shows how vivid is the reminiscence of the conditions in recent time. There can thus be little doubt that a lake of considerable size, though shallow, existed at the time of Alexander's invasion and spread up to near the city wall. The mound at that time was probably much smaller and lower than now, so that it might easily have been surrounded on three sides with the carts forming the triple barricade, of which 300 fell into Alexander's hands. With these he surrounded the lake, so that it cannot have been large. I can myself recall having seen a large sheet of water in the rainy season, soon after coming to India, in the low-lying ground referred to.

At the present time the channel of the Ayak at Siālkot is very deep, and must have been much shallower in ancient times, with a much greater overflow in the other channel referred to, especially in a heavy rainy season. Indeed it seems probable that the overflow was permanent, thus enclosing the ancient city, as if in an island. Hence possibly the name—"island of Sākala" which occurs in Sanskrit literature.

If then Sākala is identical with Sāṅgala, as suggested, we can well understand Alexander's anxiety on hearing of the coalition against him. He had left a considerable portion of his army at the Hydāspes-

(Jhelam), to fortify the cities he had founded, and prepare the fleet for the transport of the army down that river.¹ Smaller detachments had also been told off to keep up communications, one of them on the Akesines (Chināb), which would be in great danger. It seems probable, therefore, that the historians only meant that Alexander had reached a point south of the Hydrāotes (Rāvi), when news came of this grave situation, and he at once turned aside from his main object, and retraced his steps in order to cope with it. We are told that Sāngala was three marches from the banks of the Rāvi of which two were forced marches, that is, between 60 and 65 miles. Now the stages from Gurdāspur or Dinanagar to Siālkot are as follows:—Nainakot 14 miles, Shakargarh 10 miles, Zafarwāl 12 miles, Siālkot 35 miles, making a total of 61 miles. On this assumption Pimprama, where Alexander rested his troops on the third day, may have been the ancient town of Zafarwāl. Thus also we understand how Poros was able to come to his help so quickly, with a contingent of 5,000 men, for his boundary was only 12 or 15 miles away, on the right bank of the Akesines (Chināb). It would have been quite impossible for him to reach Sāngala in such a short time if the place was south of the Biās, not to mention the probability of his having to march through hostile country. It also explains to us the severe punishment inflicted on Sākala, in razing it completely to the ground. The name *Zafarwāl* is not old and the place must have had an older name of Hindu origin. The name is some times spelt Dafarwal.

The philological question, it seems to me, is the only one on which there is any real difficulty. Can we reconcile the two names of Sākala or Sāgala and Sāngala, as being the same, or referring to the same place.

Pānini has Sām̐kala, either for this or another town, but most likely he refers to the Sākala of Hiuen Tsiang and the *Mahābhārata* and the Sāgala of Buddhist literature. The difference in spelling in Greek may be the result of a clerical error on the part of the Greek historians, owing to their known difficulty in distinguishing foreign

¹ The Jhelam was used as a waterway from Karachi to the Panjab, down to the time of the Mutiny and even later.

sounds correctly. In any case Sāmākala is a near approach to Sāṅgala, 'in Greek letters' and with the double gamma. There is certainly no other place, within a radius of 60 miles from the Rāvi in any direction, that presents the same local physical features, in such close correspondence with those described in the *Anabasis of Arrian* and other writers.

Sir¹ E. H. Bunbury has the following note on the subject:—
 "While the general course of his (Alexander's) march must have followed approximately the same line of route, that has been frequented in all ages, from the banks of the Indus to those of the Biās, his expeditions against the various warlike tribes that refused submission to his arms, led him into frequent excursions to the right and left of the main direction, and with regard to these localities we have a general clue to guide us. The most important of these sites to determine would be that of Sāṅgala, the capital of the Kathaeans, which, according to the *Anabasis of Arrian*, was situated between the Hydraōtes (Rāvi) and Hyphāsis. Hence it was placed by Burnes at Lahore and by others at Amritsar. But on the other hand there are not wanting strong reasons for identifying Sāṅgala with the Sākala of Indian writers, and this was certainly situated to the west of the Hydraōtes (Rāvi), and between that river and the Akesines (Chināb)".

"Sāṅgala² is referred to by the Greek historians as the capital of the Kathaioi, and it is mentioned by Pānini in connection with king Sophytes, in an appendix of his grammar, called *Ganapatha*. The place is also associated with the name Saubhuta², which seems to have been the original of *Sophytes*, and the name of the country over which he ruled. In Pānini, however, the name is Sāmākala, and the question thus arises:—Is the Sākala of the *Mahābhārata* and Hiuen Tsiang identical with the Sāmākala of Pānini. According to the rules of transcription Sāmākala is identical with Sāṅgala, and not with Sākala or Sāgala, but if Pānini's Sāmākala is the same place as the Sākala of Hiuen Tsiang the doubt is removed." Pānini was born at Sālātūra, near Ohind B. C. 150.

¹ *History of Ancient Geography*, pp. 444-445.

² *Ancient India*. McCrindle, p. 37n.

The association of Sāmkala with the kingdom of Sophytes would imply that it was between the Hydaspes (Jhelam) and Akesines (Chināb), but there is much uncertainty regarding the boundaries of this kingdom. Strabo says :—" Some writers say that Kathaia and the country of Sopeithes, one of the petty kings, are situated in the tract between the two rivers (Hydaspes and Akesines). Others again place them beyond both the Akesines and the Hyarōtis, on the borders of the territory of the other Poros, the nephew of Poros who was taken prisoner by Alexander".¹ (Strabo, *Anc. India*. McCrindle ff. 36, 37n).

The proper name of Sopeithes is Sophytes, as we learn from an ancient coin of which the legend is in Greek characters, and as already stated, it is a transcription of the Sanskrit *Saubhūda*, which must have been the name of the country over which Sophytes ruled.² From all this it is evident that the territory of the Kathaioi and that of Sophytes adjoined each other, indeed Strabo is understood by one translator of the *Anabasis* of Arrian, as saying, that " the realm of Sopeithes was called Kathaia." (Strabo XV. I.) It thus seems highly probable, as Cunningham says, that they were one and the same people.

Another writer, not noted, has the following :—"Sīgala or Sāngala (as Arrian less correctly gives the name) is the Sanskrit Sākala or Sāmkala, which in the Prakrit form corresponds exactly to the name in Ptolemy. This city is mentioned frequently in the *Mahābhārata*, from which we learn that it was the capital of the Madra nation and lay to the west of the Rāvi. Arrian placed it to the east of that river, and this error on his part has led to a variety of erroneous identifications, Alexander, he tells, after crossing the Hydraotes (Rāvi) at once pressed forward to Sāngala, on learning that the Kathaeans and other warlike tribes had occupied that stronghold for the purpose of opposing his advance to the Ganges. In reality, however, Alexander on this occasion had to deal with an enemy that threatened his rear, and not with an enemy in front. He was in consequence compelled, instead of advancing eastward, to retrace his steps and recross the Hydraotes".

¹ Strabo, *Anc. India*. McCrindle p. 37 n.

² *Anabasis of Arrian* trans. Chinnock, p. 319.

As Arrian in his narrative seems to indicate a southern or south-western direction, on leaving the Rāvi for Sāngala, it is well to bear in mind that he was not present in the expedition nor was he acquainted with the geography of the locality he was dealing with. In describing Alexander's line of march he may, therefore, have easily fallen into the mistake of regarding it as south or south-west when in reality it was north-west. He would be all the more likely to do so, as Sāngala is not previously mentioned on the march from the Chināb to the Rāvi. Siālkot is 30 miles from the foot of the hills, and the Greek line of march, from the Chināb eastward, may have been farther north and near the hills.

A careful study of Arrian's narrative seems also to throw light on the question. He states that the intelligence of a coalition against Alexander came as he was advancing *into the country beyond the Hydrāotes*, that is, south of the Rāvi. On hearing this news, the historian states that he made a forced march against the Kathaeans, *and on the second day after starting from the river Hydrāotes* he arrived at a city called Pimprama. From this it seems clear that the historian meant to convey the meaning that Alexander at once retraced his steps to the Rāvi—probably near Pathankot or Gurdaspur—recrossed and started for Sāngala, which he reached on the fourth day, including a halt of one day at Pimprama.¹

There seems, therefore, a strong probability that the *Sāmkala* of Pānini is identical with the Sākala of Hiuen Tsiang and the *Mahābhārata* and the Sāngala of the Greek historians.

The Macedonians destroyed Sākala (Sāgala), but it was rebuilt by Demetries, one of the Græco-Bactrian kings, who in honour of his father, Euthydemus (B. C. 220) called it Euthydemina.

¹ *Anabasis of Arrian, trans.* Chincock, p. 319.

THE PERSIAN EMPEROR CYRUS THE GREAT, AND THE INDIAN " SAKA " ERA.

BY PROFESSOR GULSHAN RAI,

Sanatana Dharma College, Lahore.

[Paper read 24th February 1932.]

While the Sheshnag dynasty was ruling in Magadha, and Budha was preaching his religion in Hindustan, there rose into power a king Cyrus by name, belonging to the Achamædian dynasty, who established a mighty empire in what are in the present day called the Middle Eastern countries. From the Behistun Inscription of Darius Hystaspes, and the Babylonian proclamation of Cyrus himself, we find that the founder of this dynasty was one who in the old Persian tongue was pronounced as "Hakamani." As the Persian "H" stands for "S" in the Aryan tongues, we may take it that the great ancestor of Cyrus who first established kingly power in Persia was one "Sakhamani." The name "Cyrus" itself in the old Persian tongue is pronounced as "Kurush." In modern Persian it is "Karun." The Hebrews pronounced the name as "Kurash," and the Babylonians pronounced it as "Koresh." It is a question to ask, whether the Arabic "Kuresh" and the Indian "Kuru" is or is not the same as the Persian "Kurush." It is well known that the Kureshis of Arabia, were from times immemorial, engaged in the Indian trade. It is they who for many centuries, carried Indian goods to the ports of ancient Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. I am not a philologist, and it is not my purpose to-day to enter into an enquiry which may establish an identity between the Kauravas of India, Kurush of Persia, Kuresh of Babylon and Arabia, and Kurash of the Hebrews. I am this evening concerned only with Cyrus the Great of Persia.

We find from very early references in the History of the Babylonian and Assyrian Empires, that they were surrounded on the east, north-east, and north by a number of kingdoms, whose kings

possessed Aryan names, and who worshipped Vedic gods, like Indra, Varuna, Mitra, and Nasatya, etc. The Hittites and the Mittanis were in the north and the north-west, the Medes were in the north-east, and the Persians and the Elamites in the east. Sometimes the Persians, the Elamites, the Medes, and the Hittites established their rule in Mesopotamia, and at other times it is known the Babylonians and the Assyrians subjugated the territories of their Aryan neighbours. In 705 B. C. after the death of Emperor Sargon II of Assyria, we are told Media became independent, of the Assyrian Empire of Ninevah. In 650 B. C. Egypt also threw off the yoke of Assyria. In 625 B. C. Babylonia too revolted against Assyria, and became a separate independent kingdom. In 625 B. C. we may visualise the political map of the Middle East like this. In the east in Persia there were a number of independent petty chiefs, more or less owing allegiance to the kings of Media. At this time the conquests of Cyaxeres had made Media a powerful kingdom. It lay to the north of Persia. In the west across the Zagros range of mountains, there lay the new kingdom of Babylonia in the south, and the remnants of the once mighty Assyrian Empire in the north. Further westward, in Asia Minor, was the rich and celebrated kingdom of Lydia. In the modern territories of Greece and Macedonia, there were large number of city states and petty chieftainships. Such was the political picture of the Middle East, in the latter half of the 7th century B. C. But Assyria was soon conquered by the joint efforts of Media and Babylonia. In 606 B. C. Assyria disappeared for ever from the map of the world. The home provinces of Assyria were annexed to the now expanding dominions of Media; and Syria, Palestine, and Arabia fell to the share of Babylonia. In 585 B. C. Media conquered the whole of upper Asia Minor, and now her territories extended right up to the river Halys (modern Kizil Irmuk) east of modern Angora. After this there existed in the Middle East only four great kingdoms, viz., Media, Babylonia, Lydia and Egypt. All these four kingdoms were destined in a short period to become parts of the mighty Empire raised by Cyrus the Great.

Cambyses, the father of Cyrus the Great, was one of the petty chiefs in Persia, and as such owed allegiance to the King of Media.

It may be noted in passing that the Persian pronunciation of the name Cambyses is "Kambujes." Compare the Indian word "Kambhoj," and the present day Hindu caste in the Punjab, "Kamboh." We are told by Herodotus and Xenophon that Cambyses was married to Mundane, the daughter of Astyages, King of Media. Cambyses was the King of Anshan, a small State east of Susa. We know from the Behistun Inscription of Darius Hystaspes, and Babylonian Proclamation of Cyrus, that Cambyses, the son-in-law of Astyages of Media, was the son of Cyrus II, who was the son of Teispes (Persian Sispis), who was the son of Cyrus I, who was the son of Cambyses I, who was the son of Teispes I, who was a descendant of Achæmenes. Darius Hystaspes tells us that he was the 9th king in the Achæmenian line, counting from Teispes I. So it means that Cyrus the Great was the third Cyrus in the dynasty. Herodotus tells us that he ruled for 29 years, and we know he died in 529 B. C. He must have therefore ascended the throne of Anshan in 558 B.C. Herodotus the well known Greek Historian, and Xenophon, the author of *Cyropædia*, a work of historical fiction, both tell us that Cyrus the Great was a grandson of Astyages of Media. The Babylonian Tablets tell us that in the 6th year of the rule of Nabonidus, King of Babylonia, King Cyrus of Anshan overthrew the Median Empire, and laid foundations of the great Persian Empire. Nabonidus ascended the throne of Babylonia in 555 B. C. So Cyrus established the Persian Empire in 550 B. C.

The establishment of this Empire by Cyrus the Great, certainly caused great alarm in the courts of Babylonia, Lydia, and Egypt. We know from Greek sources, that these three monarchs of the western world, in order to meet this new danger from the East, proposed to form among themselves an offensive and defensive alliance. King Cræsus of Lydia, whose sister's husband King Astyages of Media had been overthrown by Cyrus, sent embassies to different countries, invoking assistance against the new power of the East. Babylonia or Assyria, as it is called by Xenophon, is said to have sent an embassy to the king of India for help. In response to these embassies many Greeks came to the assistance of Cræsus of Lydia.

Xenophon tells us an Indian Mission arrived in Media also. Let me here quote the exact words of Xenophon. He says :—

“Accordingly he (King of Assyria), sent around to all those under his sway, and to Croesus, the King of Lydia, to the King of Cappadocia, to both Phrygias, to Paphlagonia, India, Caria, and Cilicia, and to certain extent also he misrepresented the Medes and Persians, for he said that they were great and powerful nations, that they had intermarried with each other, and were united in common interests, and that unless some one attacked them first, and broke their power, they would be likely to make war on each one of the nations singly, and subjugate them. Some then entered into an alliance with him because they actually believed what he said, others because they were bribed with gifts and money, for he had great wealth. (See Book I, Chapter V, Para. 3).

Then again we are told by Xenophon :—

“Once when Cyrus was holding a general review and parade of all his men under arms, a messenger came from Cyaxeres, saying that an embassy had arrived from India. He therefore bids you come as soon as possible. Moreover, said the messenger I am bringing you a very beautiful robe from Cyaxeres, for he expressed the wish that you appear as brilliant and splendid as possible, when you come, for the Indians will see how you approach him. (See Book II, Chapter IV, Para. 1).

Further on Xenophon says :—

“And when the Indians came in, they said that the King of India had sent them with orders to ask on what grounds the Medes and the Assyrians had declared war. And he ordered us they said, when we have heard your statement, to go also to the Assyrian, and ask him the same question, and finally he bade

us to say to both of you, that the King of India declares, that when he has weighed the merits of the case he will side with the party wronged. Well then, Cyaxeres made reply to this, "let me tell you that we are not guilty of doing any wrong to the Assyrian; but go now if you wish, and ask him what he has to say." Cyrus, who was present, asked Cyaxeres, "may I also tell them what I think," and Cyaxeres bade him say on. "Well then," said he, "if Cyaxeres has no objection, tell the King of India, that we propose, in case the Assyrian says he has been wronged by us, to chose the King of India himself to be our arbitrator." On hearing this they went away. (See Book II, Chapter IV, Paras. 7 and 8).

It seems the Indian King finally decided to help Cyrus, for we are told by Xenophon.

"At this juncture, representatives from the Indian King arrived with money. They announced, also that the Indian King sent him the following message:— 'I am glad Cyrus that you let me know what you needed. I desire to be your friend, and I am sending you the money, and if you need more, send for it. Moreover my representatives have been instructed to do whatever you ask.'"

From both Herodotus and Xenophon we find that immediately after the establishment of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great in 550 B. C. the western powers, Lydia, Babylonia, and Egypt tried to combine and put a check on the ambitions of the new Persian Emperor. But Cyrus forestalled his enemies, overthrew Lydia in 547 B.C. and Babylonia in 539 B. C. His son Cambyses conquered Egypt in 525 B. C.

There are certain details in which Herodotus and Xenophon differ. Herodotus tells us that Cyrus fought against his maternal grandfather Astyages and defeated him in battle, and took him prisoner. Xenophon tells us that the man against whom Cyrus

fought was his maternal uncle Cyaxeres, son of Astyages. Herodotus does not mention the name of Cyaxeres at all. It is possible that Cyaxeres, in the old age of his father Astyages, was allowed to rule the Median Empire, and that on the defeat and overthrow of Cyaxeres, his father Astyages fell into the hands of Cyrus. It may also be possible, that Xenophon has mixed up Cyrus the Great with his grandfather Cyrus II. We now know from the Behistun Inscriptions of Darius Hystaspes, that there had ruled before him in the same dynasty three persons bearing the name of Cyrus. It is unnecessary just at this moment to go into this question more deeply, for whatever be the truth, the following points are established without any fear of contradiction :—

1. Cyrus the Great overthrew the Median Empire and established his own in 550 B. C.
2. Four great empires and kingdoms disappeared within 25 years of the establishment of this new Persian Empire.
3. Cyrus was in intimate contact with some Indian King, who helped him with men and money.

It becomes therefore clear, that the establishment of the Persian Empire, on the overthrow of the Median Empire was an epoch-making event in the history of the Middle East. This new Persian Empire was a wide and extensive one, and stretched from the Indus to the Nile in one direction, and from the river Oxus to the Arabian Sea in the other direction. This Empire contained within its confines the present day territories of Egypt, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Mesopotamia, Persia, Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and the Russian lands between the Aral Sea and the Caspian Sea. Such a great event as the establishment of this mighty empire in the immediate neighbourhood of India, could not have passed unnoticed by Indians, especially when one of their kings, had according to the testimony of a foreign writer Xenophon, helped Cyrus in the establishment of his empire. The Greeks, the western neighbours of this great empire, have written extensively about the origin and establishment of this empire. It should have been a matter of very great surprise, if Indians, the eastern neighbours of this empire had made no mention of its

establishment in their own literature. This empire was one of the most magnificent ones the world has ever seen. It lasted for more than 200 years, and was not overthrown till another great man of the world appeared in the person of Alexander the Great. The date 550 B. C. when the Persian Empire was established must therefore have been remembered by the ancient peoples, and must have been deeply impressed on their memories. This date must have more than deserved the beginning of a new Epoch, and the commencement of a new Era. There is some evidence to show that Darius Hystaspes, the successor of Cyrus, actually used in his inscriptions some Era. I shall try to discuss in the following few pages as to whether there is any evidence in Sanskrit literature to show that Indians remembered the date of the establishment of this Persian Empire.

In Sanskrit literature the word Sak (शक्) has got two distinct meanings, unconnected with each other. The one is derived from the root "Sak" (शक्) to be able, to be powerful. In the Vedic sense the word "Sak" is derived from the root to know. In the first sense, meaning powerful, strong, mighty, it was applied in the plural number to denote the name of a people who lived in Saka-dvipa, one of the seven dvipas, into which the whole of the Earth according to the Puranas was divided. In the Manusmriti, the Sakas are divided into such sections as Kambhojas, Pahlavas, Paradas, and Yavanas. Now we know for certain that the earliest home of the Kambhojas was in the present territory of Kandhar. The Pahlavas are undoubtedly the Persians, while the Paradas are no other than the Parthians. Now if the Persians, the Parthians, and the Kambojas are regarded in Sanskrit literature as Sakas, the countries inhabited by them must certainly be their Saka-dvipa. As a matter of fact, we know that the eastern confines of the present day Persia, are still known by the name of Seistan, the ancient Saka-sthan. We may therefore take it, that what we now call the Middle Eastern countries was known to the ancient Indians by the name of Saka-dvipa. Manu speaks of these Sakas as the degraded tribes of Kshatriyas. The Sakas are also mentioned in the Vishnu Purana. These "Sakas" need not be identified with the later Central Asian people whom the Europeans call "the Scythians;" for even Darius Hystaspes, who ruled from

B. C. 521 to B. C. 485, mentions in his inscriptions the Sakas as one of the peoples within his Empire.

In the other or Vedic sense of the word Saka, meaning to know, it means Epoch or Era. So the word can have at least two meanings; the one the name of a people, and the other an Era. The word is used in both these senses in Sanskrit literature. Again when used in connection with an Era, we come across three distinct expressions:—Saka-Kala and Saka-Nripati-Kala, on the one hand, and Saka Salivahana on the other hand. Now it is clear in the expressions, Saka-Kala and Saka-Nripati-Kala, Saka does not mean Era, for Saka-Kala would in that case mean Era-Era, which is meaningless. Here "Saka" must, therefore, mean "the People." Saka-Kala would then mean, the time or Era of the Saka people, and the Saka-Nripati-Kala, the time or Era of the Saka King. Saka-Salivahana on the other hand means the Era of Salivahana. Here Saka does not and cannot mean people. Even in so recent times as the 17th century A. D. the Era established by Sivajee the Marhatta king was known by the name of Saka Sivajee. This Era began on Jyeshtha Sukla 13 Saka Salivahan 1597, or in June, 1675 A. D.

Now, let us see whether the Era of Saka king is ever mentioned in any Sanskrit work. The earliest use of the expression, the Era of Saka king, is found in verses 20-21, Chapter VIII of Brihatsambhita, by the astronomer Varahamihira. Let me quote the exact words of the Slokas:—

गतानि वर्षाणि शकेन्द्रकाताद्वज्रानि रुद्रे गुणपेक्षुभिः ।
नवाष्टपञ्चाटयुजानि कुशविभाजपेच्छून्यशरणरामैः ॥२०॥
लब्धेन युक्तं शकभूपकालं संशोध्य पटया विपर्ययिभज्य ।
युगानि नारायणपूर्वकाणि लब्धानि शेवाः क्रमशः समाह्वयुः ॥२१॥

They mean :—Multiply by 11 and 4 the years that have passed in the Era of Saka King. Add to it 8589 and divide that by 3750. Add to the quotient the years of Saka King divided by 60. Then divide it by 5. The quotient is the number of Yugas from the beginning of the Narayani Samvatsara and the remainder are the years since elapsed.

In this verse of Varahamihira, the expression Era of Saka King is used twice.

Then again the astronomer Bhaskaracharya, in his Siddhanta Siromani, Gola Section, Prasna Adhyaya, verse 58, says:—

रसगुणपङ्खमहीसम शकनृपसमयेऽ भवन्ममोत्पत्तिः ।

रसगुणवर्षेण मया सिद्धान्तशिरोमणी रचितः ॥५८॥

It means :—My birth is in the year 1036 of the *Era of Saka king*. This Siddhanta Siromani was written by me when I was 36 years old.

Here again in this verse, the expression “the *Era of Saka king* is used.” The Saka-Salivahana or the Era of Salivahana is the date when according to the Indian tradition Salivahana overthrew King Vikramaditya, who is supposed to have started his Era in 57 B. C. Vikramaditya is known as the enemy of the Sakas, and he was a King of Ujjain. Salivahana is also a king of South India. So neither Vikramaditya, nor Salivahana can by any stretch of imagination be called a Saka King. The expressions “Sakendra-Kala,” “Saka-bhupa-Kala,” and “Saka-Nripa-Samaya” must evidently refer to the Era of a foreign king.

Even Dr. Fleet holds that Saka-Nripa must mean some foreign king.

Having established that the *Era of Saka king* refers to a foreign king, and not to any king of India, let us consider at what date was this era founded. Here the earliest reference to this point in Indian literature, is a well-known verse of Vriddha Garga, quoted by Varahamihira, in his Brihatsamhita, Chapter XIII, verse 3; and by Kalhana Pandit, in his Rajatarangini, Book I, verse 55. The exact words of the verse are :—

आसन् मघासु मुनयः शासति पृथ्वीं युधिष्ठिरे नृपतौ ।

षड्-द्विक-पञ्च-द्वि-युतः शककालस्तस्य राज्ञश्च ॥३॥

It means :—When King Yudhishtira ruled the Earth, the Sapta Rishi (Great Bear) constellation was in the Magha Nakshatra. The interval between this king and the Saka king was 2526 years.

Now if we know the date of Yudhishtira, then by adding 2526 to it we can get the date of the Saka king. All Indian traditions are unanimous in saying that the battle of Kurukshetra was fought at the close of the Dvapara Age, and that Yudhishtira abdicated in favour

of Parikshata, grandson of Arjuna, in the beginning of Kaliyuga. All Indian authorities agree in saying that Kaliyuga began in 3102 B. C. In the Kaliyuga Rajavrittanta we find the following verses :—

पञ्चविंशति वर्षेषु गतेष्वथ कलौ युगे ।
 समाश्रयिष्यान्त्यश्वेषां मुनयस्ते शते समाः ॥
 तदैव धर्मपुत्रोऽपि महाप्रस्थानमास्थितः ।
 भुवं परिभ्रमन्नन्ते स्वर्गं मारोक्ष्यति ध्रुवम् ॥
 तदैव लौकिकाब्दोऽपि सप्तविंशतात्मकः ।
 धर्मपुत्रज्ञापकार्थं लोके तावत् प्रवर्तितः ॥

They mean :—When 25 years of Kaliyuga had passed away, the Great Bear constellation came to reside in the Ashleha Nakshatra for a hundred years. At that time Yudhishtira also started on his great journey, and then after wandering about he attained heaven. From that moment in the 27th year began the Laukika Era, which was started in this world in memory of Yudhishtira.

So it means that Laukika Era commenced 26 years after the beginning of Kaliyuga. The starting point of Laukika Era was therefore 3076 B.C. This Laukika Era is still in current use among the Brahmana population not only of Kashmir, but also of the Hill territories of Chamba, Kangra, Mandi, etc. Professor Bühler was the first to prove that the commencement of the Laukika Era was placed on Chaitra Sukla 1 of Kali Samvat 25 expired, or the year 3076 B.C. Messrs. Sewell, Dikshit, and General Cunningham all agree that the Laukika Era commenced in 3076 B.C. Albiruni, contemporary of the Ghaznavid King Mahmud, also says that in his time this Laukika Era was prevalent in the Punjab and Sindh. I have mentioned above that this Laukika Era was established in memory of the death of Pandava king Yudhishtira. It has also been mentioned above, on the authority of the astronomer Garga the elder, that there is a difference of 2526 years between the times of king Yudhishtira, and Saka king. If we deduct 2526 from 3076 we get exactly 550, the date of the establishment of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great.

Now let us see whether this date 550 B.C. for the commencement of the Saka Era can be supported independently from Indian literature.

I have already quoted above a verse from Siddhanta Siromani of Bhaskaracharya. It runs as follows :—

रसगुणपूर्वम् महीसम् शकनृपसमयेऽ भवन्ममोत्पत्तिः ।

रसगुणवर्षेण मया सिद्धान्तशिरोमणी रचितः ॥५८॥

It means:—In the year 1036 of the time of Saka king, took place my birth. In the 36th year of my age was this book Siddhanta Siromani written by me.

So this book must have been written in the year 1072 of the Saka king. He wrote another book "Karana Kutuhala" in Saka 1105. Now if the Saka year here mentioned is to be counted, as it is at present, from 78 A.D.; then Bhaskaracharya was born in 1036 plus 78 or 1114 A.D. He wrote his book Siddhanta Siromani in 1150 A.D., and his Karana Kutuhala in 1183 A.D. And yet Albiruni writing in 1030 A.D. not only talks of Bhaskaracharya, but also mentions his book "Karana Kutuhala" as a work of astronomy known in his own country for more than a hundred years. Now how was Albiruni to know of things which were to happen about 150 years after his own time. Weber in his Book on Sanskrit literature (page 262) notices this anomaly, but is unable to offer any explanation. He says :—"I confess my inability to solve this riddle; so close is this coincidence as to the personage that the "Bhaskar" of Albiruni is expressly described, like the real Bhaskar, as the son of Mahadeva." But if we take this Saka Era commencing from 550 B.C., the riddle is solved; for then 1036 of this Era would mean 486 A.D. This would then be Bhaskaracharya's year of birth. In that case he writes his Siddhanta Siromani in 522 A.D. and his Karana Kutuhala in 555 A.D. Albiruni writes his book on India 475 years after this. There was thus ample time for the fame of Bhaskaracharya's books to travel to the distant lands of Khorasan, and Albiruni could well talk of persons flourishing, and about books written several centuries before his own time.

Again if this Era of Saka-Nripati-Kala is admitted to have commenced from 550 B.C. then the basic year of Varahamihira's system

of calculations, 427 is equal to 123 B.C. Amaraja in his commentary on Khandakhadya says :—

नवाधिक पञ्चशत सरंव्यशाके वराहमिहिराचार्यो दिवं गतः ।

which means :—In the year 509 of Saka, the Acharya Varahamihira went to heaven. That is to say Varahamihira died in 41 B.C. We can thus fix the lifetime of Varahamihira between 123 B.C. and 41 B.C. If we accept this, he at once becomes a contemporary of King Vikramaditya, the reputed founder of the Vikrama Era of 57 B.C. The adoption of 550 B.C. as the commencement of the Saka Era also incidentally reconciles the well-known statement made in the book called "Jyotirvidabharana," Chapter XXII, verse 10, attributed to Kalidasa. The verse in question runs thus :—

धन्वन्तरि क्षपणका-ऽमरसिंह शंकु वेतालभट्ट घटकरपर कालिदासाः ।
रव्यातो वराहमिहिरो नृपतेः सभायां रत्नानि वै वररुचिर्नव विक्रमस्य ॥१०॥

*It means :—*Dhanvantri, Kshapanaka, Amarsingh, Sanku, Vetala-bhatta, Ghatakarpar, Kalidasa, the illustrious Varahamihira, and Vararuchi were the 9 gems of the court of Vikrama. Again in the same work Jyotirvidabharana, verse 21, Kalidasa says :—

वैषः सिन्धुरदर्शनम्बर गुणैयाते कलौ संमिते ।
मासे माधव सङ्गकेच विहितो ग्रन्थक्रियोपक्रमः ॥
नानाकाल विधानशास्त्रगदितज्ञानं विलोक्याद्रादूर्जे ।
ग्रन्थ समाप्तिरत्र विहिता ज्योतिर्विदां प्रीतये ॥

*It means :—*In the year 3068 of the Kali Samvat, and in the month of Madhava (Baisakh), I began to write this book. Having consulted books on several systems of Astronomy I have for the pleasure of astronomers completed my this work in the month of Kartika.

Now 3068 Kaliyuga means 34 B. C. Jyotirvidabharana was perhaps one of the last books of Kalidasa ; and I have mentioned above, that Varahamihira died in 41 B.C. Both of them thus become contemporaries of Vikramaditya, the founder of the Era of 57 B.C. This is fully supported by Indian tradition : and all the points in this Indian tradition are reconciled, if we take 550 B.C. to be the beginning of the Saka Era.

Then again Bhattotapala in his commentary on Varahamihira's Brihajjataka gives in the following verse the date of the composition of his commentary. The verse runs thus :—

चैत्र मासस्य पञ्चम्यां सितायां गुरुवासरे ।
वस्वष्टाष्टमिते शाके कृतेयं विवृतिर्भया ॥

It means : On Thursday the 5th of the bright half of the month of Chaitra, and year 888 of Saka, was this commentary written by me.

By counting Saka Kala from 78 A.D., 888 means 966 A.D., but if we count the Era from 550 B.C., then the date of this commentary is 338 A.D. Which of these Eras is referred to would be settled, if an effort is made to find out whether the 5th of Chaitra bright half was a Thursday in the year 338 A.D., or in the year 966 A.D. A South Indian astronomer, Mr. B. V. Sundereshwara Sastri says, that Chaitra Sukla-Panchami and Thursday fell on the same day in 338 A.D. This was not the case in the year 966 A.D.

(*To be concluded.*)

CORNWALLIS IN BENGAL.

By

PROFESSOR J. F. BRUCE.

It is a strange paradox that the period in the history of England which produced the most elegant frame of social and domestic life—those spacious houses, decorated by the Adams, furnished by Chippendale, adorned by the serene art of Reynolds and Gainsborough—should have exhibited so much baseness to mar its public life. The paradox is usually explained in terms of certain social and political facts, such as the over-long tenure of power by the Whig oligarchy, corrupted by its own cynical philistinism; and, subsequently, by the tenacious attempt of a mediocre monarch to subvert that oligarchy by its own despicable methods of parliamentary management, and on its ruins to erect a structure of administrative despotism, which was to be maintained by his own vitiated puppets.

In this period after the Seven Years War, between Chatham and his son, between the Wesleys and Wilberforce, when behind the stage Englishmen were beginning to prepare that vast economic revolution, which has so utterly changed the face of the world, the public policy of England was shaped by the bigoted stupidity of George III and his "Friends," which lost her first empire, and by the squalour which sullied the heroic achievements of her agents in India. It was an age of tarnished failure in America and of tarnished glory in India. And the link between the two spheres was furnished by Lord Cornwallis, a man singularly unspotted by the vices of his time.

Judgment has often been delivered on British policy in India in the age of Clive and Warren Hastings—which is the age of Newcastle, Bute, Grafton, Wilkes and North in England—from 1758 to 1784, judgment varying only in intensity and literary merit. "Were we to be driven out of India this day," screamed Burke in 1783, "nothing would remain to tell that it had been possessed during the inglorious period of our dominion by anything better than the orang-outang and the tiger." In the debate on Palmerston's Bill in the House of Commons in 1858 that sober lawyer, Sir G. C. Lewis, declared: "I do most confidently maintain that no civilised government ever existed

on the face of the earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more rapacious, than the Government of the East India Company was from 1758 to 1784, when it was placed under Parliamentary control." We no longer subscribe to-day to hysterical denunciation of Clive and Warren Hastings, but we reflect sombrely upon their infection by the moral corruption of their age. We see its influence in India, unrelieved by greatness, in the administration of Sir John Macpherson, of which Sir John Shore wrote: "Never was any administration so thoroughly despicable as his:" while Cornwallis contemptuously dismissed it as "a system of the dirtiest jobbing."

Lord Cornwallis enjoyed many advantages of character and circumstance when, after having twice declined the honour, he became Governor-General in Bengal in 1786. He embodied the best ideals of public service in 18th century England. He was immune to its temptations, and redeemed mental mediocrity by simple patriotism, courage, industry and transparent honesty. He proved himself, moreover, a great administrator. He belongs, in short, to that long roll of admirable second class statesmen, from Hubert Walter to Campbell-Bannerman, to whom England owes so much of her political advantage. He lived, too, into a purer age, which had been purged by failure from disgrace. He enjoyed, as Hastings never had, the complete confidence of a great Prime Minister and of a competent President of the Board of Control. Further, his rule in Bengal was viewed by contemporaries against the melancholy background of the impeachment of Warren Hastings at Westminster, where with misconsecrated zeal Burke, Fox and Sheridan plied their industrious muckrakes over the midden-heap of India under George III and his placemen. Yet it must remain the verdict of history that Cornwallis merely developed under happier auspices what Hastings had begun: that, in that part of his policy which was his own, he embarked from the false premiss that reform in India meant making it like the England of his ideals; and that he made serious and abiding mistakes from the best motives in the world; but that he re-created the system and standards of the Bengal Civil Service, with all its subsequent implications, which became the most competent and conscientious bureaucracy recorded in history.

Dr. A. Aspinall¹ and the University of Manchester and its Press have earned our thanks for the publication of an admirable essay on the administrative and judicial reforms of Cornwallis in Bengal, to which Miss L. Penson apparently had access some three years ago, when preparing Chapter XXVI, Vol. V, of the Cambridge History of India. We are not so churlish as to complain because this essay is rather narrow in its scope, and does not achieve more than to fix and illustrate judgments already formed upon its subject; for it is deliberately selective, omitting any review of Cornwallis' hotly debated land-revenue policy, or his military reforms, or of his relations with the "country powers," which in sequel loomed so large in the history of British India. Within its set limits it is a model of patient research, which supports its concluding generalisations beyond reasonable doubt. And it reflects the spirit of our own age; for Dr. Aspinall has had actual experience of India, which is an advantage sometimes neglected nowadays by those who pronounce judgment upon it. A word is due to the publishers. In this land, where the printer is possessed of a devil, it is a pleasure to the pedantic reader to detect only a very rare and unimportant misprint.

We are prone to overlook certain plain facts in the situation which Pitt despatched Cornwallis in 1780 so radically to overhaul. The Company had no political importance in India before 1746 and no territory in Bengal before 1757. The Regulating Act of 1773, which was the foundation of all later legislation, was the first statute which officially recognised that the Company had any other function than trade. England had, in fact, stumbled into an empire in India during an awful period of its history, when the country, bereft of the last remnants of Mughal authority, and wholly abandoned to rapine, lay beyond the pale of European standards, themselves at that time impure enough. We are wise now after the event, but the destiny of England in India was but dimly seen even by Warren Hastings, who, after all, was primarily the local general manager of a trading firm, which had to do business in a land of brigands by the agency of daring men, who had wandered beyond the pale to seek their personal fortunes. It would

¹ "Cornwallis in Bengal," by A. Aspinall, M.A., Ph.D., Manchester University Press. Price, 15 Shillings.

have been an interesting experiment to have confronted Burke, Fox and Sheridan in India with Warren Hastings' antagonists and circumstances.

It is undeniable that while Hastings was Governor-General many Englishmen succumbed to the terrible temptations presented by the state of the country and by the jobbery of the ruling clique at home, when a writership in the Company—which had not yet become quite "Honourable"—was known to be as lucrative an investment as a seat in Parliament. In India "every schoolboy knows" the case of Grant, the Company's Resident at Benares, who eked out his salary of Rs. 1,000 a month by means of another £40,000 a year, acquired at the expense of the native inhabitants and the Company. Shore tells us that he himself could have made £30,000 a year and £100,000 by a single mission to Dacca to settle the revenues. (Aspinall, 151). We owe it to the integrity of Cornwallis that in a few months he reformed the commercial administration of the Company the provision of its annual investment—and that in a few years he purified the covenanted service and the collection of revenue, while guaranteeing to its servants adequate and honourable recompense. Within three years of his arrival he could write: "I abolished sinecure places, put a stop to jobbing agencies and contracts . . . and have been unwearied in hunting out fraud and abuse in every department. (Aspinall, 28). In this he was splendidly seconded by such men as Shore, Duncan, Charles Grant (not the Resident at Benares, of course), Barlow and Law in Bengal; but he had by sheer force of character—which his successor, Shore, for all his virtues, lacked—to impose a new discipline upon Englishmen morally enervated alike by their superiors in England and their dependants in Bengal; and he had at the same time firmly to resist the importunities of patrons even so highly placed as the Queen, the Prince of Wales, Lord Ailesbury and Dundas himself.

Warren Hastings created the Bengal Civil Service in 1772, but by 1793 Cornwallis had re-created it and fixed its tradition for the future. This was a great and enduring administrative achievement. But it must not be forgotten that in this, as in other aspects of his rule, he acted on the assumption that the native inhabitants were never to be trusted that everything possible was to be done for their good but

nothing, except the most menial services, was to be done by themselves. The Court of Directors held a longer view, and wrote in 1786: "When the talents of the more respectable natives can with propriety and safety be employed in the management of the country, we think it both just and politic to carry that principle into effect." Cornwallis never envisaged even the distant possibility of their self-government and, by establishing the district officers in semi-absolute authority, he began a tradition which, so long as it should endure, would present an insuperable obstacle to the real political education and progress of the people. "Although," he wrote in 1793, "we hope to render our subjects the happiest people in India, I should by no means propose to admit the natives to any participation in framing Regulations." Herein he revealed inferiority in judgment and sympathy to such men as Munro, Malcolm, Metcalfe and Elphinstone, who regarded themselves as trustees with the duty of gradually educating the Indian people during their political minority.

In reforming the administration of the Muhammadan criminal law in Bengal Cornwallis effected many humane improvements, but again on lines already sketched by Warren Hastings. Yet, while Hastings had been chary of tampering extensively with a venerable system, which in several respects was by no means inferior to the contemporary English system, Cornwallis would have preferred to substitute the English Penal Code. Fortunately he found this impracticable; for it would have been a calamity to have imposed on India the obsolete and often barbarous code and procedure, which prevailed in 18th century England, though in any case these would have been swept away by the great reforms enacted by Sir Charles Wood in 1859 and 1861. Warren Hastings had already asserted administrative and even legislative control over the Nizamat in Bengal, and Cornwallis further developed that policy. As early as 1789 he had determined to substitute English for Indian judges, as Hastings seemed to have contemplated doing. This change did not prove successful, and was afterwards severely criticised by such men as Munro, who was very scornful of the ignorance shown by these judges in regard to the customs and conditions of the people, and deplored the frequent miscarriage of justice which resulted. Cornwallis undoubtedly removed

many abuses and barbarities from the existing administration of criminal justice in Bengal, and greatly improved the condition of the gaols; he was less successful in his attempts to reform the police, partly because of the strict need of economy which was enjoined upon him by the Court of Directors, partly because of the intricate connexion between the police and the zamindari system of local petty justice. His experiments also, between 1787 and 1793, at the reform of civil justice by combining the functions of collector, magistrate and civil judge in the person of the district officer, and by establishing higher jurisdictions for revision and appeal, were largely defeated by the overloading of the duties of the Collector, which was their chief consequence.

In 1793 the work of Lord Cornwallis culminated in the promulgation of the Code which has made his name famous in the history of modern India. The magisterial functions of the Collector were taken away; he became once more merely a revenue officer and administrator. Civil courts were established in each of the districts, with appeal to four Provincial Courts, each consisting of three English judges, and further right of appeal in more important cases to the Sadr Diwani Adalat. Civil justice was to be made more easily and cheaply accessible to all. Hindu and Muhammadan pleaders were authorised to represent their clients in these courts. The Company's officials and other European residents were made amenable to the jurisdiction of these civil courts. The criminal law was unaltered by the Code of 1793, but the Rule of Law was definitely established in British India. Many detailed reforms were included, largely by the advice of that distinguished jurist and scholar, Sir William Jones, who unfortunately died in the next year, 1794, at the early age of 47. (Dr. Aspinall has shown, however, that the contribution of Sir William Jones to Cornwallis' judicial reforms has been exaggerated.) So was established "the Cornwallis system," which aimed at giving the people of Bengal, and of British India generally, peace, prosperity and justice under an efficient and upright British administration, which, in short, says Ross, "laid the foundation of the present Indian constitution."

The Cornwallis system was quite beneficent in intention and admirable in its effect upon the *morale* of the Company's service; and the contrast with the abuses of the preceding period—brought into such high light by the impeachment of Warren Hastings—lent to it an added authority, which prevailed for a generation. But it was open to certain grave objections, which were largely due to the character of its author and the personal authority with which he was invested in Bengal. Cornwallis' rectitude and devotion to public duty were above reproach, whilst he revealed somewhat unexpected capacity as an administrator. Yet he was stubborn and inflexible, firmly wedded to certain preconceptions in regard to the political condition both of England and of Bengal. Reform was needed in his day not only in Bengal, but also in England. Contemporary English institutions and practice were inapplicable, without considerable modification, to Bengal. Yet he aimed at reorganising Bengal as far as possible upon purely English lines by purely English agency, and sometimes by an ideal standard, to which Englishmen at home had not yet attained. He wished rigidly to exclude Indians from any really responsible share in the conduct of their own affairs, because he regarded them as untrustworthy, as if corruption were unknown in the England of his own day. His system provided no prospect of the practical inculcation in Indians of the principles of government and justice which he imposed upon them from above. He created a chasm between the English rulers and even the noblest and ablest of their Indian subjects, and who shall say that this was not short-sighted and deplorable? It was not before the Charter Act of 1834 that a new and better principle was ordained, "that no native of India, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty, should be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment, by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour." Many other aspects of the Cornwallis system have since been abrogated, and much of the glory has departed from it. For a liberal examination of this part of Lord Cornwallis' work, supported by an exact apparatus of illustration we are much indebted to Dr. Aspinall, and we hope that he, or another, will similarly review those aspects of Cornwallis' administration, which he has omitted.

BACK NUMBERS.

A limited number of back numbers of the Journal of Panjab Historical Society are available. Price to members, Rs. 3 each. To others, Rs. 5.

CONTENTS.

Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 1—106. (1911).

The Tomb of the Emperor Jahangir. *J. P. Thompson.*

Abulfazl. *Sh. Abdul Qadir.*

Historical Notes on the Lahore Fort. *J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vedic Social Life according to the Similes in the Agni Hymns of the Rig Veda. *H. D. Griswold.*

The Shrine of Baba Farid Shakarganj at Pakpattan. *Miles Irving.*

A new Pathan Sultan of Delhi. *R. Whitehead.*

The Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique in the Panjab, 1641.
E. D. MacLagan.

Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 107—187. ('912).

The Earliest English Visitors to the Punjab, 1585—1628.
E. D. MacLagan.

A Græco-Buddhist Sculpture in the Lahore Museum. *J. Ph. Vogel.*
Coronations of Muhammadan Sovereigns. *Khan Bahadur Pirzada
Muhammad Husain.*

The Travels of Fray Sebastian Manrique in the Punjab, 1641.
E. D. MacLagan.

Historical Rhymes and Proverbs of the Punjab. *J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 1—95. (1913).

The place of Coins in Indian History. *R. B. Whitehead.*

Dara Shikoh as an author. *Pt. Sheo Narain.*

A Statue of King Kanishka. *J. Ph. Vogel.*

A Historic Elephant-fight. *M. Nur Bakhsh.*

Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 97—184. (1914).

Baba Ratan, the Saint of Bhatinda. *J. Horovitz.*

The Indian Origin of the Gypsies in Europe. *A. C. Woolner.*

The Guleria Chiefs of Kangra. *Pt. Hiranand Shastri.*

Jahanara. *G. Yazdani.*

Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 1—70. (1914).

Archæological Discoveries at Taxila. *J. H. Marshall.*

India and Historical Research. *Ramsay Muir.*

The Road between Delhi and Multan. *A. M. Stow.*

The History of the Western Hills. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

The Ranas and Thakurs of the Western Hills. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vol. III, No. 2, pp. 71—158. (1915).

Taxila. *Lecture by Sir John Marshall.*

The Panjab Hill States. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

The Site of the Battle of Delhi, 1803. *Sir Edward Maclagan.*

Vol. IV, No. 1, pp. 1—75. (1916).

Four Letters by Austin of Bordeaux.

History in its relation to Sociology. *The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muhammad Shah Din.*

History of Kashtwar State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

The "Kohinoor" of 1851. *Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.*

Pahul (Sikh baptism). *Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.*

Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 77—149. (1916).

History of Basohli State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Malana and the Akbar-Jamru Legend. *G. M. Young.*

An Inscription of the Reign of Ghiyathu-d-din Balban. *R. B. Whitehead.*

History of Bhadrawah State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

The Post Office in the Mutiny.

Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 1—53. (1916).

Mughal Farmans, Parwanahs and Sanads issued in favour of the Jesuit Missionaries. (With twelve plates.) *The Rev. Father Felix, O. C.*

Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 55—125. (1916).

Jesuit Missions in Lahore. The Mughal Seals. *The Rev. Father Felix, O. C.*

Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 1—67. (1917).

Ballad on Nadir Shah's Invasion of India. *R. B. Pt. Hari Kishan Kaul.*

Vol. VI, No. 2, pp. 69—167. (1917).

Some Notes on Ancient Kulu Politics. *G. C. L. Howell.*

An Unpublished Diary of Sikh Times. *Shaikh Abdul Qadir.*

Influence of the Indian King upon the Growth of Caste. *The Hon'ble Mr. H. J. Maynard.*

History of Nurpur State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Note on the Routes from the Panjab to Turkestan and China recorded by William Finch (1611). *Sir Aurel Stein.*

General Ventura. *Pt. Sheo Narain, R. B.*

Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 1—89. (1918).

History of Mandi State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Three Mughal Parwanas. *M. Zafar Hasan.*

The Family of Lady Juliana Dias da Costa. *The Rev. H. Hosten, S. J.*

The Annual Relation of Father Fernao Guerreiro, S. J., for 1607-1608. *The Rev. H. Hosten, S. J.*

Land Revenue Administration under Maharajah Ranjit Singh. *Sita Ram Kohli.*

Vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 91—205. (1919).

History of Suket State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

The Struggles of the Hindu Sahi Rulers of Kabul and Panjab against the Central Asian Turks (870—1027). *Gulshan Rai.*

History of Kulu State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

A Journey to Toling and Tsaparang in Western Tibet. *G. M. Young.*

Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 1—102. (1920).

The Ballad of Ram Singh's two Rebellions.

The Ballad of Larn Barn of the Kulu Naggar Tract. *Recorded by C. H. Donald : edited by Rev. T. Grahame Bailey.*

History of Kangra State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Addenda to History of Nurpur State.

Daniel Moginie, a forgotten Swiss adventurer in Hindustan (1738—1749). *Translated from the German by the Revs. J. W. Dühr, S. J., and H. Hosten, S. J.*

The Cradle of Græco-Buddhist Art. *A. Foucher.*

Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 103—206. (1921).

History of Jammu State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

History of Bhadu State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

History of Spiti. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

History of Lahul. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Notes on the History of Chanehni State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Notes on the History of Bandhralta State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Some aspects of Slavery. *Dr. Lakshman Sarup.*

The historical aspect of some Himalayan Customs.

Military Secretariat Records.

Vol. IX, Pt. I, pp. 1—91. (1923).

The Dispersion of the Indo-European Family. *H. D. Griswold.*

Note on the passage of the Hydaspes by Alexander. *J. Hutchison.*

Note on the History of the Burning Glass. *Dr. Lakshman Sarup.*

Ahmad Shah Abdali and a Hindu Swami. *Parmanand Arora.*

Hasham Shah. *Bawa Budh Singh.*

An Autobiographical Memoir of Louis Bourquien. *J. P. Thompson.*

Facts and Fancies about the Iron Pillar of Old-Delhi. *J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vol. IX, Pt. II, pp. 93—178. (1925).

Material in Inscriptions for the History of Institutions. *Sir John Maynard.*

History of Punch State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

History of Rajauri State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

A Note on Five Rare Old Paintings of the Moghul School. *Kanwar Sain.*

Vol. X, Pt. I, pp. 1—91. (1929).

Embassy of Mr. Johan Josua Ketelaar, Ambassador of the Dutch East India Company to the Great Moguls—Shah Alam Bahadur Shah and Jahandar Shah. *Translated from the Dutch by Mrs. D. Kuenen-Wicksteed and annotated by J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 1—70. (1929).

Akbar's Popularity. *Parmanand Arora.*

Surgeon Gabriel Boughton. *Abdul Wali.*

History of Chamba State. *J. Hutchison and J. Ph. Vogel.*

Vol. XI, Pt. I, pp. 1—53. (1931).


Jaswan State, Guler State, Siba State, Datarpur State, Kutlehr State, Bangahal State. *J. Hutchison.*

The Unpublished Letters of Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala. *Jagat Singh.*

Serai Nur Mahal. *R. B. Pt. Sheo Narain.*

Padmavati—*A Romance of the Sixteenth Century.*

Review—"Warren Hastings and Philip Francis."—By Sophia Weitzman. *The Hon'ble Mr. Justice F. W. Skemp.*





Journal
OF THE
Panjab University Historical Society
(Incorporating the Panjab Historical Society.)

Vol. I.] DECEMBER 1932. [No. 2.

ORIGINS OF THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.

BY

P. N. KHERA.

There have been some wars in history which were inevitable, which simply *had* to be fought. But there have also been wars which were not at all necessary, and the First Afghan War is one of them. The following essay is an attempt to prove that this ghastly affair in which thousands of human beings marched to the Valley of Death was not inevitable, was by no means in the logic of history.

The circumstances that led towards this war began to develop in 1834, the year of Shah Shuja's expedition for the recovery of his lost throne.

The first circumstance of note was the capture of Peshawar by the Sikhs while Amir Dost Mohammad of Kabul was away at Kandhar concerting measures for repelling the attack of Shah Shuja. This gave rise to a dispute between the Sikhs and the Afghans which is of great historical significance inasmuch as it was the failure of the British Government in India to find a solution of this question acceptable to the Amir that led him to form an alliance with Russia, a fact which was the immediate cause of the First Afghan War.

Having gained some confidence by an easy victory over the Durrani Prince, Dost Mohammad declared war against the Sikhs. He

counted upon the support of the British Government in India and sent frantic appeals for help. The Government, however, was not in a mood to interfere, although Captain Wade, the British Government's Agent at Ludhiana was in favour of mediation.

However, Dost Mohammad counting upon the support of his expelled Peshawar brothers advanced towards that city. It seems that Maharaja Ranjit Singh at this stage offered to negotiate with him on the basis of conferring the Kohat district on the expelled rulers of Peshawar, provided the Amir conferred Jalalabad upon them. But the Amir flushed with his last victory banged the door on negotiations and advanced. But having failed to get help either from his Peshawar brothers or from the British Government, he had to make an ignominious retreat.

The Amir was of course disappointed at the neutrality of the British Government. He retired through Jalalabad to Kabul, where he shut himself up in the Bala Hissar for three days and admitted no one to his presence out of shame.

Having felt the shame of his retreat so much, especially when he had assumed the title of Ghazi and Amir, he was very anxious to turn out the infidel Sikh from Peshawar. It was a question of national, religious and most of all personal honour with him now.

His appeals for help to the British Government had brought him nothing in reply but sermons on the benefits of trade and commerce and the wonderful era of prosperity that would follow the opening of the Indus to navigation. Naturally therefore he sought friends in other quarters, especially Persia.¹ But it is very clear that he always preferred a British alliance to any other.² He even proposed to send an agent to represent his case to the British Government.³ He seemed impatient of delay and wanted to know the intentions of the

¹ Wade to Government, giving information from a letter received from Mr. Masson, 23rd February 1836.

² See some of his letters of 'no date' given as enclosures to the letter of Captain Wade to Government of 7th June, 1836. Also Burnes to Government, 31st October, 1837. Also Book 108, Letter 42.

³ Wade to Government, 7th June, 1836.

British Government.¹ But the British Government had no intention of either helping him or interfering in the Sikh-Afghan quarrels at this stage.² Later on of course the policy changed. But before we come to that stage, it is necessary to look into the condition of affairs in Afghanistan itself in order properly to understand the developments that led to that change of policy on the part of the British Government.

The condition of Afghanistan.—Prince Kamran of Herat was in the habit of threatening and sometimes actually attacking Kandhar which was held by certain of Dost Mohammad's brothers. Their Chief was Sirdar Kohar Dil Khan.

But Kamran himself was in constant danger of an attack from Persia. He was accused by the Shah of Persia of persecuting his Shiah subjects.³ So the Kandharis, who considered Kamran an enemy, considered the Persian Shah a friend.

At Kabul Amir Dost Mohammad was hard pressed by the Sikhs. His one aim in life seems to have been (at this period at least) the expulsion of the Sikhs from Peshawar. For this end he begged help from the English, which was refused. So he too, like his Kandhar brothers, turned towards Persia for help. Moreover, his mother came of a Persian family,⁴ and so it seems that Persia was very favourably situated under these conditions.

In 1835, Shahzada Kamran planned an attack on Kandhar. The Kandhar Chiefs applied to Dost Mohammad, their Kabul brother, for help. But he himself was in need of help against the Sikhs, and so he refused to come to their aid. The Kandhar Amirs therefore decided to write to the English Governor of Bombay offering to surrender their country to the British Government on any terms.⁵

¹ See Wade to Government, 19th July, 1836. Dost Mohammad sent for Mr. Maason and said, "I hear the Government at Calcutta consider me unworthy of their notice, or otherwise I cannot account for their neglect of me. I have done all in my power to come to an understanding with them, but have received not the slightest encouragement from them. *I have only one wish, that the business be brought to a close.*" (Italics mine).

² Government to Wade, 22nd August, 1836. Book 107, letter 10.

³ Burnes to Government, 10th November, 1837. 108/52.

⁴ Burnes to Government, 14th October, 1837. 108/42.

⁵ 142/14. Wade to Government, giving information received from Maason; 9th March, 1836.

But meanwhile Kamran postponed his attack and the Amirs never pressed their proposition. Dost Mohammad, however, continued to write to the British for help and at the same time kept making overtures to Persia.¹

Captain Wade, however, was a man of some imagination. He learnt of the Persian designs on Herat. If Herat fell, then might not Persia extend her influence to Kandhar and Kabul? *That* would be a real danger. But the danger could be warded off, and Captain Wade had an ingenious suggestion to make. It was that "the British Government has it in its power at any time by the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul in concert with Ranjit Singh, and the establishment which would ensue of a confederation of the States on the Indus, to counteract any designs inimical to its interests from the westward."²—This was in June, 1836.

Captain Wade thus anticipated the policy which was to be a fact two years later. No serious consideration was paid to this suggestion then, *i.e.*, in 1836, but it seems to me that this suggestion left a germ in the mind of the Governor-General which lay dormant for two years, when under favourable circumstances it became active again, and had important results. And while blaming Lord Auckland for his Afghan policy, which caused one of the most futile wars of history, *i.e.*, the First Afghan War, we must give a proper share of the blame to his subordinates, whose despatches and suggestions were constantly influencing his mind.

In September, 1836, Captain Burnes was ordered to proceed on a commercial mission to the countries bordering on the Indus, "with a view to complete the re-opening of the navigation of that river."³ From Hyderabad to Attock he was to "obtain without exciting jealousy or alarm the most minute information of the state of the country and the *character and strength* of the tribes along its banks."⁴ (*Italics mine*).

¹ 142/36. Wade to Government, 7th June, 1836.

² *Ibid.*

³ See a copy of letter of instructions to Burnes in the letter of Government to Captain Wade, 5th September, 1836.

⁴ *Ibid.*

By the year 1836, the fear in the minds of British diplomats, of Russian intrigues in the East, begins to manifest itself. The smallest and sometimes even unimportant news about Russia and Russians are reported to the British Government in India, and they are listened to with attention. Mr. Masson, the British news-writer at Kabul, reports whatever he hears of the Russians there. Captain Wade too is not slack in this matter. Mr. Masson wrote that a Russian envoy had arrived at Bokhara.¹ At the same time a mysterious man passed through the Punjab. His name was Disco, and he was supposed to be a Russian spy.² He came from Bombay with one S. Furni, but mysteriously disappeared at Multan, and then again met him at Lahore, where he stayed for some days and then left for Kabul. At Lahore he certainly entered into some correspondence of a suspicious nature with M. Ventura. Mr. Mackeson saw a letter from him written to Ventura inviting him to join the service of the Russian Government, which he could secure for him owing to his influence with the Russian Court, and that he (Ventura) would best serve his interests by entering the service of the Russians *who would soon be in India*. Ventura not believing in his *bona fides*, refused.³ When Captain Wade heard of the arrival of a Russian envoy at Bokhara, he thought that it was the same Disco.⁴ But Masson was not certain whether he was an envoy or a mere traveller. The Governor-General was naturally anxious to know more about him, and especially to learn whether he was an envoy or a traveller.⁵ But although these reports were sent and listened to carefully, no idea of interfering in Kabul affairs to guard against any danger from westward, was entertained at this period.

Ranjit Singh was to be clearly told that although his ambitions towards Sindh had been checked, the British Government had no wish to interfere in his quarrel with the Afghan nation. Peace in Afghanistan is of course desirable (and this non-interference might destroy peace) and the danger of Persian intervention is as threatening to the

¹ Wade to Government, 23th June, 1836. 142/39.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ 142/48. Wade to Government, 19th July, 1836.

⁵ 107/10. Government to Wade, 22nd August, 1836.

British Government as to the Maharaja, but it is not the policy of the British Government to interfere with quarrels so distant from its frontiers.¹

But at the same time full information about the developments taking place in the countries beyond the Indus was to be had. Meanwhile the Battle of Jamrud had been fought on 30th April, 1837, between Sikhs and Afghans, in which the Maharaja's famous general Hari Singh had been killed fighting bravely. The Maharaja therefore was concentrating his forces at Peshawar to retrieve his honour.

So far, as we have seen, the policy of the British Government had been that of complete neutrality and non-interference in Afghan affairs. But Persia was supposed to be meditating an attack on Herat, and it was feared that Ranjit Singh, provoked by the imprudent demonstrations of Dost Mohammad, might institute offensive operations, and although the Sikhs' position in Afghanistan was of no profit to them, yet Ranjit Singh "may not be without the hope of bringing the Kabul and ultimately perhaps the Kandhar Chiefship under supremacy."²

These circumstances and the thought that there would be disturbance of peace in Afghanistan, were making gradually for a change in the policy of the British Government. In his letter of 15th May, 1837,³ the Secretary to the Government of India writes to Captain Wade, that "in any case it must be the desire of His Lordship in Council to learn fully the state of affairs in these countries (to which indeed attention has been earnestly prescribed by the authorities in England,) and to omit no means of obtaining information upon the projects of aggression from the westward which *however distant and doubtful* they may be in execution are yet talked of with confidence at Tehran, and it must be in the policy and interest of the Lahore as well as of the British Government to resist them."

For this purpose, *i.e.*, resisting the aggressive projects of Persia, a friendship between the Sikhs and Afghans is the best means. But that friendship cannot be forced upon them "against the family and the

¹ 119.10. Government to Captain Wade, 2nd March, 1837.

² Government to Wade, 19th May, 1837. 119/18.

³ See Macnaghten to Wade, 15th May, 1837.

national and the religious animosities by which they are distracted."¹ The best course therefore would be to limit the present endeavours to the collection of information and to "———the promotion of an unforced reconciliation with an avowal of a friendly disposition towards all parties———."² This letter marks a definite change in the policy of the British Government. Before this time, they did not want to interfere at all. Now they were at least ready to promote an "unforced reconciliation." From this day onwards also we see in all the letters of the British Government a strong desire towards a closer friendship with Ranjit Singh. The reason was that the Governor-General had a very exaggerated idea of the Persian danger to India. But the Home Authorities must have their share of blame in making him nervous. His mind was informed either by the information from Home or from his subordinates in India and Afghanistan, and therefore what is condemned as his policy was not only his. I do not say this as a justification of his later policy but only as an explanation of it. His letter to Burnes³ is written in the same tenor as that to Wade quoted above. Burnes was told not to discuss any political propositions made to him by any power but to refer them to Captain Wade. But he too, in addition to his commercial duties, was to learn "what has been the degree of recent connection (of Afghanistan) with Persia and by what agents it has been conducted and what would be the probable result of a Persian attack upon Herat." ".....and you will gather all the information in your power on the commerce of Russia, and on the measures adopted by that power with the object of extending her influence in Central Asia."

Captain Burnes' Mission.—Such was the condition of affairs when Captain Burnes sailed up the Indus and reached Peshawar on the 13th of August, 1837.⁴ It seems that Dost Mohammad was determined to make the most of the presence of an agent of the British Government. At Hasan Abdal Burnes was informed through a letter from Mirza Sammi Khan—the Secretary of the Amir—that an embassy from Persia was coming to Kabul and had arrived at Kandhar.

¹ See Marnaghten to Wade, 15th May, 1837.

² *Ibid.*

³ Of the same date. *Ibid.*

⁴ Book 108, letter 31, 22nd August, 1837.

Another embassy had arrived at Kabul from the King of Bokhara, and there was a Sirdar coming from Kandhar too. With so many agents present at Kabul, it would be difficult for him, thought Burnes, to satisfy Dost Mohammad.¹ But he proposed to dwell upon the advantages that would accrue to the Amir from being the first of his family who has had personal communication with an agent of the British Government.² At Peshawar he was called by Kharak Singh to a private conference, where the Kanwar and his Sardars said that they had received a letter from Ranjit Singh to ask him (Burnes) what his precise object in going to Kabul was. Captain Burnes told them that his object was purely commercial, and assured them of the friendship of the British Government towards the Sikhs, and that nothing in Kabul would diminish that friendship.³

Interesting developments had meanwhile taken place in Afghanistan. The Kandharis had opened diplomatic intercourse with Persia and the Russian agent at Tehran. Dost Mohammad had invited one of the Kandhar Chiefs to be present at any Conference that might be held with Captain Burnes at Kabul. They had resolved to send one, but when the *Elchi* from Persia (Kambar Ali Khan) arrived at Kandhar, they dropped the idea.⁴ They stipulated with Persia to attack Herat in concert with the Persian army if they are supplied with necessary money for expenses, and to send a son of Sirdar Kohan Dil Khan to Tehran and keep aloof from all friendship with the English.⁵

Kambar Ali Khan was still at Kandhar and seemed likely to continue there according to Burnes' report.

The strangest news conveyed by Burnes was that a representative of the Lahore Court was also present at Kandhar, the son of Sultan Mohammad Khan of Peshawar having been deputed with presents

¹ Book 108, letter 128, 1st August, 1837.

² *Ibid.*

³ Book 108, letter 32. 31st August, 1837, from Jamrud. At Peshawar Captain Burnes saw the Sikh Army and found it very efficient. He also writes that the Maharaja's people are actively engaged in erecting a fort at Jamrud, the place of the last conflict between the Sikhs and Afghans.

⁴ Burnes from Jalalabad, 9th September, 1837. Burnes in this letter gives a detailed account of the recent intercourse of Kandhar and Persia.

⁵ See letter of Kandhar Chiefs to the Shah of Persia as enclosure to the last letter.

in company with an agent from Ranjit Singh. The arrival of these gifts had given some offence to the Kandhar Chiefs. They had sent some gifts to Sultan Mohammad, with whom they were on friendly terms, and he had passed them on to Ranjit Singh as the tribute of Kandhar.¹ Ranjit Singh in his usual clever way, found an opportunity of trying to detach the Kandhar Chiefs from Dost Mohammad. He sent presents in return and a letter, portion of which contained a statement of his intention to restore Peshawar to Sultan Mohammad Khan, in co-operation with whom he was about to crush the Chief of Kabul, to aid in which he requested the assistance of Kandhar. Though sincerely attached to their brother of Peshawar, the Kandhar Chiefs were much concerned at this.²

Captain Burnes before reaching Kabul received the Governor-General's letter expressing a wish to bring the Afghan-Sikh disputes to a happy termination without involving the British Government. Captain Burnes' own suggestion was as follows :—³

1. That Peshawar be restored to Sultan Mohammad Khan. Burnes thought that Dost Mohammad would agree to it as it would be a "voluntary sacrifice of what is by conquest the right and possession of the Lahore Chief." Moreover, Dost Mohammad had by now found out that his late success at Jamrud had brought with it no substantial gain.

2. That the Maharaja should garrison the fort of Peshawar (Bala Hissar) and receive the tribute through his detachment.

This settlement, Captain Burnes thought, would satisfy all parties; Ranjit Singh, because, it would save his honour, Sultan Mohammad because he would get the whole district, the Kandhar Chiefs because they are attached to Sultan Mohammad and Dost Mohammad because he would be saved from the constant threats of the opponents to his religion and power.

On the 20th of September, 1837, Burnes reached Kabul and was conducted into the city with great demonstration by Mohammad

¹ Book 108, letter 34, from Burnes, 9th September, 1837.

² *Ibid.*

³ See Book 108, letter 36. From Burnes—Camp near Sufed Koh—10th September, 1837.

Akbar Khan.¹ After a few formal talks, he had at last a very long interview in private with the Amir.² In this interview Burnes fully explained the advantages to be derived by all those who associated in the navigation of the Indus and promoted commerce. The Amir appreciated the motives of the British Government and promised whole-hearted co-operation, but he complained that his wars with the Sikhs crippled his resources, and that he had to take money from his merchants and to increase the duties, which hurt the trade. The Amir was bitter against Shah Shuja, who had disgraced the name of Durrani and Peshawar by entering into an alliance with Ranjit Singh. His own existence was in danger, as the Sikhs planted a fort near the Khyber Pass, but he defeated them and Hari Singh, the ' inveterate hater of the name of Mohammadan ' was slain. Burnes agreed that war crippled his resources, but at the same time urged him to reflect on the uselessness of seeking to contend with so powerful a Prince as Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Dost Mohammad admitted this, although he thought that Ranjit Singh's strength lay in the family differences of the Afghan Chiefs. It would, therefore, be a source of gratification to him if the British Government would counsel him how to act, as none of the other neighbours could avail him. He would in return pledge himself to forward the commercial and political views of the English. Captain Burnes declared that, although his mission was purely commercial, anything that tended to promote peace would be gratifying to him ; but he wanted to know definitely what the Amir's sentiments were.

At this the Amir said that, it was known in the whole of Khorasan that the English had saved Shikarpur from the aggression of the Sikhs. Could not some similar motives induce them to interfere in the affairs of Peshawar ? Burnes assured him that their motives were purely commercial and their friendship with Ranjit Singh firm. The difference in policy towards Shikarpur and Peshawar, he explained, was due to the fact that, Shikarpur was a *possession* of the Amirs while

¹ Book 108, letter 37. By an irony of fate this Mohammad Akbar Khan is the same man who played the principal part in the tragedy of the retreat to Jalalabad four years later.

² Captain Burnes gives an account of the interview in his letter to Government of 5th October, 1837. Book 108, letter 39.

Peshawar was an undoubted conquest of the Sikhs made by the sword and preserved by it. To interfere with that would be a violation of justice and the integrity of Ranjit Singh's dominions.

Dost Mohammad talked of the promise of assistance and pecuniary help from Persia. Jabbar Khan also said that they had written to Persia for help because the British Government had not shown any interest in their affairs. Dost Mohammad even showed willingness to send a son to the Maharaja to ask forgiveness and to agree to hold Peshawar as tributary to Lahore, and send horses, etc., as tribute for that part. But the Persian party (Kazilbashes) in Kabul tried whatever they could to promote Dost Mohammad's alliance with Persia. Therefore the arrival of the British agent was looked at with suspicion if not open dissatisfaction by them.¹ The Persian *Elchi* had arrived at Kandhar, but Dost Mohammad did not encourage him to come to Kabul.

The Kazilbashes must have realised that this was due to the arrival of Alexander Burnes. It rather damped their spirits. Captain Burnes even thought that it was doubtful if the Persian *Elchi* will advance to Kabul, and it is certain if he does so that "any offers which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those of the British Government."² Persia, thought Burnes, was urged by Russia to capture Herat,³ and Dost Mohammad agreed that it was so.⁴

The Persian *Elchi* at last started from Kandhar towards Kabul, but he was recalled by the Kandhar Chiefs at the instigation of one Haji Khan Kakar who had quarrelled with Dost Mohammad and who advised them to form an alliance with Persia independent of Kabul. The *Elchi* returned to Kandhar and from there to Persia with presents for the Shah and accompanied by a son of

¹ A very detailed account of the influence of the Kazilbashes (or the Persian party) in Afghanistan is given by Burnes in his letter of 14th October, 1837, to Government. See Book No. 108, letter 42.

² Burnes to Government, 14th October, 1837, Book 108, letter 42.

³ Burnes to Government, Book 108, letter 45, 20th October, 1837.

⁴ Burnes to Government, Book 108, letter 48, 31st October, 1837. The Amir said that "designs of Persia were sinister and that Russia through her was preparing to try her fortune in these countries as the British had tried it in India."

Kohan Dil Khan, the head of the Kandhar Sirdars.¹ Dost Mohammad made it clear to Captain Burnes that all this was done without his consent.² He himself had resisted all persuasions to send a letter of invitation to the Persian *Elehi* when he had reported his arrival at Kandhar, and this he said "was the best way in which he could mark his desire to ally himself to the British Government."³ Dost Mohammad, it appears certain, preferred an English alliance to any other, and tried his best to convince the British Government of his sincerity.

Meanwhile, the news of the arrival of the Persian *Elehi* at Kandhar had reached the Governor-General and he decided upon modifying the character of Captain Burnes' mission.⁴ He was permitted to enter into communication with Dost Mohammad on his present position and the circumstances by which he was surrounded. The Maharaja was told by the Governor-General that Burnes had been instructed to apprise the Amir that if he received foreign emissaries, the good will of the British Government towards him would be impaired, and its good offices upon every occasion withdrawn.⁵

The Governor-General thought that the division of power in Afghanistan was very useful to the British Government at this time.⁶ There was no single power strong enough to be dangerous if it went over to the enemy. The idea of the balance of power on a small scale was thus working in his mind.⁷

To maintain that balance it was necessary to follow the policy of supporting the *status quo*. The danger spots which could disturb the *status quo* were two, Herat and Kandhar. These two places must be saved from Persian and indirectly Russian designs. Therefore Mr. McNeil, the English representative at Tehran, was to be requested that in any mediation that he might undertake, the desirability of maintaining the integrity of Herat and Kandhar was not

¹ Wade to Government, 31st October, 1837, Book 108, letter 48.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Government to Wade enclosing copies of letters to Burnes and Ranjit Singh, 11th September, 1837, Book 110, letter 55.

⁵ Enclosure to the above, Governor-General to Ranjit Singh, Book 110, letter 55.

⁶ Government to Wade, 13th November 1837, Book 110, letter 69.

⁷ Government to Wade, 25th November, 1837, Book 110, letter 72.

to be overlooked.¹ His Lordship also realised the great importance of cultivating a closer connection between the British Government and the rulers of Kandhar.² Mr. McNeil was of the same opinion and Captain Wade agreed with him that, "it ought to be the primary object of the British Government to maintain at all hazards the integrity of Herat as the only safe and sure means of opposing the efforts of Persia to annihilate the independence of Afghanistan."³

When, therefore, Captain Burnes learnt that the Kandharis had entered, after useless appeals to the British for help, into a treaty with the Persian Shah, who had promised to win Herat for them, he at once thought of taking some definite step to detach the Khandar Chiefs from Persia.⁴ In fact he had been urged to use his own discretion in detaching them. He, therefore, at once wrote a letter to Kohan Dil Khan telling him that if Herat fell to Persia, and Kandhar was threatened by the Shah, and the Kandharis remained on friendly terms with the English, then Amir Dost Mohammad accompanied by Captain Burnes would come to their help and that in that event the expenses of keeping off the Persians would be furnished to them.⁵ A few days later he also sent Lieut. Leech to Kandhar. He was to be the agent of the British at Kandhar and this was openly to be declared, so that Persia should hesitate before attacking Kandhar.⁶ Burnes' action therefore was perfectly judicious and in accordance with his instructions.

The British Government *had* to make some definite and positive offer of help to some party. The mere expression of their wish that the Persians should be opposed was certainly not going to have any effect on the Kandhar Chiefs. The action Captain Burnes took was the only means of frustrating Persian designs on Herat and of proving the sincerity of the Government of India to the Afghans. Moreover, Captain Burnes believed that "this promise will be a dead letter,

¹ Government to Wade, 13th November, 1837, Book 119, letter 69.

² *Ibid.*

³ Wade to Government, 28th October, 1837, Blue Book No. 5, 26th March, 1839, p. 14.

⁴ See Book 108, letter 54, Burnes to Government, 19th November, 1837, and Book 108, letter 65, Burnes to Government, 22nd December, 1837.

⁵ Burnes to Government, 22nd December, 1837, Book 108, letter 65.

⁶ Burnes to Government, 26th December, 1837, Book 108, letter 67.

since Herat will detain the Persians, if not for good, certainly for a considerable time." But Lord Auckland, who had a genius for doing the wrong thing, could not see the wisdom of this step. Captain Burnes was therefore told that his action was disapproved and that he had never been authorised to make any such offer.¹ It is strange that, after indulging in such high-sounding phrases about the desirability of saving Herat, the Government should have shirked a small obligation by way of achieving its object.

Thus the Governor-General lost a very valuable opportunity of proving the sincerity of the British Government to the Afghans. But it must be remembered that Burnes made this offer of help to Kandhar immediately in consequence of the arrival of a Russian agent at Kabul on the 19th of December, 1837. How far the arrival of this man influenced Burnes it is difficult exactly to estimate. But it seems highly probable that he must have been influenced by the hints contained in the letter from Mulla Rashid, the counsellor of Kohan Dil, Khan of Kandhar, to Amir Dost Mohammad, received in Kabul on the same day as the Russian *Elchi*.²

The Mulla's letter says :

"———Captain Burnes will undoubtedly comprehend the real motives of this *Elchi*," and, "you have now both the English and Russian ambassadors at your Court. Please to settle matters with any of them who you think may do some good office hereafter," and in a postscript that, the appearance of this *Elchi* will induce Captain Burnes "to be sharp and to put off delay in promoting objects."

So far the British Agent had not done anything to support Dost Mohammad. The Amir was bent upon rescuing Peshawar from the hands of the Sikhs. The Maharaja, as we have already seen, was willing to restore it to Sultan Mohammad Khan under certain conditions. Dost Mohammad too was willing to hold it as tributary to

¹ Book 121, letters Nos. 1 and 7, of 20th and 31st January, 1838 "Positive engagements to assist opposition to actual invasion from the westward by arms or subsidies have not been contemplated by His Lordship." Captain Burnes had only been authorised to proceed to Kandhar if he thought it essential for his efforts to check the influence of Persia on the Kandhar Chiefs, Book 119, letter 84.

² Book 108, letter 64, Burnes to Macnaghten, 20th December, with enclosures.

Lahore and send tribute *for that part*. It seems to me that a compromise could have been effected. Captain Burnes also held out some hopes to the Amir.¹ What was the obstacle in the way? It was the policy of Lord Auckland. In the beginning, however, his attitude was not so uncompromising. In the month of July 1837 his Secretary had written to Captain Wade that for Burnes in Kabul the most thorny question would be that of Peshawar, yet there might be a compromise, "not for the abandonment of this conquest to the Afghans but for a more acceptable mode of its management and upon an enhanced tribute or by some other means———".² Captain Wade was therefore asked to get from the Maharaja his terms, and Burnes to get the terms of the Amir, and then effect a compromise. But care was to be taken not to commit the Government by pledging its guarantee to any agreement that might be entered into by the Amir and Ranjit Singh.³

Meanwhile the news had come that the Persian *Elchi* intended for Kabul had advanced as far as Kandhar. From that day onwards Dost Mohammad was viewed with suspicion by the British Government, and in November the Government wrote to Captain Wade to refrain from any negotiations with Ranjit Singh regarding Peshawar until assured that Dost Mohammad Khan had relinquished all connections with Persia.⁴

Captain Wade was told that if Dost Mohammad received the Persian *Elchi* at Kabul, then Captain Burnes would refrain from any attempt at mediation between the Sikhs and Afghans.⁵ To Burnes instructions in the same tenor were given.⁶ The Persian *Elchi* of course as mentioned already, did not come to Kabul and returned from Kandhar.

Even then nothing was done in the matter of Peshawar. On the other hand the Government of India had been drawing closer and

¹ Dost Mohammad to Kandhar Chiefs, 25th October, 1837. "We have some hopes regarding Peshawar."

² Government to Wade, 31st July, 1837.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Government to Wade, 25th November, Book 119, letter 72.

⁵ Government to Wade, 13th November, 1837, Book 119, letter 69.

⁶ Government to Wade enclosing a packet for Burnes, 2nd August, 1837, Book 119, letter 81.

closer to Ranjit Singh, and the proposal emanating from the Maharaja for an interview with Lord Auckland was encouraged.¹ Captain Wade was instructed not to do or say anything that might offend the Sikh ruler.² Seeing the British Government in such placating mood Ranjit Singh, it seems, realised his importance and stiffened his attitude, and the Peshawar question naturally became more difficult of solution. Captain Wade indeed discerned this change in the tone and attitude of the Maharaja and reported it to his Government. But His Lordship had so far been "unable to discover any symptoms of such change."³

Dost Mohammad too must by this time have begun to feel disappointment at nothing being done by the British Government towards the realisation of his fond hopes. In October he had gone even so far as to say that "whether the British Government interested itself or not, he was resolved to do everything which he could to show his respect for its wishes and conciliate it, and if he could not succeed he was equally determined to have nothing farther to do with Persia."⁴

But the Governor-General's policy by the month of December was definitely that of maintaining the *status quo*. Burnes was informed that the British Government's good offices for the security of Dost Mohammad's *remaining territory* were available and "should thankfully be accepted by him." If the Amir should try to use this tender of good offices for his ambitious views, then those whom such ambitions concerned should be reassured. In such a case Burnes could send a member of the Mission "designed to mark our recognition of their independence to the Court of Kandhar and Herat."⁵

This was the situation when suddenly on the 19th December 1837, a Russian agent, called Vickovitch arrived at Kabul.⁶ Dost Mohammad took advantage of his presence to frighten the British Government, who were already in a mood to be frightened by the Russian bogey.

¹ Government to Wade, 25th November, 1837, Book 119, letter 76.

² Government to Wade, 13th November, 1837.

³ Government to Wade, 25th November, 1837, Book 119, letter 71.

⁴ Interview of Dost Mohammad with Burnes, on 24th October, 1837.

⁵ Government to Wade enclosing a copy of a letter for Burnes, Book 119, letter 91. This letter written on 27th December must have crossed the letter of Burnes of 26th December, informing that he had sent Lieut. Leech to Kandhar.

⁶ For the previous intercourse and letters of Russian ambassador at Tehran to Dost Mohammad, see Book 108, letter 53 and 60.

Vickovitch was considered a 'veritable agent of Russia.'¹ Burnes wrote that he was one of those who believe that "Russia entertains the designs of extending her influence to the Eastward and between her dominions and India."² Even if Russia had no designs against the British in India, she wanted relations with the countries on the British Government's borders and therefore 'evils must flow from such connections.' "It is indeed casting before us a challenge," and "it is a true maxim that prevention is better than cure, and we now both have in our hands."³ Such language was bound to have effect on the Government's mind, and Captain Burnes was asked to tell the Amir to dismiss the Russian with courtesy and a letter of thanks to the Emperor of Russia for his proffered kindness to Kabul traders. But if he (the Amir) enters into any political intercourse with him, then Captain Burnes was to give the Amir distinctly to understand that "the act will be considered a direct breach of friendship with the British Government."⁴

(Captain Vickovich's real name was believed to be Omar Beg, a Sunni Mohammadan subject of Russia.⁵)

Captain Wade's Suggestion.—Captain Wade again advocated the cause of Shah Shuja, and made the same suggestion which he had made sometime back. The reply to his suggestion for the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul, was that the scheme could not be discussed, as the Government's policy was to maintain the present position of the Chiefs in Afghanistan and that no scheme for supporting the pretensions of Shah Shuja was in His Lordship's contemplation.⁶ It is clear therefore that the Governor-General had no idea of restoring Shah Shuja to the Kabul throne in the January of 1838.

Ranjit Singh was to be again assured that nothing would be done in the matter of Afghan affairs without his concurrence.⁷ Captain

¹ Book 108, letter 66.

² Book 108, letter 68, abstract in Blue Book No. 6, 1839, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Macnaghten to Burnes, 20th January, 1838.

⁵ Macnaghten to Burnes, enclosing a confidential letter from the English ambassador at Tehran. Book 121, letter 2, for a full description of the person of Omar Beg. see Book 121, p. 8.

⁶ Government to Wade, 20th January, 1838.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Wade was asked by his Government to furnish to the Maharaja, "without reserve and with perfect frankness all the information in his power relative to the proceedings of the Russian Envoy and the advance of the Persian Army."¹

It was also heard that the Russian Agent proposed to come to Ranjit Singh's Court. The Governor-General made it clear that he would strongly discourage his reception by the Maharaja. It was admitted by the Governor-General that his open reception by the ruler of the Punjab, though conveying with it no substantive importence would be open to the remark that the Maharaja is friendly to those who are the supposed enemies of British power.² The Maharaja on learning the wish of the British Government ordered Mon. Avitabile at Peshawar to prevent the Russian Envoy from entering the Maharaja's territory.³

Dost Mohammad it seems made a last effort at the solution of the Peshawar question, and was even ready to agree to a settlement giving Peshawar to Sultan Mohammad. But the Governor-General thought "that the relinquishment of Peshawar upon any terms must depend upon the pleasure of Maharaja Ranjit Singh whose right to that possession appears.....to be admitted even by the Amir and cannot be questioned."

And, thought the Governor-General, His Highness the Maharaja had never manifested any design of transferring the management of Peshawar to any of the Afghan brothers, and under these circumstances, His Lordship "will not of course bring forward for discussion any proposition for establishing the authority of Sultan Mohammad Khan throughout the territory."⁴ His Lordship wanted to know whether Dost Mohammad was prepared or not to rest satisfied in his present possessions with a guarantee for their integrity by the British Government, "the Sikhs remaining as at present in the immediate occupation and management of the Peshawar territory."⁵

¹ Government to Wade, 31st January 1838.

² Macnaghten to Wade, 3rd March 1838.

³ Book 121, letter 58.

⁴ Government to Wade, 7th March 1838.

⁵ This letter is very important as showing the attitude of the Governor-General at this time. Now he was not ready even to discuss the question of transferring the Peshawar territory to Sultan Mohammad.

⁶ *Ibid.*

It was regretted that positive instructions had not been sent to Captain Burnes to dispel from Dost Mohammad's mind any extravagant hopes of British interference.¹ Dost Mohammad was not to be helped although he was weak and pressed upon by powers stronger than himself. Frankness and openness of communication with Lahore was again urged upon Captain Wade.²

The Government's letter to Captain Burnes on the same day (*i.e.*, 28th March 1838) is very interesting as showing how the Governor-General shifted his previous position. Previously it had been said in so many words that the British Government were ready to enter into a stipulation with Dost Mohammad for the security of his *remaining territories*. Now it was said, "That we should engage to protect him against the powers to the Westward, would be as you are aware an infringement of our Treaty with Persia independently of other considerations."³

Captain Burnes was, in the same letter, required not to remain in Kabul "one day longer than may be consistent with the preservation of our national honour....." Also if Dost Mohammad prefers a Persian and a Russian alliance to that of the British Government, he will be committing a gross error in judgment, "the consequence of which he must be content to endure."⁴

A month later, *i.e.*, on 27th April 1838, the Governor-General made up his mind. On that day letters were written to Burnes, Dost Mohammad and the Honourable the Secret Committee.⁵ All these letters show Lord Auckland's exaggerated fear of Russia. He thought that although Russian help to Persia would have the immediate effect of furthering the Persian cause, yet ultimately Russia would extend her influence and intrigues to "the very frontiers of our Indian Empire."⁶ He thought that "Russia can have

¹ Government to Wade, 28th March 1838.

² *Ibid.*

³ Treaty with Persia of 1814.

⁴ Secretary to Wade with enclosures, containing copy of a letter to Burnes, 28th March 1838.

⁵ Government to Wade, 27th April 1838.

⁶ Letter to Secret Committee. *Ibid.*

no legitimate ground for extending her political connection to Afghanistan, while we are necessarily interested in the peace and independence of that country by proximity and position."

About the Persian Treaty of 1814 he wrote that Persia had departed from the Treaty by connecting herself with Russia in such matters as will be injurious to the British in India, which was opposed to the purpose of the treaty.

Dost Mohammad had suggested that the Kabul Government and the British Government should combine openly to resist the advance of the Persians. This hurt the pride of Lord Auckland. Burnes was informed that, though that topic (combined resistance to Persia) might be a subject of anxiety to the Amir, it was "in no degree alluded to or contemplated in the propositions tendered for his acceptance by your Government." This means if anything, that Dost Mohammad had no right to make any suggestion to the British Government to which the Government itself did not allude first. Moreover the Amir was to be told that the British Government "yet stands in need of no aid for its defence." The Government's good offices with respect to the Sikh-Afghan dispute were also to be withdrawn. Captain Burnes was sent a letter of 'recall' to be delivered to Dost Mohammad at the proper moment with an explanation of the reasons of that step. Dost Mohammad was also to be warned that if he, in alliance with Persia or Russia did anything hostile to the Maharaja or the British Government "he will incur a new danger, probably far more serious than is to be apprehended by him under any circumstances from Persian enmity or estrangement."

Thus Lord Auckland decided finally to break with Dost Mohammad. He also hinted pretty plainly at the serious danger that Dost Mohammad would incur from an alliance with Persia or Russia. But Dost Mohammad had realised by now that the friendship of the British Government would neither help him get Peshawar, nor save him from aggressions from the westward, nor would his propositions of a combined resistance to Persia be accepted, or even discussed. So why should he care for their friendship which would neither be useful itself, nor let others be useful to him. He therefore drifted into the arms of Russia.

It was decided by Lord Auckland to reinstate Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul. The restrictions imposed upon the Shah's correspondence with his friends in Afghanistan were removed.¹ Mr. Macnaghten the Secretary to the Government of India was placed at the head of a mission to be sent to Lahore to explain the circumstances leading to Captain Burnes' recall and to negotiate a treaty for the reinstatement of Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul.²

So this Russian fear from which the Governor-General suffered led to the decision to replace Shah Shuja on the throne from which he had been separated for about thirty years, and ultimately to the First Afghan War, one of the most futile wars of history. Lord Auckland's policy leading towards that war has been described in this article mostly in his own words. It speaks for itself, and there is no need to condemn the already much condemned policy. All one need say is that if statesmanship means the achieving of maximum results with minimum loss, Lord Auckland was no statesman. His main concern was the defence of Indian frontiers, and by some queer logic he arrived at the conclusion that the best way to defend was to attack. He did attack and the result was that after a loss of some 20,000 lives, the world witnessed one of the most remarkable and tragic 'as you weres' of history.³

¹ Book 121, letter 62.

² Book 121, letters 56 and 57.

³ The books and letter numbers given in footnotes are according to the arrangement in the Lahore Record Office.

QUINQUENNIAL CIRCUITS OR TRANSFERS OF ASOKA'S OFFICIALS.

By

A. C. WOOLNER.

In Asoka's Third Rock Edict the King commands that certain officials (*yutā rājūke ca pradesike ca* G. III. 2. = *yutā lajūke ca pādesike* (—). D. III. 10.) must every five years *anusamyānam niyātu* G. = *anusayāvam nikhāmāvā* D. J. "for this object the inculcation of the Laws of Dharma, to wit—" so and so.

In the Provincial's Edict (Dhauli I. 24. 25. = Jaugada I. 11. 12. Vincent Smith's No. II.) the King says that for this purpose (*i.e.*, the prevention of certain municipal abuses) by reason of Dharma (*dhammante*) *nikhāmayisāmi* every five years such as will be of mild and temperate disposition, and regardful of the sanctity of life, who knowing this my purpose will comply with my instructions. But from Ujjain (*Ujjenite*) the Prince, for this purpose, *nikhāmayisati* a similar body (*hedisam eva vagam*) and will not overpass three years. In the same way from Taxila (*Takhasilāte*). When these High Officers *anusamyānam nikhāmisanti*, then without neglecting their own (ordinary) business, they will attend to this matter also, and thus act in accordance with the King's instructions.

Many years ago M. Senart rendered *anusamyānam* as "assembly," and the late Mr. Vincent Smith in his Asoka (1901 edition p. 116) labelled the Third Edict "The Quinquennial Assembly," translating the phrase in question "must every five years repair to the General Assembly" and (p. 138) "I shall cause to be summoned to the Assembly—," and "The officials attending the Assembly—."

In a footnote however (p. 117) it is recorded that Professor Kern translated by "tour of inspection" instead of "assembly." Bühler translated "go forth on a tour." Hultsch, "complete tour." Vincent Smith himself gave up "assembly" for "circuit."

Then in his last edition of *Asoka* (1920) he adopted a new interpretation. Edict III becomes "The System of Quinquennial Official Transfers." The officials "must every five years proceed in succession (*anu*) on transfer" (p. 163), and in the Provincial's Edict, "I shall send forth in rotation——" and "When the High Officers aforesaid—— proceed on transfer in rotation."

This change is based on an article by Mr. Jayaswal in the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* (IV. 37). Mr. Jayaswal rejects the old translation by "assembly" because "*Ekut* cannot denote 'coming together' or 'assembling.' *Anu-sam-yāna* therefore has not been used in the sense of 'assembly.' Literally it means 'going together,' 'departure' *samyāna*, 'in sequence' or 'regularly' (*anu*)."

Then it is objected that the whole body of the High Ministers would not 'go out' or 'be turned out' together, for the purpose of going on an official tour. The abuses they were to check, refer to Tosali itself, so why should they leave Tosali?

Mr. Jayaswal then refers to the *Sukranūti* as providing for the transfer of 'cabinet ministers' every three or five, seven or ten years, for 'authority in the hand of anyone should not be long,' and he quotes a passage from the *Divyāvadāna* referring to a revolt in Takshasīla in Asoka's reign, in which the townspeople say "We are not opposed to the Prince nor to King Asoka, but *dustātmāno*, 'mātyā āgatyāsmākam apamānam kurvanti."

In connection with this Mr. Jayaswal takes the words *nikkhāmayisāmi*, *e akkhahase acande sakkhinālabhke hosati* as "I will make the Ministers go out" and "those will become Ministers who are not rough and violent." (Everyone else takes the relative clause to describe the object of *nikkhāmayisati*). This is an ingenious combination, but it is not free from difficulties. It seems a curiously indirect way of providing for the performance of certain work, to say that the officials are to "go out," "be turned out" of their posts, in order that the work may be done (by someone else). Perhaps Mr. Jayaswal contemplates not a wholesale dismissal of high officials, but rather a general exchange of offices and portfolios. In Indian States certainly,

the Director of Education of one year may become the Chief Judge or Revenue Minister of the next year and so on. But then why should the similar body go out from Ujjain? Presumably they are to go to Taxila or somewhere else being replaced by other officials on transfer. Surely such a general post of all the high officials of the Empire is quite as unlikely as a simultaneous going out on tour from Taxila or elsewhere. That Taxila would be left as deserted as Delhi in the summer-time may seem improbable, but a simultaneous transfer seems much more improbable. Besides it was clearly a local operation. The Prince in Ujjain is to send his party out from Ujjain, and the Prince in Taxila is to send his party out from Taxila. Where were they to go? Any system of transfer from one provincial capital to another would necessarily be arranged by the central government not left to the Viceroys.

The generally accepted meaning of a "tour" or "circuit" is quite in accordance with custom. At no time would a governor or district officer have been considered efficient if he spent his whole time at headquarters. He has to go round his district or province, and see for himself what is going on.

What then, we may ask, is Mr. Jayaswal's evidence for the idea of transfer?

The fact that newly arrived ministers caused the trouble in Taxila has no necessary connection with the officials whom the Prince was to send out from Taxila. Akasmā need not be translated as "sudden" it can be "without due cause," a rendering which Vincent Smith retained. The passage in the Sukranīti does indeed show that certain officials were to be changed after 3, 5, 7 or 10 years, and that offices were exchanged.

Uktam tal-likhitāṇi sarvaṃ vidyāt tad anudarsibhiḥ

parivartya nṛpo hy etān yuñjyād anyonya-karmanī.* 107.

ekasminn adhikāre tu puruṣānāṃ trayam sadā

niyuñjīta prājñatamaṃ mukhyam ekam tu tesu vai. 109.

dvau darsakau tu tatkārye hāyanais tan-nivartanam

tribhir vā pañcabhir vāpi saptabhir dasabhisca vā. 110.

nādhikāraṃ ciraṃ dadyād yasmai kasmāi sadā nṛpaḥ. 111.

adhikāramadam pītvā ko na muhyāt punas ciraṃ ? 112.

ataḥ kāryakṣamaṃ dṛṣtvā kārye' nye taṃ niyojayet. 113.

"The King should not let anyone hold office for a long time."

"So seeing that (an officer) is fit for some work, he should appoint him to another post." Śukranīti II. 107—113.

In all this we do not find *anusamyānam* or any close parallel to the supposed use of *nikhāmayisati*.

So that granting that transfers were common, the argument really rests on the assumption that *anusamyānam* means "going out together in succession:" on the basis of that, *nikhāmayā* is rendered "must be turned out" which implies what it is desired to prove.

Now did *anusamyānam* mean going (out) together (*saṃ*), in sequence (*anu*)? Let us look at the meanings given for other compounds with a *ru-sam* as given in Monier William's Dictionary.

We find *anu-sam-carati* "visit, penetrate, traverse"

anu-sam-tanoti "overspread, extend everywhere"

anu-sam-dadhāti "explore, inspect"

anu-sam-vicarati "visit successively, make the round of"

anu-sam-yāti "go up and down, sentry-go."

Again we may refer to the Pali Text Society's new Dictionary.

anusaññāti "to go to, inspect, control"

anusamyāyāti "traverse, go up to, surround, visit."

anusancarati "to walk along, to go round about, to visit."

All these meanings are appropriate to the work of a district officer and seem more to the point than being "turned out" of office "in turn."

The officers were not to neglect their work, says Mr. Jayaswal. True, but there is no reason to suppose the bulk of their work was in Taxila, or Ujjain, reading files or writing reports.

Mr. Jayaswal himself goes further than Vincent Smith would follow. The Rajukas and Pradesikas, according to him, were not district officers, but Imperial Ministers at Patna and Provincial Minis-

tors at provincial capitals. If so, why are both words in the singular in this passage of the third Rock Edict?

In Pillar Edict IV. *lajūkās* are said to be appointed over *bahusa pāna-sata-sahasasū janasi*. Mr. Jayaswal says that "lacs and lacs" can only indicate the central government. Probably the population of India was less in Asoka's days than it is now—but can we press the phrase to so definite a conclusion? In the first Rock Edict it is stated that formerly *bahūni pāna-sata-sahasāni* were slaughtered daily in the King's kitchen.

This suggestion thrown out by Mr. Jayaswal in 1918, and accepted by the late Mr. Vincent Smith, has been ignored in the Cambridge History of India.¹ Perhaps Mr. Jayaswal himself would not now maintain the "transfer" interpretation, but as the Rulers of India series is widely used, it may be worth while recording the objections to it.

¹ As also by Dr. Hultzsch in the new edition of the first volume of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* and by Prof. Radhakumud Mookerji in his *Asoka*, 1928.

THE TRIAL OF RAJA LAL SINGH, 1846.

By

R. R. SETHI.

The Governor of Kashmir on the part of the Lahore State, Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, having resisted by force of arms the occupation of the Province of Kashmir by Maharaja Gulab Singh in October, 1846, the Lahore Government was called upon to coerce their subject, and to make over the Province to the representative of the British Government, in fulfilment of the conditions of the Treaty of March, 1846. A British force was employed to support and aid the combined forces of the Lahore State and of Maharaja Gulab Singh in these operations.

Shaikh Imam-ud-Din intimated to the British Government that he was acting under orders received from the Lahore Darbar in the course he was pursuing: and stated that the insurrection had been instigated by written instructions received by him from the Wazir, Raja Lal Singh. He surrendered to the British Agent on a guarantee from that officer that if the Shaikh could, as he asserted, prove that his acts were in accordance with the instructions issued by the Lahore Minister, and that the opposition was instigated by him, the Darbar should not be permitted to inflict upon the Shaikh, either in his person or his property, any penalty on account of his conduct on this occasion. The British Agent pledged his Government to a full and impartial investigation of the matter.¹

Mr. Frederick Currie, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, was deputed by the Governor-General "to

¹ *Vide* my article on "The Revolt in Kashmir, 1846" in Volume I, Part I of this Journal, pages 19-31.

investigate, in conjunction with Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawrence, the conduct of the Shaikh, in resisting, by force of arms, the execution of the Lahore Treaty, relating to the cession of the Province of Kashmir to the British nominee."¹ Currie was instructed by the Governor-General that if it was proved, as maintained by the Shaikh, that Raja Lal Singh did encourage him to violate the Treaty, which the Lahore Darbar was bound faithfully to carry into effect, the immediate consequences of this betrayal of duty to Maharaja Dalip Singh, and of good faith to the British Government, were to be the deposition of the Wazir. If, however, the authenticity of the documents produced by the Shaikh, in palliation of his own criminal conduct, was disproved, that individual was to take the consequences of his own misdeeds; but it was apparent, from the nature of the papers which the Shaikh had produced, that the investigation was to be in reality the trial of the Wazir, Raja Lal Singh, and the Darbar.

The conviction of the Lahore Government in being implicated in a gross and violent infraction of the Treaty might have led, if pushed to the extreme limit, to very serious consequences; and it was not the intention of the Governor-General, therefore, to make the Lahore State responsible for the misconduct of one or more individuals. There was every reason to believe that the misconduct of Raja Lal Singh was to be attributed to his personal hatred of Maharaja Gulab Singh, and not to any political combination to violate the Treaty with the British Government.²

Charged with these instructions and with the 'Kharita' from the Governor-General for Maharaja Dalip Singh, Currie proceeded forthwith to Lahore and arrived on December 1, 1846. He was met at Bhyrowal by Sardar Shamsher Singh Sindhanwala, Rai Kishen Chand, *Vakil*, and a few others, who had been deputed by the Darbar to accompany him to his camp through the Lahore District and provide supplies.³

¹ The Governor-General to the Secret Committee dated Camp, Sham Choursi, the 4th December, 1846. (Parliamentary Papers, 1844—47).

² The Governor-General to F. Currie, dated Camp, Hoshiarpur, the 23rd November, 1846. (Parliamentary Papers, 1844—47).

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 355, dated the 9th December, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

Currie entered Lahore with the usual ceremonies, having been met, some miles from the city, by Raja Lal Singh, Sardar Tej Singh, and the other Chiefs of the Darbar who escorted him to his tent.¹ It was no longer doubtful that an inquiry into the causes of Kashmir insurrection was to take place.² The Raja and the Rani were in great distress; the former holding private interviews from morning to night, the latter consulting the astrologers, and sacrificing to the gods in favour of the Raja.³

On December 2, a grand Darbar was held to receive the representative of the Governor-General who then delivered the Persian letter to the young Maharaja. On the same evening the Ministers and the Sardars paid him a visit of ceremony in his tent, and it was then that Faqir Nur-ud-Din read aloud for general information the contents of the letter received from the Governor-General. It congratulated His Highness on the happy and peaceful termination of the Kashmir rebellion, which at one time threatened to disturb the friendly relations then existing between the Lahore and the British Governments, by violating the terms of the Treaty so lately made at Lahore. It proceeded to inform the Maharaja that Shaikh Imam-ud-Din had, at last, only given himself up to the British authorities on their promise that the causes of the rebellion should be investigated, for he solemnly declared that he had acted under orders from Lahore in resisting the transfer of Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh. Finally, it pointed out the necessity of such an investigation to prove the truth or falsehood of the Shaikh's allegations.⁴

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 353, dated the 9th December, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

² Henry Lawrence writing to F. Currie in this connection "On my return to Lahore from Kashmir on the 30th November, I found rumours very generally afloat that when Shaikh Imam-ud-Din made his submission to me at Thana on the 1st of the month, he had given up to me certain papers criminating the Raja. These members of the Ministry, who were most in the Raja's confidence, seem up to the last moment, to have been ignorant or at least affected to be unaware of the existence of any such papers, and scarcely a day passed in which they did not question him on the subject and advise him, if he were guilty, to acknowledge it and throw himself on the generosity of the British Government. To all such advice he obstinately replied that he knew nothing of the papers, and had never held any secret correspondence on the subject." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 365, dated the 17th December, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ The Governor-General to the Secret Committee (No. 57), dated the 4th December, 1846. Enclosure 2 in No. 8 (Parliamentary Papers, 1844—47).

The Ministers and the Sardars were accordingly informed that on the following day, December 3, at 8 a.m. a Court of Inquiry would assemble at the Darbar tent. The Court was to be perfectly open to all, and the Sardars of all ranks were invited to attend.

At the appointed hour next day the Court assembled, constituted as follows :—¹

President :

Mr. Frederick Currie, Secretary to the Government of India.

Members :

Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawrence, C.B., Agent to the Governor-General.

Major-General Sir John Littler, K. C. B., Commanding the Garrison.

Mr. John Lawrence, C.S., Commissioner, Jullundur.

Lieut.-Colonel A. Goldie, Commanding the 12th Native Infantry.

¹ The Governor-General's directions to Mr. Currie, "so to arrange the inquiry into the Shaikh's conduct, in concert with the Lahore authorities, that there should be no ground for suspicion in any quarter as to the fairness of the proceedings." (The Governor-General to F. Currie, dated Camp Hoshiarpur, the 23rd November, 1846—Parliamentary Papers, 1844—47), shows that His Lordship contemplated the possible necessity of associating some members of the Darbar too as judges. But Currie did not think this to be fair, and wrote to the Governor-General on December 2, expressing his opinion: "I have consulted with Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence and Mr. John Lawrence upon the subject, and we have determined that it is impossible to associate any members of the Darbar with us as judges of the conduct of Shaikh Imam-ud-Din. His plea and grounds of defence are known to all, and they directly implicate the Darbar; the matter at issue being, whether he was, or was not, acting in accordance to their instruction, in forcibly opposing the occupation of Kashmir by Maharaja Gulab Singh, and in raising the rebellion in that Province. Neither could we associate with us other Chiefs not members of the Darbar. In the first place this would be calling on the subjects of the Lahore State to sit in judgment on the acts of their Government, and in the next, it would be impossible to find any Chief who is not a friend or enemy of the Wazir, and interested either in his conviction or acquittal."

"The only mode of fairly redeeming the promise under which the Shaikh surrendered and of doing impartial justice to all, appears to us to be, that the Shaikh's conduct and defence should be investigated by a tribunal of British officers in the presence of the parties interested in the result of the trial. I have, therefore, requested General Littler to join us in this inquiry, and to nominate another intelligent officer of high rank also to act as a member, and we propose that the Court shall consist of myself as President, Major-General Littler, Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence, Mr. John Lawrence and Lieut.-Colonel Goldie (the Officer General Littler seems to desire to name) as members." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 355, dated the 9th December, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

To this the Governor-General agreed and wrote thus to the Secret Committee on December 4, 1846: "The course which has been determined upon by Mr. Currie, on consultation with Lieut.-Colonel Lawrence and Mr. John Lawrence has my full approbation, as being the best adopted to remove many of the objections which would have attended a mixed Commission of Sikh Sardars, associated with British Officers, for the investigation; or, on the other hand, the selection of a tribunal entirely composed of Sikh functionaries." (Parliamentary Papers, 1844—47).

Raja Lal Singh, Diwan Dina Nath, Sardar Tej Singh, Khalifa Nur-ud-Din, Sardar Attar Singh Kalehwala, Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala and a large assemblage of other Sardars attended, as did also Shaikh Imam-ud-Din and his officers.

The Shaikh, being called on to make his statement, declared that he received secret instructions from Raja Lal Singh, through his confidential agent, Puran Chand, to resist the occupation of Kashmir by Maharaja Gulab Singh, and to create disturbance in the Province; that he replied in a matter of this kind the mere letters of Puran Chand would not be sufficient for him to act upon, he must have a writing from the Raja to himself, and a paper to assure and guide the troops; and that he subsequently received the three papers which he had delivered to Colonel Lawrence at Thana, and that he considered these papers his warrant for raising the rebellion which he had headed.

The proofs adduced by the Shaikh in substantiation of his statement were these: (a) a letter written to him by Raja Lal Singh, desiring him to create disturbances in Kashmir, and oppose the occupation thereof by Maharaja Gulab Singh; (b) an *ikarnama* which accompanied the above letter, engaging to maintain him in his *jagirs*, and to intercede with the British officers for his Jullundur property, and promising further reward to him, and to his followers, if he did as directed in the letter; (c) a *parwana* from the Darbar to the officers and soldiers in Kashmir, exhorting them to exert themselves and do good service at the bidding of the Shaikh, without fear of consequences, and promising in that case, that they should be continued in service when they came to Lahore; (d) the evidence of Puran Chand corroborating the statement of the Shaikh, as to the nature of the communications which passed between Raja Lal Singh and the Shaikh, through him, his confidential agent at Lahore, and as to the authenticity of the documents produced; and (e) the evidence of Diwan Hakim Raj, a confidential servant of the Darbar, who was deputed from Lahore in August, 1846, to bring away the Shaikh from Kashmir.¹

¹ The evidence of Diwan Hakim Raj was important. He was sent to Kashmir in consequence of the British authorities urging the Lahore Darbar to send a special emissary to bring away the Shaikh. He declared in his evidence that he received secret instructions from Raja Lal Singh, directing him to aid and assist the Shaikh, who had been written to by the Raja to raise disturbances in the Province.—Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 355, dated the 9th December, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

The circumstances stated in the defence bore very little on the matter at issue. The only facts stated were (a) the orders given by the Darbar to the Shaikh to evacuate the Province; (b) the *parwana* sent to Diwan Hakim Rai to proceed on his mission; and (c) the practice of not employing an agent to write the letters addressed to his master. The first two of these were admitted but they did not affect the case; and the third was satisfactorily disproved by a document admitted to be true.

Upon full deliberation and consideration of the evidence and the statements, the Court of Inquiry recorded their unanimous opinion that it was established and proved beyond doubt, that the Wazir, Raja Lal Singh, did encourage Shaikh Imam-ud-Din to excite disturbance in Kashmir, and to oppose the occupation of the Province by Maharaja Gulab Singh; and that he did encourage the troops in the Province to aid the Shaikh in the late rebellion.

Mr. Frederick Currie explained to the members of the assembly, after the verdict was given, that it was not the intention of the Governor-General to consider the misconduct of the Wazir as a violation of the Treaty of Peace, and as involving the termination of the relations of amity which had been established between the two Governments, and that His Lordship would consent to accept the deposition of Raja Lal Singh as an atonement for his attempt to infringe the Treaty by secret intrigues and machinations.

It was manifestly impossible that the Government of the Maharaja could be carried on with any prospect of success by one who had proved so faithless to His Highness' interests, or that the British Government could continue to act in concert with one who had so grievously offended them.¹

The Ministers and the principal Sardars acknowledged, more candidly than might have been expected, the impossibility of the Raja any longer being the Wazir; and his deposition once determined on, he seemed to pass altogether from their minds, or only to be remembered as a large *jagirdar*, whose income must be recovered to the

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 355, dated the 9th December, 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

State without delay. Diwan Dina Nath, the most practical man in the Ministry, who had single-handed defended the Raja in the face of facts to the last moment, as soon as the verdict was pronounced, passed on without a remark to the necessary arrangements for securing his relatives, Misr Amir Chand and Misr Bhagwan Das who held extensive districts in the Province and were defaulters to a large amount.¹

This indifference to the Raja's fate is to be accounted for by his policy in the Wazarat. Instead of trying, as any sensible man in his position would have done, to make himself popular with the Sardars and 'win golden opinions from all sorts of men,' by attending to the interests of the Khalsa and administering the revenues with liberality; he early took the first step to his downfall, by acting as if he considered it certain and laying up ill-gotten gains against the evil day. He discharged as many of the old Sikh soldiers as he could; and entertained in their places foreigners from his own country and Hindustan, and while, reducing the *jagirs* of the Sardars on the plea of public poverty, he appropriated enormous grants to himself or lavished them on his relatives and servants. His brothers, relations and servants were all largely provided for at the expense of the State; though when he found, by orders from Henry Lawrence from Simla in July and August 1846, that Government would not permit him openly to appropriate ten lacs of rupees of *jagirs* for the payment of his own 'Body-guard,' he denied all intention of so doing. He refrained from having the Sanads, which had been prepared issued—but by private orders he regularly received the proceeds of these *jagirs* and paid

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 365, dated the 17th December, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

The Governor-General entirely concurred in the decision of the Court and confirmed the same. The Governor-General writing to F. Currie in a letter dated, Bhyrowal Ghat, the 7th December 1846: "You selected the best form and mode of proceeding, and the invitation given to the leading Chiefs to attend the examination of the witnesses in open Darbar, was well calculated to satisfy all parties that the inquiry would be conducted in a fair and impartial manner; and I am gratified to find by your report of the 5th instant received this morning that the Chiefs had unanimously assented to the mode of investigation as being satisfactory to them. You further state that all the Chiefs were unanimous in assenting to the immediate deposition of the Raja from the Wazarat. I have attentively perused the whole of these documents. I concur in the decision, which is clearly justified by the evidence and I confirm it." Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 355, dated the 9th December 1846. From F. Currie to H. M. Lawrence.

Cortlandt's and other Battalions, as also some others as his own personal retainers.¹ As a minister, therefore, the Raja failed to conciliate either the Chiefs or the army; and as a private character, he was personally odious to the Sikhs for his intrigues with Ranjit Singh's widow.

One of his favourite projects was the establishment of the 'Body-guard' (above referred to), which was to prove faithful, when all others might desert him. It was composed of about 2,000 Afghan *sawars* under Sardar Sultan Mohammad Khan of Barukzai, brother of Dost Mohammad Khan of Kabul, and four Infantry Regiments of Hindustanics with two troops of Horse Artillery, under the command of General Cortlandt. His two brothers appear to have had similar bodies of men at their disposal. The anxiety of the Raja during a few days preceding the trial had made him draw most of these guards around him within the Palace walls; and the absurdity of relying on such anti-national supports was strongly exemplified on the occasion of his deposition—when if ever—their devotion should have been shown. To General Cortlandt orders were given to withdraw his infantry and guns; to the Barukzai Chief to retire with his *sawars*, and both orders were tamely and unhesitatingly obeyed.²

On December 4, on the termination of the investigation and after the sentence of "guilty" had been pronounced, Henry Lawrence, attended by the rest of the Darbar, went to the Palace, and the result of the investigation and the removal of Raja Lal Singh from the Wazarat was communicated to the Maharani by Faqir Nur-ud-Din and Diwan Dina Nath.³ The charge of the Palace was, at this time, made over to Sardar Sher Singh Attariwala, brother-in-law of the Maharaja, who had gained considerable credit lately by his spirited administration at Peshawar, and active co-operation with Maharaja Gulab Singh in suppressing the Kashmir rebellion. Meanwhile, the Raja himself was conducted by Lieut. Edwardes from the tent wherein

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 365, dated the 17th December, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

² *Ibid.*

³ "On the news being communicated, as could be expected, the Maharani became greatly outrageous," Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 357, dated the 10th December 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

the Court was held, to his own house within the city, escorted by a detachment of his own 'Body-guard'.

To prevent even the slightest hindrance of public business, the powers of Government were, as a temporary arrangement, vested in a Council of four, viz., Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Sher Singh, Diwan Dina Nath and Faqir Nur-ud-Din; and circular orders were immediately issued by the Darbar to all the Kardars in the kingdom, informing them of the Wazir's deposition for treason to his sovereign, and that no *parwanahs* were to be obeyed which did not bear the four seals of the Council.¹

After the deposition of the Raja from the Wazarat, it was resolved to remove him also from the Lahore State. This was rendered necessary by his intimacy with the Queen-Mother, who laying aside even the last appearances of matronly modesty, had abandoned herself to alternate ravings and intrigues—now imprecating, now imploring the Sardars, the British Resident, in fact anybody, to restore her lover. But it was considered quite inconsistent with the peace of the Province that the Rani and the Raja should both remain in it. Accordingly, on December 13, 1846, the Raja was removed under charge of Lieut. Wroughton of the 12th Native Infantry, escorted by the 27th Native Infantry Regiment, 200 Sikh *sauwars* and a company of Sikh Infantry,² to Ferozepore, *en route* to Agra in British territory, where he lived upon a pension of Rs. 2,000³ a month from the Lahore State⁴ till October 1852, when he was allowed by the Governor-General in Council to reside at Dehra Dun in winter and at Mussoorie in summer,⁵ of course under strict surveillance as

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 365, dated the 17th December, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to F. Currie.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 4059, dated the 11th December, 1846. From H. M. Lawrence to Lieut. Wroughton, 12th N. I.

³ In April 1849, this amount was reduced by half.—Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume XI, Serial No. 31, dated the 23rd April, 1849. From the Secretary to the Board of Administration, Panjab, to H. M. Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General.

⁴ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume IX, Serial No. 139, dated the 25th August, 1847. From W. Edwards, Under-Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, Foreign Department, to H. M. Lawrence, Resident at Lahore and Agent, Governor-General, N.W.F.

⁵ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume XI, Serial No. 2035, dated the 29th October, 1852. From the Off. Secretary to the Government of India to the Board of Administration for the Affairs of the Panjab.

before.¹ In June 1862, the Raja petitioned praying to be permitted to return to the Panjab, but his request was not complied with.² It was in September 1867, after his death, that his son Ranbir Singh was allowed to come to this Province.³

¹ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume XI, Serial No. 2070, dated the 7th December, 1852. From the Secretary to the Government, N. W. Provinces, to the Secretary to the Board of Administration, Panjab.

² Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume XX, Serial No. 1789, dated the 7th July, 1862. From the Secretary to Government, Panjab, to the Commissioner of the Meerut Division.

³ Panjab Government Records, Press List Volume XXI, Serial No. 1763, dated the 21st September, 1867. From the Secretary to Government, Panjab, to the Secretary to Government, N.-W. Provinces.

THE PERSIAN EMPEROR CYRUS THE GREAT, AND THE
INDIAN "SAKA" ERA.

By

GULSHAN RAI,

Sanatana Dharma College, Lahore.

[Paper read 24th February 1923.]

(Continued from page 73.)

There is one other point in this connection which may be mentioned. I have already quoted Varahamihira's Brihatsanhita, Chapter VIII, verses 20-21. They are :—

गतानि वर्षाणि शकेन्द्रकालाद्गतानि रुद्रैर्गुणयेच्चतुर्भिः ।
नवाष्टपञ्चाष्टयुतानि कृत्वा विभाजयेच्छून्यशरागरामैः ॥२०॥
लब्धेन युक्तं शकभूपकालं संशोध्य षट्त्वा विपर्ययेद्भिज्य ।
युगानि नारायणपूर्वकाणि लब्धानि शेषाः क्रमशः समाप्त्युः ॥२१॥

*It means :—*Multiply by 11 and then by 4 the years that have passed in the Era of the Saka King. Add to the product 8589, and divide the resultant by 3750. Then add to the quotient the years of the Saka King, and divide the resultant by 60. Then divide the remainder by 5. The quotient is the number of Yugas elapsed from the commencement of Narayani, and the remainder are the years in the current Yuga.

These verses evidently give a method for finding out the Samvatsara year in the 60 year Cycle of Jupiter. Let us apply this formula in the first place taking the commencement of the Saka Era in 550 B. C., and let us see what Samvatsara year it gives for the present day. I will then apply the same formula, assuming that Saka Era began in 78 A. D., and see what results this gives. Assuming that the Saka Era is 550 B. C., the present year in this Era is the close of 2481. Multiplying it by 44 we get 109,164. Add to it 8589, and we get 117,753. Divide it by 3750, and the quotient is 31. Add this figure of 31 to 2481, the present day Saka

King's year. That gives 2512. Divide it by 60. The remainder is 52. This gives 10 Yugas elapsed and 2 Samvatsaras passed in the 11th Yuga. Let us now apply the same formula with the assumption that Saka year began in 78 A. D. Then the present Saka year is the end of 1853. Multiplying it by 44 we get 81,532. Add to it 8589, and we get 90,121. Divide it by 3750, and the quotient is 24. Now add this 24 to 1853, the present day Saka Salivahana year. This gives 1877. Divide it by 60. The remainder is 17. This gives 3 Yugas elapsed, and 2 Samvatsaras passed in the 4th Yuga.

By adopting 550 B. C. as the commencement of the Era, we get 52 elapsed and 53rd current Samvatsara in the 60 year Jupiter Cycle. By adopting 78 A. D. as the initial date of this Era we get 17 elapsed and 18th current Samvatsara in this Jupiter Cycle. Now which is the correct Samvatsara. Let us look at the existing Almanacs. In the Deccan Almanacs the current Samvatsara is Prajapati, the 5th in the list. In North India Almanacs the current Samvatsara is Tarana, the 18th in the list. A cursory view would show that the north Indian almanacs consider the Salivahana Era to be identical with the Saka Era, and the Deccan Almanac Samvatsara is wrong according to the formula of Varahamihira. But a closer study of the problem would show that neither of these two present day almanacs is correct. There are according to Surya Siddhanta, 364,220 revolutions of Jupiter in a Mahayuga of 4,320,000 years. That gives for each revolution of Jupiter a period of 11.860963154137 years. Multiplying it by 5 we get 60 year Samvatsara Cycle of Jupiter. That gives for each Jupiter Cycle a period of 59.304816 years. From the beginning of Kaliyuga, there have so far elapsed 84 such cycles. This last cycle ended in Kaliyuga year 4981. The current Kaliyuga year is 5033. That gives us Samvatsara 52. This is exactly the result we arrived at by applying Varahamihira formula on the assumption that the Saka King Era began in 550 B. C.

Now let us examine the question from another point of view. All modern astronomers are agreed that the precession of equinoxes is 50.26" per annum. Indian Astronomers have calculated that this precession of equinoxes, called in Sanskrit, Ayana Gati, is 50" per

annum. The calculation is so approximately true, that for all practical purposes, results arrived at by them may be taken to be correct. From Varahamihira we know, at what point in the ecliptic were Winter and Summer Solstices, both at the time when Vedanga Jyotish was written, and when Varahamihira himself flourished. From this we can find out the exact number of degrees by which the Solstices in the ecliptic have receded. By dividing this difference by the rate of the precession of equinoxes, we can calculate the exact number of years which intervened between the time of Vedanga Jyotish and Varahamihira. Then again we know the present position of the Solstices, and from this we can calculate the period by which we are separated from Varahamihira. That would definitely fix the date of Varahamihira, and then we will be in a position to say which Saka Era he is using in his books. In his book Brihat Samhita, Chapter III, verses 1 and 2, he says :—

आश्लेषार्द्धादक्षिणमुत्तरमयनं रवेर्धनिष्ठाद्यम् ।
 नूनं कदाचिदासीद् येनोक्तं पूर्वशास्त्रेषु ॥१॥
 साम्प्रतमयनं सवितुः कर्कटकाद्यं मृगादितश्चान्यत् ।
 उक्ताभावो विकृतिः प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षणैर्व्यक्तिः ॥२॥

They mean :—“At one time the Sun's southward course commenced on his reaching the middle of Ashlesha, and its northward course on his reaching the beginning of Dhanishtha. This must have been the case as we find it so recorded in ancient Sastras. But at present the one course of the Sun commences at the beginning of Karka (Cancer), and the other at the beginning of Makara (Capricornus.) That it is so, and different from what it was at one time, can easily be ascertained from actual observation as follows.”

At the present time the Zodiacal sign of Karka (Cancer) begins at 90° of the ecliptic and ends at 120°. The sign Makara (Capricornus) begins at 270° and ends at 300°. The Nakshatra Ashlesha on the other hand begins at 106°—40' and ends at 120°. The Summer Solstice at the time of the Vedanga Jyotish was in the middle of Ashlesha, that is to say at 113°—20', and Winter Solstice in the beginning of Dhanishtha, or at

293°-20'. In 1931 the Summer Solstice had receded to a point in the Nakshatra, Ardra, *i.e.*, at 67°-16'-20" in the ecliptic, and the Winter Solstice to a point in the Nakshatra, Mula, *i.e.*, at 247°-16'-20", in the ecliptic. So in 1931 there was a precession of the equinoxes to the extent of $(113^{\circ}-20')-(67^{\circ}-16'-20'')=46^{\circ}-3'-40''$ which is the interval between ourselves and the times of the Vedanga Jyotish. Dividing this by 50'26" the rate of precession, we get 3299 years, or 1368 B. C. Mr. Davies and Col. Wilford fix 1391 B. C. as the date of Vedanga Jyotish. Sir William Jones, Colebrook, Weber, B. G. Tilak, and R. C. Dutt also accept this date. Now let us see what is the difference in time between Varahamihira and Vedanga Jyotish on the one hand and Varahamihira and our own times on the other hand. We have seen above that in his work Brihat Samhita, Chapter III, verses 1 and 2, Varahamihira says that in his time the Sun commenced his southward course in Karka (Cancer). In another work of his, Pancha Siddhantika, Chapter III, verse 21, he says :—

अश्लेषाद्वादीसीद्यदा निवृत्तिः किलोष्णकिरणस्य ।

युक्तमयनं तदासीत् साम्प्रतमयनं पुनर्वसुतः ॥२१॥

Which means :—“When the return of the Sun towards the south took place from the middle of Ashlesha, then the Ayana was right. At the present time the Ayana begins from Punarvasu.”

From this we find that in Brihat Samhita Varahamihira distinctly says that the Sun commenced his southern course in Karka (Cancer). This Zodiacal sign begins in 90° of the ecliptic. If we accept 78 A. D. as the commencement of the Saka Era used by him, then 427 Saka is 505 A. D., *i.e.*, 1426 years from the present time. If we take into calculation the precession of the Equinoxes then the Sun in that year should have commenced his southward journey at 87°-11' in the ecliptic. But this point is not in Karka (Cancer), but in Mithuna (Gemini). The last point in Karka, *viz.*, 90° had been crossed in the year 303 A. D. If this statement of Varahamihira is to be believed, then his date must be much earlier than the year 303 A. D. Then again in Panch Siddhantika Varahamihira says that the Sun commenced his southward course at

the end of the Nakshatra, Punarvasu, which means a point $93^{\circ}-20'$ in the ecliptic, or in other words we must take the time of Varahamihira 239 years earlier still, *i.e.*, to 64 A. D.

The only portion of Punarvasu which is common, with the Zodiacal sign of Karka (Cancer) is between 90° degrees and $93^{\circ}-20'$. So it appears at the time when Pancha Siddhantika was written, Summer Solstice may have taken place at $93^{\circ}-20'$, and Winter Solstice at $273^{\circ}-20'$. This means that the difference between Varahamihira and Vedanga Jyotish is 20 degrees of the ecliptic, and between Varahamihira and our times, $26^{\circ}-3'-40''$. Reducing them into years, we get 1432 years interval between Varahamihira and Vedanga Jyotish, and 1866 years interval between Varahamihira and our own times. So the date of Varahamihira is 1432-1368 or 1931-1866; *i.e.*, 64 A. D. in one case and 65 A. D. in the other case. The difference of one year is due to fractions involved in calculations. From the positions of solstices in the ecliptic thus given by Varahamihira, and recorded by him in his own books, Brihat Samhita and Pancha Siddhantika, we find that he must have flourished in the first century A. D. He may be a century earlier still, for a difference of even a degree and a half in the ecliptic means an interval of more than a century. We have already seen that according to Amaraja, Varahamihira died in 509 in the Saka King Era. If we take 550 B. C. as the commencement of this Era, then his death must have taken place in 41 B. C., which is quite reconcilable with the results arrived at by calculating equinoctial positions. The equinoctial position in 41 B. C. was $94^{\circ}-24'$, *i.e.*, the first half of the first quarter of Pushya Nakshatra, or very near the end of Punarvasu Nakshatra. In 123 B. C. which is arrived at by deducting 427 the basic figure of Varahamihira from 550 B. C. the Era of Cyrus the Great, the equinoctial position was $95^{\circ}-56'-54''$, again the first quarter of Pushya Nakshatra not very far from the end of Punarvasu.

In this connection it may also be pointed out, that we can find an explanation for the figure 427 used by Varahamihira in his calculations. 550 minus 427 is 123 B. C. We have just seen that his date of death is 41 B. C. So it is clear 427 cannot be the date of the book Pancha

Siddhantika, for he cannot be expected to have lived 82 years after writing his book, which cannot be the earliest one of his works. There is no evidence to show that 427 is the date of his birth. Then again it cannot be shown that 427 was the year when according to his calculations the precession was put at Zero, nor we are told there was any great conjunction of planets in this year, as was the case with the commencement of Kaliyuga. Why should have Varahamihira then selected the figure 427. I have shown above that it cannot represent the year 505 A. D. Let us see if by adopting 550 B. C. as the commencement of his Saka Era, 123 B. C. represents some historical event. If we look at the ancient History of Persia, we find that the Parthians became independent of the Greek Empire, in about 250 B. C. This Parthian dynasty lasted till 225 A. D. We also know that one of the kings in this dynasty, Mithradates I conquered Taxila in northern Punjab in about 138 B. C. But he was killed by the Yuichis in 136 B. C. He was succeeded on the Parthian throne by Phraates II, who ruled till 127 B. C. He was followed by Artabanu II, who ruled only 4 years, and died in 123 B. C. In 123 B. C. Mithradates II ascended the Parthian throne, and ruled for sufficiently long time till 88 B. C. It appears that from 136 B. C. to 123 B. C. during a period of 13 years the Parthian Empire was under a shadow, for within a period of 15 years it had 4 kings, on its throne. But it seems before 136 B. C. under Muthradates I and after 123 B. C. under Mithradates II, the Empire had stable government. The first monarch ruled for 38 years and the second for 35 years. Both were great conquerors, and both extended the limits of their empire. The first was little known in India, for within 2 years after his conquest of Taxila, he died. But the second Mithradates had made extensive conquests from the very beginning of his reign, and he also ruled for a sufficiently long time to have become widely known. We know from Indian History that during this period the Parthians had extensive territories in India. They were in occupation of western India as well. To the people in Malwa and its capital Ujjain they were well-known. In fact the Indian tradition has it, that it was a king of Ujjain, Vikramaditya, who defeated the Sakas in 57 B. C. About this time we

again find that there is a quick succession of short lived kings in Parthia. After the death of Mithradates II in 88 B. C. and before the death of Mithradates III in 56 B. C., there were in 32 years as many as 4 kings in Parthia. It is quite possible that during this period they were defeated in India. Because Mithradates II was a powerful king well-known in India, it is more than probable that Varahamihira took this king's date of coronation as the date for calculations in his astronomical works. We must also remember that the rise of the Parthian Empire in circa 250 B. C. was a result of a patriotic movement against the domination of the Greeks, who had overthrown the ancient Persian Empire of the Achæmedians in 331 B. C. It should not therefore be surprising, if the Parthians revived the Era of their ancient national hero, Cyrus the Great. This Era I have tried to show began in 550 B. C. There was an interval of 427 years between the epoch of Cyrus, and the coronation of Mithradates II. The Achæmedians had established an empire in India, and so did the Parthians. The Era of the Saka king Cyrus was known to the Indians, as is testified by the astronomer Garga the elder, and the new Saka king Mithradates II was as I have shown a contemporary of Varahamihira. There is under the circumstances nothing surprising, when we find him adopting the figure 427 for the purposes of his calculations.

So from the writings of Garga the elder, Varahamihira, Kalidasa, the Astronomer, Bhattotpala, and Bhaskaracharya, we are driven to the conclusion, that the Saka Era mentioned by these authorities is not the one counted from 78 A. D., but from 550 B. C. This does not necessarily mean, that no Era commenced in 78 A. D. What I am trying to establish is, that there were more than one Saka Eras. One 550 B. C. which was called the Era of Saka kings. The other was of 78 A. D. which was the Era of Salivahana, the Deccan King well-known to Indian tradition. It is notorious that the Huna invasions of India in the 5th and 6th centuries A. D. disorganised Indian society completely. We know that before the rise of the Chalukyas in the Deccan, there is a blank in the history of that part of the country, for several centuries. In northern India also, there was before the rise of Harshavardhana of Kanauj, a blank in the history for more than a

century. In the modern period too, between the fall of the Mughals, and the rise of British power in India, society had been disorganised to such an extent, that the people of India had lapsed into illiteracy, and the early British rulers had to take special steps to promote Oriental Learning. Our knowledge of our own ancient literature, had contracted so much that we had forgotten even our greatest of Emperors like Asoka, Chandragupta and Samudragupta. It is no wonder then, that after the cataclysm of Huna invasions, Indians lost to a very great extent a knowledge of their past. It seems after society was again reorganised in the 7th and 8th centuries A. D., Indians mixed up the 2 Sakas, the Saka Salivahana, and the Era of Saka King. Salivahana was remembered in the Deccan as an Emperor of the South. So here the Saka Era began to be associated with him. In northern India, Vikramaditya was remembered as the Emperor of the North. So here the Saka King's Era was forgotten, and Vikrama Era associated with his name spread in these parts. But Vikramaditya is still remembered as Saka-Ari or enemy of the Sakas.

The next question to settle is, when was this Era of the Saka Kings introduced into India, and who introduced it. On this point I can offer no definite explanation. But some few points might be mentioned in this connection. We know that Darius Hystaspes, the 2nd Persian Emperor after Cyrus the Great, who ruled from 521 B. C. to 485 B. C. conquered the north western portions of India in about 510 B. C. Herodotus, the Greek historian, tells us that India formed the 20th Satrapy of the Empire of Darius. We are also told that in the time of Darius, a Greek Admiral Skylax by name, traced the course of the river Indus, right upto the place where it falls into the sea, and that he navigated the coasts of the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. From this we can infer, that the entire Indus Valley, consisting of modern Sindh, western Punjab, Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Afghanistan formed part of the Persian Empire. There is some evidence to show that Persian influence had during the Achaemenian occupation of this country penetrated so far south as Gujrat (Kathiawar). From the well-known Rock Inscription at Girnar, in Kathiawar, we learn that the famous Sudarshana lake

was first constructed by Chandragupta, and that supplemental water channels were constructed by Asoka, under the superintendence of his representative, Raja Tushaspa, who was then Viceroy of this part of the country. The name Tushaspa is certainly a Persian name. It means that even in the time of Asoka, who enjoyed an almost universal sovereignty in India, Persian influence in the country had survived to such an extent, as to enable a Persian to attain the position of a Viceroy of such an important Division as western India. It may be pointed out that in the time of Asoka, Ujjain was the capital of western India, and Gujrat (Kathiawar) was within the territory of this viceroyalty. It may also be mentioned in this connection, that the edicts of Asoka discovered in Shahabazgarhi (Peshawar), and Mansohra (Hazara), are written in Kharoshti script. This means that in the time of Asoka, Persian influence had survived in northern India also. The Kharoshti script contains many letters of the Aramaean script. We know that the Syrians and the Chaldeans used this script in their trade and official business. The entire official class in the old Assyrian, Babylonian and Median kingdoms, carried on their official work in this script and when these kingdoms were superseded by and merged in the all embracing empire of the Persians, the officials of this empire also carried on their work in the same old Aramaean script. When a portion of India was annexed to the Persian Empire, the Persian officials, and later on the Persian educated Indian officials too, used the same Aramaean script, and it was thus introduced into northern India. It is certain, Kharoshti script was introduced into India several centuries before the Parthians and Scythians invaded it. The Indian territory within the Persian Empire must have been an extensive one, for we are told by Herodotus, that the Indian Satrapy paid 360 talents of gold per annum, the largest amount of tribute, paid to the Emperor. In the presence of all this evidence, it cannot therefore be denied that Persian influence in northern and western India during this period was really great. It is just possibly nay probable, that the Era of the Saka King Cyrus the Great, was introduced into India during this period, and it remained current in north-western and western portions of the country. India came into contact with the Western Greek world in

the time of Chandragupta. This contact continued in later times, as is shown by the Rock Inscriptions of Asoka. The Persians were also in contact with the Greeks. We may, therefore, take it that Indian astronomers became acquainted with the Babylonians during the Achæmedean period and with Greek and Roman astronomy of the Alexandrian School for the first time in the time of Asoka. This contact must have continued in later ages, for on the rise of the Parthian Power, the Indian trade must have diverted from the middle Eastern Countries to the Arabian and Red Seas. It is therefore not surprising that Varahamihira should in his *Pancha Siddhantika* talk of *Romaka Siddhanta*.

Furthermore, it may be mentioned that within a century of the death of Asoka, the Parthian Kings established their rule not only in Northern India, but also in Sindh and Western India as well. Mithradates I, the Parthian King, took Taxila in 138 B. C. Mithradates II who ascended the Parthian throne in 123 B. C. was a very powerful king, and he certainly held very large portions of India within his empire. Varahamihira thus must have been contemporaneous with Mithradates II and his successors, and he could not have been unacquainted with the Persians and their Era. This is of course on the assumption that the year 427 used by Varahamihira was of the Saka King Era commencing in 550 B. C., and was actually the year of coronation of the Parthian King Mithradates II. If, on the other hand, Saka Era mentioned by him was 78 A. D., then certainly the rule of Persian Kings and Persian influence in India, would be far distant from him, about 4 or 5 centuries earlier. Moreover, at this time Huna invasions were taking place, and no one could think of using the Era of the Saka Kings, whether it was 550 B. C. or 78 A. D. In 500 A. D. even Salivahana had receded into the dim past, and there would have been no motive for Varahamihira, a native of Northern India, to use Saka Salivahana, the Era of a South Indian King. For this reason too I must hold, that Varahamihira used the Saka Era of 550 B. C.

One word more in this connection. I have mentioned above, that the Saka King Era of 550 B. C. was introduced into India, possibly

during the period of Persian Rule in this country. But I may point out my conclusion does not rest on this argument alone. It is not necessary that a foreign era should be introduced into a particular country only during a period of foreign rule. No European power has so far established its rule in Japan, and yet in 1873, that country adopted the European calendar. During the Achæmedean period, the Persian Empire was the greatest power in the world. It had within its confines the ancient lands of Babylonia and Egypt, and it was at this time a centre of the then civilised world. India was the next door neighbour of this magnificent Empire. Even if Persia had not conquered any portion of India, it would not have been matter for surprise, if traders, astronomers, poets and other educated people of India, who admittedly had intimate relations with Babylonia and Egypt, mentioned the Era of Cyrus in their books or remembered the year when Cyrus established his Empire. There is now evidence of the existence of more than one Saka Era in India. Mr. Ston Konow who has edited Kharoshti inscriptions found in India, says that the Saka Era mentioned in these inscriptions begins in about 88 B. C. So it is clear the Era of 78 A. D. is not the only Saka Era.

But it may be pointed out, nothing so far is known in the western world about the establishment of an Era by Cyrus the Great. That is unfortunately true. If Herodotus and Xenophon had not told us something about the great Persian Empire, established by Cyrus the Great, we should have known nothing about it either. There are hardly any Persian records to give us the history of this magnificent Empire. It is only in recent times that some corroborative evidence in support of the statements of Herodotus have become available by the decipherment of Cuniform inscriptions of Darius Hystaspes, the Babylonian chronicles of the reign of Nabonidus, and the Babylonian proclamation of Cyrus the Great. The entire history of the mighty empires of ancient Assyrians, Babylonians, Egyptians, the Hittites, and the Mittanians, have only in recent times begun to be known. Present day investigations by Indian Parsis have shown that Darius Hystaspes did use some Era, and a distinctive kind of calendar coming from times even older than his.

It may be said that at such an early time as 550 B. C. the system of counting by Eras had not perhaps been discovered. But that is not correct. The Greeks had begun to count by the Olympiads, and this Era began in 776 B. C. The Romans counted by an Era beginning in 753 B. C. which is supposed to be the year when Rome was founded. The Babylonians used an Era which began in 747 B. C. This Era was started by King Nabonassar. Here was an example where a king established an Era. The Persians were the next door neighbours of the Greeks and the Babylonians. The latter were a great commercial and literary people, and their commercial activities extended all over the then civilised world. The Babylonians are also known as great astronomers. It cannot I think be seriously contended, that the ancient Persians were unacquainted with a system of chronology, fixed by Eras. The empire established by Seleucus on the ruins of this Persian Empire, brought into being a new Era, which is counted from 312 B. C. I am sure this Era of Seleucus must have displaced the previous Era established by Cyrus. When the only sources for the histories of the Achaemadian, Parthian, and Sassanian dynasties in Persia, are Greek and Latin writers, it is not surprising that we at the present day know nothing about the Era associated with the Empire founded by Cyrus the Great.

In India, I claim, we do have a record, however mutilated it may be, of the Era of Cyrus, and of Persian Rule in this country. History of India tells us that the Persians occupied India at least twice, and Indian tradition claims that they were on both of these occasions expelled from India. There is one Vikramaditya known as Saka-Ari, (enemy of the Sakas), whose Era is 57 B. C. There is another Vikramaditya, known to Indian tradition as Harsha Vikramaditya. Albiruni says, his Era was 400 years before the Vikramaditya of 57 B. C. Both these Vikramadityas are known to the author of Nepal Vanshavalī. If that is the case, and there is no sufficient reason to doubt it, then in connection with Persia, we should have in Indian History, and in Indian tradition, the following important dates:—

550 B. C. The Era of Saka Kings, associated with Cyrus the Great.

510 B.C. Conquest of Northern and Western India by Darius Hystaspes.

457 B.C. Defeat of the Persians by Harsha Vikramaditya.

138 B.C. Conquest of Northern Punjab by the Parthian King Mithradates I.

123 B.C. Accession to the Parthian throne of Mithradates II.

57 B.C. Second defeat of the Persians, this time by Vikramaditya.

78 A.D. Overthrow of Vikramaditya by Salivahana.

Under this scheme of chronology, the Era of 78 A.D. is reduced to the position of a South Indian Era, introduced in commemoration of the victories of Salivahana. I believe 78 A.D. is not the only Saka Era. There is another Saka Era beginning in 550 B.C., and still another one, according to Mr. Ston Konow, which began in 88 B.C. I think we have so far been mixing up together, these so many Saka Eras. In my humble judgment, the entire material on this subject requires careful re-examination. There are now 600 to 700 dates in Saka Era collected from various inscriptions. I have classified these dates into three categories. In the first category, I have put those dates, which mention only the word "Saka." In the second category, I have put those dates, which mention along with "Saka" the word "Salivahana." In the third category, I have put only those dates, which mention the expression "Sakendra-kala," or "Saka-bhupa-kala," or "Saku-nripa samaya," which certain such words as mean "Saka King." It would be better if all these dates be subjected to a thorough examination, of course taking into full consideration the Indian tradition, on the subject. Inscriptions bearing dates subsequent to 1100 or 1200 Saka need not be examined, for such later dates must be a long time after the Huna invasions. If the whole thing is re-examined in this manner, I am sure, Indian tradition and the results of modern scientific investigation will be found to be reconcilable. By accepting the Era of Saka King to have begun in 550 B.C. we bring down the dates of Vikramaditya, Kalidasa and Varahamihira, from the 6th century A.D. to 1st century B.C., and Bhaskaracharya from 12th century A.D. to 6th

century A.D. Bhattotpal is brought down from 10th century A.D. to 4th century A.D. This no doubt upsets the present day scheme of chronology, but if scientific investigation requires us to modify our previous views, more so when the results of such investigations enable us to reconcile them with Indian tradition, I think we should be quite ready to change our views.

THE MULTAN OUTBREAK AND THE TRIAL OF DIWAN MUL RAJ.

BY

SITA RAM KOHLI.

(Continued from page 48).

Mul Raj's trial—31st May 1849.—In the meanwhile, Diwan Mul Raj had been brought to Lahore (20th February). It was decided that he should be tried for the murder of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson. The hands of the Government were, however, otherwise too full with more pressing work and it was not before the month of May that a Commission, consisting of Mr. C. G. Mansel (President), Mr. R. Montgomery and Lieutenant-Colonel Penny* (members), was appointed to try Mul Raj for the "murder of Mr. Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson." Mr. Loring Bowring was appointed to conduct the prosecution and Captain Hamilton,† assisted by Mr. Girdhari Lal, represented the defence. Captain J. H. Wakefield and Maulvi Rajab Ali were appointed recorders of the proceedings in English and "native languages," respectively.

The Commission began its sittings in the Diwan-i-Am, in the citadel of Lahore, at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 31st May.‡ As

* Colonel Penny was substituted for Brigadier Godby who was unable to attend on account of severe indisposition. This was also one reason why the trial was delayed. Regarding the appointment of the Commission and its personnel, etc., see Government of India letter No. 174, dated 25th April 1849, Punjab Board of Administration letter, dated 16th May, Government of India letter No. 216, dated 24th May, and Punjab Board's reply dated 28th May 1849.

† Captain Hamilton of the 34th Native Infantry was acting as Deputy Commissioner in the Punjab. His services were secured after Mr. John Lawrence and Herbert Edwards had declined to accept Mul Raj's request to defend him. It appears from the vernacular correspondence that Raja Dina Nath and Diwan Rattan Chand were also requested to act as Mul Raj's counsel, but they declined on the ground of pressure of work. In fact, the Governor-General desired "to employ only the native agency" to conduct defence and disapproved of the appointment of a British officer (Captain Hamilton) as counsel for Mul Raj,—*vide* Government of India letter No. 216, 24th May 1849.

‡ The Diwan-i-Am is a spacious building of the old Mughal days in the citadel of Lahore. It was specially fitted up for the occasion by Mr. John Login.—see page 164 "Login and Dulceep Singh" and also Sohan Lal's Diary, *infra* V, page 164. The *Indian News*, London, dated 31st July 1849, gives the following note:—

"The trial was conducted in the Diwan-i-Am or Hall of the Darbar, which presented a very imposing appearance. Two sides of the raised platform, on which were seated the members of the Commission, the counsel for the prosecution and defence, prisoner, English recorder, etc., etc., were lined with troops, European and Native. One side was set apart and provided with seats for spectators, who were not, however, so numerous as might have been expected from the interest attaching to the trial. A few ladies and several Sikh Sardars of note were present and the centre of the large hall was nearly filled with natives."

ordered by the Governor-General, the proceedings were carried on in the open court.* Mul Raj was present in court throughout the trial. The order of the Governor-General having been read out, the President and members of the Commission along with the recorders were duly sworn in.

Charges against Mul Raj.—The prisoner was then publicly arraigned by the President on the following three charges :—

- (a) That he did positively enact and instigate the murder of Mr. Patrick Vans Agnew and Lieutenant William Anderson, which murder was committed at Multan on or about the 20th day of April 1848, by his troops and followers ;
- (b) that he was an accessory before the fact to the murder by his troops and followers of the said P. V. Agnew and William Anderson ;
- (c) that he was an accessory after the fact to the murder by his troops and followers of the said P. V. Agnew and William Anderson and that he approved of the act and rewarded the murderers.

Mul Raj pleads not guilty.—On being asked by the Court to plead to the charges Mul Raj pleaded “not guilty.”

The Prosecution opens the case.—Mr. L. Bowring opened the case, and, on behalf of the Prosecution, he urged, among other matters, that Mul Raj, though too late for his wish to bear fruit, repented of his decision to resign, and, therefore, prepared to resist the transfer of the charge of his Nizamut when the new Governor and his companions arrived in Multan, and that, on their arrival, the Diwan neglected the customary forms of civility to the Governor-designate and to the British officers. That the Diwan's conduct after Mr. Agnew was assaulted and wounded by Amir Chand was totally opposed ‘to what humanity or common attention would dictate.’ Instead of attending to Mr. Agnew or making any attempt to capture his assailants, the Diwan rode off at full speed to his own residence, in spite of the fact that he had from 200 to 300 troopers at his back at the

* Rules were drawn up by the order of the Government to regulate attendance of the visitors in the Court room.

time. Mul Raj's subsequent conduct, said Mr. Bowring, was hostile, for he not only employed his own forces, but, by offer of tempting bribes and promises, he even seduced the Lahore troops from their allegiance. It was further urged by the prosecution counsel that even supposing Mul Raj gave no positive instructions to the effect that he intended to resist the transfer of authority, there could be little doubt that he must have used such expressions as would lead his troops to suppose that such was his wish and design, for, otherwise, it seemed highly improbable that all these men should have been seized by sudden impulse without any orders from their master.

The Defence.—At the close of the Prosecution evidence, the accused was called upon to enter on his defence and Captain Hamilton produced ten witnesses on behalf of the defence. It took the court four days to record the defence evidence. On the 5th day Captain Hamilton addressed the court. Considering the fact that Captain Hamilton was not a lawyer by profession, the manner in which he presented the case for the defence does no small credit to him personally, as also to those who were responsible for the selection. Throughout the anxious days of his trial, Mul Raj must have felt that, whatever the verdict of the court might be, he could not have done better if he had placed his brief in the hands of the ablest man of his own choice.* Captain Hamilton began with discussing and criticising the prosecution evidence. After carefully examining the statement of each witness, he pointed out material discrepancies in their statements. He further remarked that the major portion of this evidence was hearsay and as such, inadmissible and not worthy of a moment's credit. He denounced the evidence produced by the prosecution before the court as in the main no better than "foul heaps of falsehood and perjury." He pointed out that, with the single exception of Mr. John Lawrence, all the witnesses were men of no worth or status in life. They were rather men without a job or men who gave evidence in the hope that they would thereby be able to secure better jobs at some future time.

* In a letter to his wife (June 10th, 1849), Sir John Login also expresses his appreciation of the marked ability shown by Captain Hamilton in the conduct of the case.—See page 165, "Login and Duleep Singh."

Theory of accident.—Captain Hamilton next dwelt on the all-important question of the murder of Messrs. Agnew and Anderson and tried to show that, in its origin, the attack was a mere matter of accident. The passage over the bridge which the party was crossing at the time of the attack, he urged, was narrow and crowded and consequently it was far more likely that the spear was thrust into Agnew's body by a sudden turn of Amir Chand or that Agnew was struck by the spear because of his horse taking a slight swerve.* Mr. Agnew gave a blow with his riding whip to the assailant or some other person by whom he supposed he had been struck. This was resented and was returned with a sword cut. The soldiery was excited and inflamed into a popular insurrection and military revolt. He put special emphasis on the theory of accident as the root cause of the assault and observed that the alleged attack was neither preconcerted nor premeditated. It was further urged that there was no complicity or motive on the part of Mul Raj in so far as he sent Raizada Tulsi Ram explaining his inability to visit the wounded English gentlemen and entreating them to be on their guard against the mutineers. "The best exculpation of the Diwan," argued Captain Hamilton, "was to be found in the declaration of Mr. Agnew that he did not consider Mul Raj in any manner implicated in the attack, and that he believed the disturbance to be a popular tumult and mutiny."† With regard to the absence of motive on the part of Mul Raj, the counsel remarked that no evil motive could be ascribed to the Diwan, who had repeatedly shown his anxiety to be relieved of the charge. Long before the arrival of the Governor-designate, Mul Raj had dismissed his superfluous troops and disposed of the stores required for the support of the garrison, had paid off the arrears of revenue due from him and had already remitted a portion of his own savings to Amritsar. Moreover, the Diwan stood high in the opinion of those in authority (as is borne

*The proclamation issued by the troops, which accompanied Mr. Agnew from Lahore and subsequently joined Mul Raj; also represents the assailant of Mr. Agnew as having acted without any sort of provocation. Rumour, however, invented all sorts of stories alleging provocation. Some of these are given in contemporary ballads. One such ballad will be found transcribed in the Gazetteer of the Multan District 1901-02, by Sir Edward Maclagan, and another is in the private collection of the present writer.

† See also Agnew's letter to Lieut. Edwardes, page 40 of Part I, Vol. I of this Journal.

out by the evidence of Mr. John Lawrence) and had high hopes and expectations of a bountiful provision from the British Government—hopes and expectations which could not have been realized if he had shown the slightest opposition.

Motive of the garrison and citizens to prevent a change of government.—In regard to the outbreak at Multan, Captain Hamilton put forward the following motives on the part of the garrison and the citizens to prevent a change of the government. In the first place, a force of 1,500 men (possibly more) which accompanied Mr. Agnew from Lahore was much larger than was required for mere escort and it was rightly judged by Mul Raj's army that so many men had been brought to Multan with a view to displace a portion of the garrison. This would have meant utter ruin to a large portion of Mul Raj's forces. Secondly, the people of the town had been for more than thirty years under the government of Mul Raj and his father. They had prospered under their rule and were doubtless attached to the Diwan's family. Of the British they knew nothing, and from the Lahore Court they must have anticipated oppression and misrule. It was argued that no deep-laid scheme was required to rouse the people and the military to action.

Law points urged by Defence Counsel.—Captain Hamilton also urged various points of law: firstly, that Mul Raj after having made over the charge had no legal authority in the province; secondly, that when the alleged crime charged against him was committed, Mul Raj was not a British subject. The Punjab had not yet become a British province and Mul Raj was, therefore, in no way amenable to the jurisdiction of the British courts. Thirdly, the charges against him had been drawn up with considerable regard to the technicalities of the British law and that, according to the British code, the punishment for being an accessory after the fact was most severe, while under the Native Government such an offence would be considered a mere misdemeanour, and that under the circumstances the prisoner was not liable to the 'ample grasp of British Law.'

* A similar impression, very favourable to Mul Raj, is conveyed by Lord Dalhousie in a letter addressed to his friend Sir George Comper, dated May 10th, 1848. See *Private Letters of Dalhousie by Baird*, page 24.

The Prosecution Counsel's reply.—Mr. Loring Bowring, counsel for the Prosecution, then made his reply. He urged that the Defence counsel's arguments with regard to Mul Raj's intentions and motives were neither clear nor convincing. It had been argued that Mul Raj had discharged his superfluous troops, disposed of his stores, paid up his revenue arrears, remitted his savings to Amritsar and had, in fact, prepared himself in every way to make over charge of his office. If he had done this with a view to handing over the province, observed Mr. Bowring, it was strange that the inhabitants of Multan should have been kept ignorant of his purpose. As the evidence of some of the witnesses for the defence showed, no such intimation was given to the people of the place. Moreover, the defence had not put forward anything convincing in regard to Mul Raj's conduct at the time Mr. Agnew was set upon by his men. It was clear from the evidence of the defence itself that the Diwan was present at the time when Amir Chand wounded Mr. Agnew. What possible difficulty, it was argued, could there have been in directing the immediate arrest of the assailant of Mr. Agnew?

Mr. Bowring in the course of his speech next referred to the main argument of the defence regarding the subsequent conduct of Mul Raj. The essence of the defence story, he said, for the subsequent conduct of Mul Raj was that he was powerless, being a virtual prisoner in the hands of his mutinous troops. He was thus in no way responsible for the acts of the troops. This too, the prosecution argued, was not borne out by facts. Mul Raj had on a previous occasion promptly and successfully put down the mutiny when in 1844 his troops had risen in revolt for increase of pay. Further, the entire course of the siege revealed the fact that Mul Raj exercised complete control and authority over his troops, and, indeed, but for his master mind—always alert and constantly directing his men throughout the siege till the capture of the fort—it would have been quite impossible for any one to keep the garrison in order. This view, contended Mr. Bowring, was further supported by the fact that even when, towards the close of the siege, the tired and starving troops expressed desire to surrender, it was Mul Raj who, raising his voice, had called

upon them to hold out, a command which they had at once obeyed. Mr. Bowring then made a few comments on the credibility of the defence evidence and characterised it as 'meagre and unsatisfactory.' The more weighty points, such as the conduct of Mul Raj on and after the occasion of all the officers taking the traitorous oath, urged the counsel, were left by the prisoner quite unaccounted for. Raizada Tulsi Ram, one of the chief witnesses, had merely deposed to Ram Rang's exertions to induce the Diwan to visit Mr. Agnew after the first attack, and had said that Mul Raj had lost his presence of mind and made no arrangements for stopping the mutiny. The evidence of Ram Rang himself must naturally be looked upon with suspicion, he having been one of Mul Raj's principal officers and his nearest relation.*

Sentence pronounced.—22nd June 1849.—The case was then closed. The court was cleared of visitors and witnesses, while the judges sat within closed doors to consider the *pros* and *cons* of the case and frame their judgment. After a few hours' deliberation, the doors re-opened and the sentence, finding and recommendations of the judges were immediately read out to the prisoner and subsequently to the public. They ran as follows:—

"After mature deliberation and consideration and having duly weighed the evidence for both the prosecution and the defence, and what the advocate and *rakil* of the prisoner have urged in his cause, the Commission are of opinion that the prisoner Mul Raj, late Governor of Multan, is of the—

First charge	Guilty,
Second charge	Guilty,
Third charge	Guilty,

and do therefore sentence him to suffer death. But the Commission direct that the execution of the sentence, in compliance with the instructions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, be suspended pending orders of the Governor-General of India.

* Ram Rang was married to Mul Raj's first cousin.

Further, the Commission earnestly recommend the prisoner to mercy as being the victim of circumstances.”*

Some observations on the trial.—The trial of Mul Raj attracted a good deal of public attention at the time. As we have had occasion to remark before, the proceedings of the trial were reported in the English Press both in India and in England. As was natural to expect, in an atmosphere of intense feelings, which the Sikh War had created, some severe comments were made even when the case was *sub judice*. A correspondent writing under the pseudonym of “Ultor” in the *Friend of India* accused Mul Raj of ‘grossest cruelty and treachery,’ while another writer described him as a ‘daring malefactor’ who deserved no sympathy. But if Mul Raj had many accusers, he had also some sympathisers who regarded him as neither a murderer nor a villain, but a weak, timid man forcibly placed at the head of the revolt by his mutinous troops and as such, deserving of pity—‘a victim of circumstances.’

We have the opinions of some contemporary writers—persons capable of making shrewd observation of men and events, persons who had had opportunities of studying Mul Raj’s character at close quarters. The most important of these men is undoubtedly Mr. (Sir) John Login. He was appointed Governor of the Lahore Citadel in March 1849, and in that capacity he had the charge of all State prisoners, Mul Raj, Chattar Singh, Sher Singh and others. In a letter dated, Citadel, June 10th, 1849, Mr. Login writes to his wife “..... I told him (Mul Raj) that Vans Agnew was my dear friend, and that his death was a grief to me. He expressed himself as more grieved than ever at the event since he heard this, and he solemnly avers he never

* At the conclusion of the trial the President of the Commission, submitted two bills for contingent expenses to the value of Rs. 469-12-0, incurred in the conducting of the case:—

	Rs.	s.	p.
(A) (i) Amount due to Girdhari Lal (<i>Vakil</i>), at Rs. 5 per day for 23 days, 8th May—30th May 1849	115	0	0
(ii) Amount due to Girdhari Lal at Rs. 10 per day for 23 days, 31st May—22nd June 1849	230	0	0
(B) Wages of Clerks employed in transcribing the prosecution and defence evidence	112	0	0
(C) Stationery	12	12	0
Total	469	12	0

authorised it. Nor had he ever encouraged his people to attack Agnow. He expressed great regret for what had occurred, but said he was helpless, and so far I believe the evidence does not implicate him."

In another letter, dated June 17th, 1849, Mr. Login again writes: "The trial of Mul Raj still going on. I do not think the old fellow is anything of the hero they would make him out to be, but rather a weak, chicken-hearted fellow, afraid to do what was right and entirely in the hands of some resolute villains around him. I do not think he really intended any harm to dear Pat Vans Agnew, but he had not moral courage enough to put the fellows down....."*

Mr. (Sir) John Lawrence heard of the outbreak on the 30th April while he was at Dharamsala. On the same day he wrote to Sir F. Currie: "Bad as Mul Raj's conduct may have been, I should doubt very much if he has had anything to do with the original outbreak. Depend on it he has been forced into it by circumstances. He was notoriously a timid man, and one of the chief points on which he originally so much insisted with me was that he might be allowed to get away before it could be publicly known that he had given up the country....."†

Sir Lepel Griffin wrote and published his history of the Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab in 1865, and, as he tells us in the preface, he personally questioned the actors in, and eye-witnesses of, the events described in the book. He further adds that he has had also special opportunities of personally examining a large number of the Chiefs and Sardars with their bards and family priests from whom he had gained much new and interesting information. Speaking of Mul Raj's trial, Sir Lepel Griffin remarks: "It is not for history to praise an unsuccessful rebel, but a careful review of the Diwan's history will show him to have been more unfortunate than criminal. It is certain that when Mr. Vans Agnew first arrived at Multan, the Diwan had no intention of rebelling. Had such been his design, he would not have resigned his charge or have given over the fort. It is equally certain that the first attack on the British officers

* "Sir John Login and Duleep Singh," (pages 164-167).

† "Life of Lord Lawrence," by R. Bosworth Smith, Volume I, page 218.

was without the Diwan's privity or consent. That attack was either an outburst of fanatical hatred on the part of the Muhammadan soldiery, who saw the fort, in which they took so much pride, passing into the hands of strangers, or it was instigated by some of the Diwan's officers, who wished to compromise him and compel him to rebel. It is probable that he was under restraint and unable to command the obedience of his soldiers when the Idgah was assaulted and the English officers slain. At no time from that fatal day till the arrival of the British army before Multan, could the Diwan, with any safety to himself, have proposed terms of submission or have sued for pardon. He was surrounded by relatives, friends and troops who depended upon him for place and wealth and power, and who saw in a new Governor nothing but ruin to themselves. They determined to force Mul Raj to rebel, for his victory would enrich them, and his defeat could not be more injurious to them than his resignation. Diwan Mul Raj was not an amiable character. He was mean, grasping, suspicious and vacillating. But the crimes of cold-blooded murder and of premeditated rebellion cannot, with any justice, be laid to his charge."*

Commutation of sentence—31st July 1849.—The judges while pronouncing the sentence of death on Mul Raj had recommended him to the Governor-General of India for mercy as being the 'victim of circumstances.' "Lord Dalhousie," writes Sir William Lee-Warner, "gave anxious consideration to the case, feeling that if the crime had been committed while Mul Raj was engaged in hostilities as a rebel, he could not be fairly treated as a murderer, since Sher Singh and other Sardars had been allowed to go free. Moreover, for the murder of Agnew, the culprit, Godhar Singh, had already been sentenced to death. The evidence convinced the Governor-General that the Diwan had not premeditated the slaughter of the two British officers, nor had he instigated the attack upon them as they left the fort. No doubt, he was in command of the garrison when the assault was delivered on the Idgah where the wounded officers lay, and had made no effort to save them; he had even rejected their overtures for help, and seduced their escort from fidelity. But as it seemed clear

* The Punjab Chiefs by Lepel Griffin, Lahore, page 284, Chronicle Press, 1865.

that Mul Raj could not in any case have stayed the fury of his fanatical followers, Lord Dalhousie gave him the benefit of the doubt, and remitting the death penalty, sentenced him to imprisonment for life, with banishment from India.*

Death of Mulraj.—September 1851.—The decision of the Governor-General was conveyed to Mul Raj on or about the 31st July 1849. But no arrangements were made for his removal from Lahore till January 1850. Mul Raj was then taken to Calcutta, probably *en route* to 'Black Water.' On the mere thought of his dreaded doom, Mul Raj's fortitude for once gave way. He became indisposed and never recovered from his illness. For about a year, he was kept in Fort St. William in Calcutta. Early in August 1851 he was taken seriously ill and it was decided to remove him to Benares. But before he reached his destination, Mul Raj breathed his last near Buxar, on 11th August at the age of 36.†

* *Life of Marquis of Dalhousie*, Volume I, pages 264-65, London, 1904. It may be pointed out in this connection that when Sir William recorded his opinion in 1904, the Private Papers of Lord Dalhousie had not seen the light of the day. These papers were edited and published by J. A. H. Baird in 1911. One of Lord Dalhousie's letters, bearing date February 5, 1849, contains the following reference to Mul Raj: "I cannot hang him, but I will do what he will think a thousand times worse; I will send him across the sea, what they call the "Black Water" and dread far more than death." (page 51). This is supported to the very letter by a reference made by Sohan Lal, the Diarist of the Lahore Darbar. Under date 9th Phagan, 1906 (19th February 1849), with reference to the Resident's conversation and remarks in the Darbar, he writes.

"باز فرمودند، فردا مولراج خواهد آمد۔ و بعد از آن در کا، پادی خواهد رفت" viz., afterwards (he) was pleased to remark that Mul Raj will reach (Lahore) to-morrow and will be subsequently deported to Black Water,—page 155, *Diester V.*

† Mul Raj's body was cremated on the banks of the Ganges, off Partalpur near Buxar—*vide* letter No. 90, dated 18th August 1851, from R. Lowther, Esq., Commissioner, Allahabad Division, to the Board of Administration Punjab.

LUCKNOW IN 1841.

By

PRINCE ALEXIS SOLTYKOFF.

(Translated and Edited by H. L. O. Garrett.)

(Prince Alexis Soltykoff was a member of a distinguished Russian family. He made several journeys to India and his descriptions of the Panjab, Delhi and the Simla hills have already appeared in the *Civil and Military Gazette*.)

LUCKNOW, DEC. 24TH.

I arrived here yesterday at midnight. On leaving British territory 45 miles from here, I crossed the Ganges on a bridge of boats and entered a wild sandy desert, completely without roads. However I got on fast, the porters of my palanquin did their work well and after twelve miles, I was met by two troopers of the Royal police from Lucknow who had been sent to look after me, as the country is not very safe owing to the *thugs* or stranglers an Indian sect who abound in this kingdom.¹ These picturesque horsemen were relieved every ten miles. As I went on the country became less arid; but it had been quite dark for a long time when I arrived at the capital. Not knowing where to go I had myself taken to the place where porters are supplied, the post office in fact, and there, as there was no shelter for me, I had the palanquin put on the ground in the courtyard and having eaten some bread and sardines and drunk a glass of wine, I went to sleep in the palanquin with the idea of calling on the English Resident early in the morning. But at four o'clock in the morning before dawn a gentleman called Login,² the medical officer attached

¹ I have often heard it said by reliable persons that there has never been a case of a European being attacked by *thugs*. On the other hand they kill quantities of Indians.

² Afterwards Sir John Login, better known as the guardian of the young ex-Maharaja Dulip Singh—Editor.

to the Residency, came to wake me. He was full of apologies saying that nothing had been known of my arrival and begged me on behalf of the Resident to come at once to occupy the room they had just got ready for me, either to sleep or to have a cup of tea and dress. So I left my travelling den and accompanied by the doctor, a nice young fellow who had just arrived from Herat, I passed through several dark and deserted streets to get to the English Residency, a large mansion where I have a big comfortable room. When the sun rose I went on to the terrace from which I saw a magnificent panorama of the city of Lucknow, with its mosques, its splendid palaces, its mysterious wooded surroundings. But there were no more palm trees here, except here and there as in Italy. It was very cold, yet during the day there is a fierce sun which warm one's chilled body. One does not know what to do, one shivers yet one must stay in the shade for fear of sunstroke. The Resident, Colonel Low,¹ soon came to my room in a dressing gown with a shawl cap. He speaks French fluently, at which I was much surprised as this is most unusual in India. He was not like a Englishman at all, but more like a genial Frenchman. This hospitable officer without any ceremony invited me at once to go through the city on an elephant, adding that there was one ready for him every morning at daybreak and that he scarcely used it. He called out of the window and at once I saw the giant quadruped come out of the garden with splendid silver gilt *howdah*, decorated with plates of imitation precious stones, diamonds, rubies and emeralds which instead of being inset were simply hung on the *howdah* and gave a charming effect in the rosy morning sun. This *howdah* of a very original design was composed of two chased silver swans with, as I have said, these plates of imitation precious stones. The harness was a blaze of gold and red. The Mahout was in white with a Kashmir shawl thrown over him. I mounted by means of a ladder and a servant, also wrapped in a Kashmir shawl, seated himself behind me. Then we set off, preceded by a regular trooper, a kind of Cossack in curious uniform. There are always a dozen mounted at the gate of the Residency garden, ready to accompany its inmates.

¹ Afterwards General Sir J. Low, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., Military Member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General during the Mutiny.—Editor.

I entered a large and crowded street. On all sides were beautiful Moorish buildings, with cupolas in the Russian style and countless minarets. Horsemen dressed in cloth of gold and Kashmir shawl, on fine horses preceded by armed pikemen or swordsmen, other nobles carried in open gilded palanquins, smoking silver *hookahs*, and surrounded by servants and preceded by guards on camels caparisoned in red and green; elephants, often several together in whose *howdahs* the rank and fashion of Lucknow, richly dressed in the brightest colours, chatted to one another; parties of wild Afghans on their huge camels, a great contrast to the fastidious Lucknow people; all this passed by me. At last I reached the end of the street and perceived a magnificent Moorish gateway above which rose slender minarets and gilded cupolas like those of the Kremlin the whole making a superb effect against the crowded street before me. On arriving at this gate I learnt that it led to into the walled enclosure which the old king has chosen for his burial. I entered and I was astonished to see that this huge place contained everything of the most interesting and diverting that could be gathered together; charming Moorish buildings, fountains and aviaries containing the most strange and beautiful birds. They were still working at one or two of these buildings which are intended to accommodate the citizens of Lucknow on public festivals. I entered the largest where the mother of the king lies in the middle of the principal hall. By the side of the tomb is a charming little mosque or rather model of a mosque in silver gilt. It is there that the king also wishes to be buried by the side of his mother. The interior of this handsome building is composed of four or five apartments with roofs separated from one another by columns and arcades. All this space, except that occupied by the Queen's tomb, has been filled with all the most splendid and striking objects of which the king could think. The vaults are adorned with hundreds of cut glass lustres in all colours: silver gilt candelabra stand on the marble floor as do strangely carved pulpits also in silver gilt for the use of the Mohammadan priests, for the kings of Lucknow belong to that religion and are of the sect of Ali (Shias). Two tigers life size in coloured glass of an emerald colour, with gold ornaments, coming, I was told, from Siam where they were cast; a beautiful silver horse as high as a

table held by a beautiful girl in silver, thousands of other things ; some rather ordinary arms arranged in trophies, a life size horse in painted wood, a representation of the king's favourite charger, made by an Englishman in Calcutta and richly caparisoned held by the statue of the royal groom also in painted wood ; all this mass of richest tinsel shines magnificently in the days of Moharram ; the fountains play, the birds sing and the whole place is full of happy crowds.

In the courtyard or principal garden a sort of screen is placed before the entrance on which are painted life size the favourite servants of the king. One of them exactly resembled my guide, a venerable old man with a long silver wand in his hand. He smiled when he showed us his picture, which was very like him.

This miniature paradise is surrounded by a bazaar always filled with a noisy crowd, and by stables where are elephants, and rhinoceros captured in the royal forests as well as enormous tigers and bears shut up in large iron cages, placed under the domes or strangely painted arcades.

There is also a large sheet of water surrounded by stone steps and grotesquely carved statues. In this pond a boat on wheels, in the form of a large fish, was moving about. It all seemed like a dream. I have also seen the royal palace while the king was away. One of his thrones, for he has many, is a gold platform, encrusted with diamonds and worth £220,000. He is rich, his revenue is £1,500,000 and I have heard that if the English took over the state it would be £1,000,000. There are 300,000 inhabitants in Lucknow. The bazaar is one long crowded street but I have not seen anything special. I feel I ought do some sketches ; but where to begin with so many charming things of which I have not yet seen a quarter ?

DECEMBER 26TH.

Early this morning I went to see a royal garden, full of roses and jasmine, orange trees and cypresses, for the vegetation here is not tropical but more like that of Sicily. The garden is full of charming white marble pavilions and baths of all sorts. The king sometimes comes there with his harem of Kashmiris and give parties there also. The keeper of this garden, who is a person of importance, complained

to me that when the ladies of the harem are let loose in the garden they spoil everything, break and pull up the flowers, damage the paths and make the pavilions dirty. After each of these invasions everything has to be renewed. From this delightful garden we went to see the stable of the king's rhinoceros, which is in a park which also contains the grave of his favourite horse surmounted by a mausoleum. A dozen huge and ugly beasts were chained under a long roof supported by beams. Further off is an elephant park which I have not yet seen but they tell me that the royal elephants, which besides those in this park, are some here some there in the neighbourhood of the city, number 450. The English Resident has a dozen and all the Lucknow nobility have dozens in their stables.

As I write the wild parrots are perched peacefully by my window for in Indian cities no one kills them. Francois has a parrot in a cage which he bought at Kandy in Ceylon. He is very fond of it and carries it about in his palanquin. This parrot is hung up on my verandah: the wild ones come and sit near him and he seems to talk to them.

Having seen the rhinoceros we then entered the tomb of one of the kings of Lucknow, a fine marble hall where three Mullahs were reading the Koran for the repose of the soul of the deceased. On our entering—I was with Colonel Low, the English Resident,—the old Mullahs stopped reading and turned to us, taking off their spectacles. The Resident saluted them and begged them to go on without interruption. Then they replaced their spectacles and began to murmur prayers once more. After we had walked round the hall we saluted the worthy priests once more and withdrew. This tomb is placed in the middle of a vast courtyard round which are Persian schools for the young people of Lucknow. One must suppose that the dead monarch was very fond of learning, as he wished to be surrounded by it even after his death.

Then we visited the observatory of an English astronomer whom the king keeps at his court and of whom he has a great opinion.

DECEMBER 29TH, 1841.

The King of Lucknow is 65 and is said to be in very bad health so I have not attempted to trouble him.¹

¹ Mohammad Ali—succeeded 1837.

Yesterday morning in the street while I had got off my elephant to make a hasty sketch of a dromedary ridden by a man who had stopped to look at me, I heard a shouting and I saw coming from the corner of the street a band of men with swords in their hands and running among the people. I stood by my elephant and they passed me with a salute. Some had silver wands, others red flags on silver staves, pikes, swords, guns, bows, arrows and shields. They were followed by four trotting dromedaries ridden by what appeared to be dragoons. Then a fine troop of cavalry with flying Kashmir shawls cantered past us, followed by the king's son,¹ the heir-apparent to the throne, carried in an open palanquin. He was a large, fat, man with a coarse ugly face, about 45 or 50, in a costume of cloth of gold and fur with a round cap trimmed with fur such as one sees in the pictures of our old Czars. As he passed he detached two of his staff to find out who I was. I gave no answer for the very good reason that I do not speak Hindustani but my Mahout hastily made some sort of answer on my behalf and they went off satisfied, to report to the prince. The people of India from here to Cape Comorin cannot understand that there are any other European people except the English. When one says Russian they take that for some particular English caste. Europe and England in their idea are the same thing. It was only on going further north that I met people who had a vague idea of Russia and the Russians.

After the prince came three elephants at an absurd amble, one had a *howdah* on his back : the other three servants ; the third merely carried the ladders for mounting the first. That was not all. After these galloped a detachment of comic opera hussars with little pennons and helmets like ancient European ones. The whole thing seemed pompous and silly. The primitive Orient and ancient Asia side by side with a parody of modern Europe.

The King of Lucknow has other soldiers, a regiment, on dromedaries in red uniforms with long skirts rather like circus riders, with the helmets and the straight swords of cuirassiers.

Lucknow is a fine city but most of the buildings are in brick and stucco, the majority white but some painted red and green : the

(¹) Amjad Ali.

interiors are often of marble. As far as I can gather Delhi and Agra contain buildings of the same type but much finer and of more costly material. But Delhi and Agra, which belong to the English, are dead capitals while Lucknow has its splendid court. I saw the royal menagerie to-day ; twenty tigers and some leopards so tame that the keepers play with them like dogs : however they are kept chained up.

A royal tomb which I visited to-day contained some ancient banners very curious and surmounted by enormous badges of a quaint design in gold or wrought iron or by huge hands. The late king's turban was there : two silver tigers, life size and very well done are stationed on either side of the sarcophagus, which is covered with cloth of gold and shawls. This tomb was that of a king whose name I have forgotten.

His sword and shield, the latter, quite black are placed above. While everything else here seems costly, bows and arrows are not, so far I have seen, of value. There were four silver horses there also of the height of a table held by winged *houwis* and by Indian Mythological heroes. There were also glass cupboards partially covered with golden gauze which contained curiosities, but as I had my boots on and as all the people there treated me with every mark of respect and politeness, I wished in my turn to show my respect for the place of which they were the guardians and I did not pass the threshold of the arcade from which I could see most things except a few details. I thought it better not to see everything rather than run the risk of offending these very attractive people, who would have let me do any thing in that sacred spot provided they purified it afterwards ; for the respect shown to Europeans here is really extraordinary. I am almost tempted to believe that it is a kindly pity like that of the Turks for the insane, or like the consideration one gives to children who know nothing and whom one readily forgives.

I wish to pass on from here ; it is quite time, though my kindly hosts wish me to stay on. They told me that on New Year's day the heir to the throne will come to breakfast in state at the Residency and that then he will probably invite back the Resident with his staff, among whom I should be included.

CAPTAIN MANUEL DEREMAO.

BY

H. BULLOCK.

Manuel Deremao, or D'Eremao, was born at Delhi about 1744. His ancestry is dealt with in Sir Edward Maclagan's *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*. We know little of his early life: tradition has it that he was brought up by his maternal grandfather Monsieur Manuel Gascoine. A few traces may be found in the Registers maintained by Father Gregory, the discaled Carmelite who came to Northern India in 1781 and remained there till his death in 1807. At a baptism at Kanaund on 23rd May 1783, "Emmanuel Wel" and "Mariana Wel" appear as sponsors. At the same place, two days later, "Mariana Wel" acts in the same capacity. At Delhi on 22nd June 1783, Mariana "Moniwel" was godmother by proxy at the baptism of an illegitimate daughter of the Chevalier Charles Dudrenez, the celebrated soldier of fortune. Again, at Delhi on 13th April 1784, we find in the Register the name of "Emmanuel Wel Darinod," which allowing for copyist's errors as well as the probably erratic orthography of the original is very probably intended for Emmanuel Val Deremao. I think it likely that all these entries relate to Captain Manuel Deremao at the time he was serving in a military capacity at the Mughal Court, or to near relatives of his.

Manuel appears to have succeeded to a *jagir* of twelve villages near Delhi, part of the estates which had been granted by the Emperors to Donna Juliana Dias da Costa in recognition of her professional services (see Maclagan, *op. cit.*, ch. XII). In his will he mentions "lands conferred as a royal gift by the Maharajah Buladar Shah in the name of and on Behee Juliana, my paternal Grand Mother, in Mouzees Bhopanee, Khanpoor, and Rutter Dihi Mundy," extending to 3,333 *bighas*. What position he held at the Mughal Court we do not know, nor have we any precise details of his relations with the *de facto* ruler, Seindia. It is said that he commanded a regiment of cavalry in the Emperor's service; and that about 1801-2 a force under

his command had regained from the Irish adventurer George Thomas the country from Rohtak to Bhatinda. It is also related that at the outbreak of hostilities between the British and the Marathas in the autumn of 1803, Deremao was in occupation of five thousand square miles in what is now the Ambala Division of the Punjab, with an annual revenue of twenty-five lakhs of rupees, on which he supported a force which like himself owed nominal allegiance to the Emperor, Scindia and Perron, but which was virtually independent. If these were the facts it is curious that the memoirs of George Thomas and of Colonel Louis Bourquien make no mention of Deremao, with whom they must have had many dealings.

There can however be no doubt that when Lake and Ochterlony had time, after their triumphs elsewhere, to devote attention to the country west of Delhi in mid-December 1803, Deremao was in effective control of the important fortress of Hansi. The following extracts from Lake's dispatches to the Governor-General show what weight was attached to the possession of that fortress; and the second extract is curious as being, it is believed, the only mention of Deremao in published correspondence, though even in this he is not named:—

Lake to Marquis Wellesley, 12th September 1803.

I apprehend the Seiks if assured of our not interfering with their government will enter into a treaty of amity with us, and would ensure the capture of the fort called Hansi, late George Thomas's, provided we would promise to destroy it, which in my opinion would be a good thing: I believe at present there are a great many of Perron's guns in it, which might be got by this means, and which I shall endeavour without trouble and difficulty. . .

The same to the same, 17th September 1803.

. . . I forgot to say that I looked upon the strong fort at Hansi to be ours, as there are very few persons in it, and the person who commands it has sent to say that he will give it up to me if I can send troops, which will be difficult, he therefore will keep it, as the people he has in it are entirely his.¹

¹ *Selection of the Despatches and Treaties of the Marquis Wellesley*, vol. 8. J. Owen, Oxford, 1887, pp. 397, 401.

We have Deremao's own authority for stating that he had addressed a letter to Lake as soon as the latter arrived in Delhi in September 1803, offering to deliver up to the British the fort of Hansi "with seventy pieces of Ordnance, ammunition, and other stores."¹

This is corroborated by Lake's dispatch of 17th September, quoted above. Deremao further states that, as soon as his approaching the British with this offer was known, the princes of Patiala and Bikaner "severally wrote to him, each offering him Rs. 50,000 and villages in *Altamgha*² in their respective districts" in lieu of those villages which Deremao held from the Mughal. It was for this reason that the sole condition which he imposed for the surrender of Hansi to Lake was that he should be confirmed by the British in the possession of the lands which he had inherited. This condition was accepted: Lake wrote to Deremao "you will not only retain your lands of *Altumgha* and *Pay*, but future favours will be conferred on you. The allowances of your brother, &c., and those sepoys under you shall likewise be continued to them for life."³

It was not till 16th December that Lake was able to spare troops to proceed to Hansi. On the morning of that day, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's instructions, a detachment of *Telingas* and *Najibs* (irregular levies, recruited from men who had quitted Scindia's service at Agra, shortly before), under the command of Major John Brownrigg, an Irish adventurer who had left the Maratha army with them, arrived at Hansi and was "immediately put in possession of the Fort by Captain Manuel the Commandant, to whom every credit is due for his judicious and firm conduct during a long period. The Garrison consisted of 500 fighting men: of them Captain Manuel happily succeeded in attaching 300 to the interest of the Hon'ble Company. The remaining 200 were refractory and have been dismissed." Thus ran Brownrigg's report⁴ and he continued: "Those who behaved well are retained in service and continued in the Fort, and in pursuance of your orders, I sent in a party of *Tellingers* and *Najeebs* for its better security until the arrival of Col. Ball, who will

¹ Deremao to Government, 2nd January, 1821. (Appendix, No. IX.)

² Tenure by grant under the royal sign-manual.

³ Captain John Gerard to Deremao, undated. (Appendix, No. IV.)

⁴ Major John Brownrigg to Ochterlony, 16th December, 1803. (Appendix, No. II.)

take such measures as he judges best." Brownrigg adds that he was making a Union Flag, which he hoped to hoist on the ramparts with a salute on the following day; that there were about seventy guns mounted in the fort; and that Hansi was "a strong Fort and does great credit to the active and enterprising genius of George Thomas."

Another eye-witness of the capitulation of Hansi was Captain William Long, an English soldier of fortune formerly in Scindia's service, who had come over to the British on the outbreak of war. "We arrived in due course of march at Hansy," he writes, "and Monsieur Perron's commandant, a Captain Manuels, received us with open arms and gave a grand fête, at which all the officers were present. Captain Samuels (*sic*) evacuated the fort of Hansy, with a remaining garrison of about five thousand fighting men, chiefly Mawatties, who had a bonus given them of six months' pay; and the Captain himself is said to have marched out with about two lakhs of rupees. A good job for him he had made a favourable treaty with the Resident at Delhi, the well-known Colonel Sir David Ochterlony. The fort, guns and ammunition became the Hon'ble Company's property, as well as the adjoining districts."

When regular troops under a regular officer, Colonel George Ball, arrived, Deremao appears to have handed the fort over in a more formal manner. This took place on 28th December 1803, when he obtained a written receipt for the fort and its contents¹ from Lieutenant Robert Young of the Bengal Army, "commanding a detachment of the 1st Bn. 8th Regt. N. I." His conduct throughout the transaction was acknowledged by Ochterlony² and we may conclude that he then retired to Delhi and took up his residence there. The "well-affected men of the Garrison" received an additional reward of half a month's pay, apparently for the purpose of clothing themselves in British uniform, and were no doubt absorbed in one of the many irregular corps then existing.

We hear no more of Deremao till September 1806, when he received a notification from the Governor-General in Council that his

¹ Receipt by Lieutenant Robert Young, 28th December, 1803. (Appendix, No. III.)

² Ochterlony to Deremao, undated. (Appendix, No. V.)

allowance from the British was to be reduced, whilst those of his son Lieutenant Domingo Deremao (who seems to have been a Maratha officer and at Hansi with his father) and his nephew Antony Deremao (also said to have been a Maratha officer) were to be withdrawn. The Captain was drawing a pension of Rs. 400 monthly from the British.¹ Deremao was not slow to protest respectfully against this reduction² and his representations, which appear to have been supported by the Resident at Delhi, soon met with success. The Governor-General gave orders that the payment of the allowances to be resumed and for the *Altamgha* lands to be put in Deremao's possession; and it is satisfactory to know that the old officer retained both till the day of his death.³

Captain Manuel Deremao spent the rest of his life at Delhi, his birthplace. There, known to all as "Manuel Sahib," he was held in high esteem and renowned for his widespread generosity. Amongst his personal friends were, it is said, the Maharajas of Patiala and Bikaner, despite his refusal of Hansi to them; and even the Emperor Shah Alam, who visited him frequently and of whom family tradition relates that when the Captain was ill, the Emperor prepared a dish with his own hands and waited on him whilst he partook of it. The last time he took up his sword was for the siege and capture of Bharatpur in the winter of 1824-5, when his son Domingo is stated to have acted as an honorary aide-de-camp to Sir David Ochterlony, their old friend. In 1821 he was much concerned at a suggestion which reached him from official quarters that his *Altamgha* lands would not descend to his posterity on his death, but would be assumed by Government. He submitted a lengthy petition, in which his past services were summarised and which was sponsored with warmth by Ochterlony,⁴ and the Governor-General in Council conceded the point.⁵

He died at Delhi on 5th June 1829, aged eighty-five years, and was buried in the ancient cemetery at Kishanganj, where his tomb may

¹ Resident at Delhi to Government, 6th June, 1829. (Appendix, No. XIII.)

² Deremao to Government, 16th September, 1806. (Appendix, No. IV.)

³ Government to Deremao, 2nd December, 1806. (Appendix, No. VII.)

⁴ Deremao to Government 2nd January, 1821 and Resident at Delhi to Government 22nd January, 1821. (Appendix, Nos. IX and X.)

⁵ Government to Resident at Delhi, 10th February, 1821. (Appendix, No. XI.)

still be seen. Beside him sleep his wife, daughter, son and daughter-in-law, as well as many Armenians and other Christians who died before the British came to the capital and whose history is extremely obscure. His death was duly reported to the Political Department of the Government of India, and the wish in his will that the Resident at Delhi should be trustee of his estate appears to have been acceded to.¹ His wife Justiana or Justiniana survived him and died at Delhi on 1st November 1843. Their son, Lieut. Domingo Manuel Deremao, seems to have removed to Calcutta for the benefit of his health a few months before his father's death; his first wife died at Delhi on 3rd July, 1836, aged 43 years. (She is described in her epitaph as "Bibi Anna Sahiba, daughter of the late Masih Ata Khan Sahib, grandson of the Nawab Iswi Khan Sahib, *rais* of Delhi." Inquiry from Muslim historians has failed to throw any light on these persons, and it is thought that the names are Persian pseudonyms of Christians rather than Muslim names).² His second wife, whom he is believed to have married at Sardhana about the year 1837, is stated to have been of high Afghan birth. Converted to Christianity, she received the name Elizabeth. Domingo died at Delhi on 19th January, 1852, being survived by three sons and four daughters. Previous to his death the *jagir* had been handed over by the family to the management of the local British revenue officials.³ Though his father had twelve villages, only three are named in Domingo's petition: the remaining nine must have fallen to the share of other members of the family.

In the Roman Catholic Church at Delhi there is a tablet inscribed: "Mrs. Dominga (*sic*) Deremao, a benefactress of this Church, died on the 4th February, 1871 in the 81st year of her age." This lady, however, cannot be identified with Lieut. Deremao's second wife, who is known to have lived for some years after 1871.

¹ Government to Resident at Delhi, 26th June, 1829. (Appendix, No. XVI.)

² *List of Inscriptions on Tombs and Monuments in Punjab, &c.*, by Miles Irving, Lahore, Government Press, 1910.

³ Commissioner of Delhi to Board of Revenue 9th January 1829. (Appendix, No. XVII.)

APPENDIX I.

Secret and Political Department, Fort William, 2nd March 1804. Secret Consultation of 2nd March 1804, No. 2117.

(LAKE TO WELLESLEY).

MY LORD,

For your Lordship's information I have the honour to enclose extract copy of a letter this day received addressed to Lt.-Col. Ochterlony, Acting Resident at Delhi, containing information of our troops having taken possession of the important fortress of Hansi on the 16th instant.

2. It is necessary to inform your Lordship that in consequence of a correspondence which passed between Lieut.-Colonel Ochterlony and Captain Manuel (late in the service of Dowlat Rao Scindia) commanding the fort of Hansi, I directed that officer to detach the force under Major Brownrigg consisting of the battalion of Telingars and Nujcebs which came over from the enemy at Agra to take possession of the Fort which owing to the meritorious exertions of Captain Manuel, who I beg leave particularly to recommend to Your Lordship's favour and protection, was delivered up immediately on the arrival of our troops.

3. Major Brownrigg and the Officers and men under his Command have conducted themselves to my entire satisfaction on this service and will I have no doubt acquit themselves with credit whenever their services may be further required.

4. I have the honour to enclose a copy of Lt.-Col. Ochterlony's order, of whose present to the Garrison as a reward for their good conduct I have entirely approved.

I shall have the honour to transmit correct returns of the Ordnance and Stores taken in the Fort as soon as I receive them from Major Brownrigg.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) G. LAKE,

Headquarters, Camp Nchmeda, December 22nd, 1803.

APPENDIX II.

Extract of a letter from Major Brownrigg to Colonel Ochterlony, Acting Resident at Delhi.

CAMP AT HANSI.

16th December 1803.

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that I arrived before Hansi this morning with the detachment under my Command and was immediately put in possession of the Fort by Captain Manuel, the Commandant, to whom every credit is due for his judicious and firm conduct during a long period. The Garrison consisted of 500 fighting men: of them Captain Manuel happily succeeded in attaching 300 to the interest of the Hon'ble Company. The remaining 200 were refractory and have been dismissed. Those who behaved well are retained in service and continued in the Fort, and in pursuance of your orders, I sent in a party of Telingars and Nujcebs for its better security until the arrival of Col. Ball, who will take such measures as he judges best. I am making colours for the Fort, and if ready shall hoist the British-Union on the Rampart to-morrow morning under a salute of 21 guns from the Fort and an equal number from the Camp.

There are about seventy-five pieces of Cannon mounted on the Fort, and in a day or two I shall have the honour of transmitting you a return of the Ordnance and

stores. The Fort is square, built on a high mound of earth and encompassed by a ditch from 30 to 40 feet deep which can be supplied with water from a very large tank close under the walls.

The Glasses (*sic*) is very good but not perfectly finished. I have not time at present to give you a particular description of Hansi, but must express my satisfaction that it has fallen thus into the hands of the Hon'ble Company, for even in its present unfinished state it is not only capable of defence but may be deemed a strong Fort and does great credit to the active and enterprising genius of George Thomas.

A true extract.

(Signed) G. A. F. LAKE,
Military Secretary.

APPENDIX III.

Political Department, Cantonment of 18th December 1806.

This is to certify that Captain Manuel Deremao, late of the Maratha Service, having this day delivered over to me that charge of the Fort of Hansi with 70 guns, ammunition, grain, and other stores in the Fort without any resistance and agreeable to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's orders.

HANSI:
28th December 1803.

(Signed) ROBERT YOUNG, LIUT.,
Commanding a Detachment of the
1st Bn. 8th Regt. N. I.

APPENDIX IV.

Translation of a Persian letter.

From—Captain J. Gerard [A. A. G. to Lake.]
To—Captain Manuel.

I have received your letter and agreeable to your request it was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief. He has directed me to acquaint you that all who entertain a sincere desire and incline themselves to serve under the British Government will no doubt merit its approbation.

If your attachment is really as you express in your address, you will deliver over the Forts, etc., under your charge to the English Power. As to your request you will not only retain your lands of Altumgha and Pay, but future favours will be conferred on you. The allowances of your brother, &c., and those *sepoys* under you shall likewise be continued to them for life.

[This letter evidently passed during the negotiations for the surrender of Hansi and other forts. It is undated.]

APPENDIX V.

[Not checked with original or copy, which is not traceable in Imperial Record Department.]

Lt.-Col. Ochsterlony desires Captain Manuel Deremao will accept his best acknowledgements for his firm judicious conduct during the short but trying period he has held the Command of Hansi under the protection of the British Government.

The Lieut.-Colonel will not fail to represent his sentiments to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and requests Captain Manuel D'Eremao will assure the well-affected men of the Garrison of his approbation of their good conduct and fidelity and inform them that half a month's pay has been remitted for the purpose of purchasing a uniform and Gurkha (?) as a reward for their good conduct and Obedience to Captain Manuel D'Eremao's orders.

(Signed) G. A. F. LAKE.

Military Secretary.

APPENDIX VI.

(Imperial Record Office, Calcutta, Political Department Consultations, 18th December 1806).

No. 20.

N. B. EDMONSTONE, ESQUIRE,

Secretary to the Government &c., &c., &c.

SIR,

Agreeable to the orders of the Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council conveyed to me through the circular letter of Mr. Seton, Resident at Delhi, stating "that the allowance which had hitherto been paid to me in consideration of my having quitted the Marhatta Service under the proclamation issued by this Government on the 29th August 1803 was to cease on the 1st instant, from which time a Reduced rate of allowance would be assigned to me proportionate to my Rank and claims," I have to acquaint you that I have fixed on Delhi (my birth-place) for my future abode, and I trust that the Hon'ble Governor-General will take my peculiar situation, as differing from those of the other officers of the late Marhatta Service, into his favourable consideration.

I have taken the liberty of enclosing for the information of the Hon'ble the Governor-General in Council a copy of a letter received by me when in Command of Hansi and also a copy of a Receipt for Guns and Stores delivered over to Lieutenant Young.

By the former I had understood that my present allowances as well as my Altumgha would have been continued not only to me but to my son Domingo D'eremao and my nephew Anthony D'eremao, the former in the receipt of 60 Rupees and the latter 40 Rupees per month for life on account of the services I had performed at a critical juncture and at a period of the utmost danger to my person from the mutinous state of the Garrison of Hansi, and I have only to refer the Hon'ble the Governor-General to Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony then Acting Resident at Delhi as to the extent of my services at that period, and to whom it is well known that I was offered both by the Rajas of Patiala and Bikanir not only fifty thousand rupees, but a permanent provision for life for the fort of Hansi which I refused.

I have &c.,

DELHI:

(Signed) MANUEL D'EREMAO,

16th September 1806.

CAPTAIN.

APPENDIX VII.

To Captain Manuel D'Eremao.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th September together with its enclosures and to signify to you the determination of the Governor-General in Council on your case.

The Governor-General in Council has been apprized by the reports of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief of your Meritorious Conduct on the occasion of the

delivery of the Fort of Hansi to the British Arms and of His Excellency's sense of your general merits and character. I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council acknowledges the value of your services and entirely approves and confirms the Assurances conveyed to you by the Commander-in-Chief of the continuance to you during your life of the full amount of the pay which you received in the Marattha Service and of your confirmation in the possession of the lands which you held in Altumgha. The Resident at Delhi will accordingly receive instructions to resume the payment of the allowance of Rs. 400 per mensem which you have received from that Officer which the Governor-General in Council is pleased to grant to you as a pension for life. The Resident will further be directed to proceed to put you in possession of the Altumgha Lands referred to in your letter, and in that of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief to your address.

I am further directed to inform you that the allowances heretofore received by your son and nephew from the treasury of Delhi will continue to be paid to them during the remainder of their lives.

I am, Sir, Your Obedient Servant,

(Signed) N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Secretary to Government.

2nd December, 1806.

APPENDIX VIII.

To—A. Seton, Esquire, Resident at Delhi.

Sir,

You will have been apprized by the records of the Residency at Delhi, of the Services rendered to the British Government by Captain Manuel Deremao on the occasion of the surrender of the Fort of Hansi to the British Arms and of the Assurances Conveyed to him by the Right Honourable Lord Lake of the Continuance during life of the pay which he received in the Marattha Service and his Confirmation in the possession of the lands which he held in Altumgha under the Marattha Government. The Governor-General in Council having entirely approved and confirmed the assurances made to Captain Manuel by the Commander-in-Chief.

I am directed to desire that you will resume the payment of the allowance of Rs. 400 per mensem which he formerly received from the treasury at Delhi and that you will continue to pay to him that amount which the Governor-General in Council has been pleased to grant to him as a pension for life. You are authorized to recommence the payment from the 1st September last when it ceased under the order for discontinuing the allowances heretofore received by the Officers who quitted the Marattha Service.

I am further directed to desire that you will ascertain the extent and value of the Altumgha lands referred to in the preceding part of this letter and take the necessary measures for putting Captain Manuel in possession of them, agreeably to the promise of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General in Council has further determined to continue to the son and nephew of Captain Manuel for themselves the amount of their respective pensions of Rs. 60 and Rs. 40 per mensem; [and you are accordingly authorized to resume] the payment of these pensions from the 1st September last.

I have, etc.

(Signed) N. B. EDMONSTONE,

Secretary to Government.

FORT WILLIAM:

2nd December 1806.

APPENDIX IX.

To His Excellency the Most Noble The Marquess of Hastings, Governor-General in Council.

The humble petition of Captain Manuel Deremao late of the Marattha Service and Commandant of Hansi.

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHEWETH,

That in the year of our Lord 1803, when the victorious Arms of the British had extended their conquest to Delhi, Your petitioner was sole Commandant of the Fort Hansi, which he held on the part of the Marattha Government and on their defeat and dispersion by the English, continued to defend against the bodies of the Bhutoos, Ranghurs and others, till the conquest of Delhi by the British and the arrival of Lord Lake at the Capital.

2. Your petitioner then, in a imitation of the British prowess, magnanimity, and equity, determined to surrender himself and deliver the Fort of which he was Commandant to them; and with that view addressed the late Lord Lake.

3. When it was known that Your petitioner sought the protection of the British, and had offered to deliver up the Fort to them, the Rajas of Patiala and Bikaner severally wrote to him (copies of whose letters Nos. 1 and 2 Your petitioner has taken the liberty to enclose) each offering him Rs. 50,000 and villages in Altumgha in their respective districts (in lieu of those held by Your petitioner in Altumgha from the Emperor Bahadour Shah in the province of Delhi) for the Fort of Hansi.

4. That Your petitioner considering the palpable want of fidelity in the Native Chiefs to their promises and likewise the unsullied character of the British for their voracity; and viewing them besides, from their being the Sovereigns of the Country and conquerors of the Maratthas, as his lawful masters, Your petitioner determined to cast himself on their clemency and munificence and therefore refused every offer, however advantageous, made by the above-mentioned Native Chiefs.

5. To this end Your petitioner in the very month (September 1803) that Lord Lake arrived at the Capital, addressed to His Excellency the letter above alluded to, in which Your petitioner without making any stipulations for himself, or asking any terms excepting being confirmed in the possession of the Altumgha lands held by Your petitioner from the Emperor Bahadour Shah (Copies of whose Firmans to Your petitioner's ancestors are enclosed, Nos. 3 and 4) and subsequently confirmed to Your petitioner by the Marattha Government (Copies of whose Parwana is enclosed, No. 5) offered to deliver up the Forts to the British with seventy pieces of Ordnance, ammunition, and other stores.

The result of this address to Lord Lake was a letter from His Excellency to Your petitioner (a copy of which is enclosed, No. 6) expressing His Excellency's gratification at my offering to surrender, and his acceptance thereof, and besides promising to Your petitioner the continuance of his allowance with that of the Officers and men under his Command as enjoyed under the Marattha Government; and appointing him on the part of the British Government still to hold the Command of the Fort of Hansi. His Excellency was pleased expressly to declare with the solemnity of an oath calling God to witness, that agreeable to Your petitioner's desire (it being the only condition of the delivery of the Fort) the villages and lands held by Your petitioner, should according to the purport of the Emperor's Firmans and the Parwana of the Marattha Government be confirmed and continued to him and his posterity by the British as heretofore.

Your petitioner in perfect reliance on Lord Lake's assurances, delivered himself and Forts up to the British, and in return experienced the utmost happiness in so doing, from the fulfilment of all the engagements and kind assurances continued in Lord Lake's letters in both continuing to him and the Officers and men, late under his Command, the pay of their rank and in confirming and protecting him in the possession of the Altumgha lands above alluded to (*Vide* enclosure No. 7).

While thus enjoying both the allowance and the Altumgha lands, secured to Your petitioner by British munificence, Your petitioner resolved in the year 1806 an intimation from Mr. Seton, the then Resident at Delhi, that Your petitioner's allowance would be reduced, from a misconception that Your petitioner had quitted the Marattha Service under the proclamation of 1803.

But Your petitioner's representation of the true state of the case, addressed to Mr. Secretary Edmondstone, removed the misconception and obtained for Your petitioner the very favourable decision of Government, contained in enclosure No. 8, in which the Governor-General in Council entirely approves and confirms the assurances conveyed to Your petitioner by the Commander-in-Chief, of the continuance to

him during life of the full amount of the pay which he received in the Marattha Service and of Your petitioner's confirmation in the possession of the lands which he held in Altumgha."

In conformity with the above decision, Your petitioner continued to enjoy both his allowance and lands.

In the year 1817, the wording of that part of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's letter, which confirms the Altumgha lands to Your petitioner and his posterity, having created in the mind of a friend a doubt as to its real import, Your petitioner addressed a private letter to General Sir David Ochterlony, begging to be favoured with his opinion on the subject; that gentleman having a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances of Your petitioner's case, and of the nature of the provision made for him by the Government.

The reply with which General Sir David Ochterlony was pleased to favour me being of the utmost importance to a just view of the point in question, Your petitioner takes the liberty to quote it for the information of Your Lordship: "I believe that the word Altumgha mentioned in the Secretary's letter secures to your offspring whatever lands you hold on such grants. It would however be satisfactory to me to examine copies of the Grants you possess from the Emperor and from the Marattha Government as it might put the question beyond doubt."

In compliance with the request of General Sir David Ochterlony Your petitioner lost no time in forwarding copies of the necessary Grants and in reply received the following encouraging definition of the purport of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's letter, viz:—"I have received your papers and will not permit myself to doubt that the Altumgha Grants you possess and the assurances received from the British Government will secure to your posterity the lands held by your ancestors."

After such an unequivocal declaration of security afforded both by the letter of General Sir David Ochterlony and by that of the Government communicated by Mr. Secretary Edmonstone and by the letter of His Excellency Lord Lake, Your petitioner could not but rest assured that the possession of the Altumgha lands was secured both to Your petitioner and his posterity for ever, according to the tenure of the original Grants and their subsequent confirmation.

Your petitioner therefore would never have taken the liberty of troubling Government any further respecting either his allowance or his Altumgha lands, but for an intimation from Mr. Fraser the Deputy Superintendent of Delhi, received about two months since, acquainting Your petitioner that after his demise his Altumgha lands would not descend to his posterity but be assumed by the Government.

The occasion of this intimation having originated in a misunderstanding of the terms on which Your petitioner holds his Altumgha lands, Your petitioner begs leave to state for the information of Your Lordship:

About four years ago Mr. Fraser, the then Collector of Delhi, requested to see and examine the Grants pertaining to the villages held by Your petitioner in Altumgha and Your petitioner, in consequence of his official request, forwarded the Firmans of the Emperor and the Parwanas of the Marattha Government.

Your petitioner had heard nothing for about four years of the result of this examination but about eight months ago Mr. Fortescue the late Civil Commissioner of Delhi communicated a similar request, and Your petitioner forwarded the same papers which had been sent to Mr. Fraser, the letters of Lord Lake not having been demanded (as the British Government's Confirmation of the lands to Your petitioner and his posterity it was not sent).

Mr. Fortescue upon examination of the Firmans and Parwana only, made his report to Government and having neither demanded or seen the British Confirmation of the lands, assumed that they were held by the authority of the Maratthas only. It was on this principle (Your petitioner humbly conceives) that Mr. Fortescue made his report to Government: and occasioned the intimation last received from Mr. Fraser.

Having thus stated for the information of Your Lordship the nature of Your petitioner's and his posterity's claims to the Altumgha lands, confirmed to him by Government, and also the occasion of the intimation which has induced this petition it only remains for Your petitioner to say that he ever relied on and still relies for

his and his posterity's protection in the Altamgha lands on the equity and veracity and munificence of the British Government, so manifestly pledged and manifested towards Your petitioner in the letters of Lord Lake and Mr. Secretary Edmondstone; and therefore humbly hopes that the justice of his and his posterity's claims to those lands will appear to Government to be of a nature perfectly clear and decided; and Your petitioner further humbly implores Your Lordship to grant to him some additional mark of the favour and protection of Government which shall effectually secure Your petitioner and his posterity against any further molestation in their possession of the Altamgha lands for ever.

And Your petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray.

DELHI,

The 2nd of January, 1821.

(Signed) M. DEREMAO, CAPTAIN.

APPENDIX X.

TO GEORGE SWINTON, ESQUIRE,

Acting Secretary to Government,

Political Department, Fort William.

SIR,

I have the honour herewith to transmit a memorial from Captain Manuel Deremao to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council.

2. I would fain indulge the hope that this memorial, which I know in every part which relates to recent events to be a faithful recital of facts, will, of itself, induce His Lordship's most favourable consideration.

3. At the moment that Captain Manuel Deremao delivered up to us the Fort of Hansi, the importance of the cession was immense; and I have no hesitation in saying would have been gladly purchased on much higher terms than what was demanded or expected by Captain Manuel Deremao; not so much for the value of the country, or for any intention to retain it, as that it gave us a strong Fortress, and a powerful train of Artillery which in other hands might have been highly injurious to our interests, and in ours, was of the utmost importance; as from thence, on the first suspicion of Holkar's attempt on Delhi, I drew several guns, which were of the greatest use in the defence. It was all that remained to Perron in this quarter; and the acquisition gave a formidable blow to the adherents of Dowlat Row, who were traversing the pergunahs, and levying contributions in the name of the Marattha Government, as collections, and granting receipts for much larger sums than they received.

4. Independently however of the individual claims of Captain Deremao, and the strong assurances he received from myself, and the then Commander-in-Chief, I beg leave earnestly to implore the attention of His Lordship in Council, to the Sunnads under which he holds, and which I am instructed to believe are not merely grants in perpetuity to heirs male, but to heirs general; and if I am rightly informed, the undoubted validity of the grants, the length of time which his ancestors held uninterrupted possession, and even the period in which it has been in his own occupancy, would secure him unmolested possession, by the existing regulations of Government, were it situate in our own Provinces and made a subject of discussion in our own Courts of Law.

5. To a man bordering on, if not past, the age of seventy years, little satisfaction can be derived from the assurances that he will hold his lands for life. He is fully aware that at his death, his personal allowance will cease to benefit his family; and to the grant, to the assurance he received, and the word Altamgha, and his heirs general, he looked with full conviction, that his Children and Grand-Children, under the benignant protection of the British Government, would enjoy comparative ease and comfort, and at all events be secured from penury. I never, in any instance,

regretted more sincerely my inability to do justice to a cause, which I most solemnly believe to have strong claims on the most favourable consideration of His Lordship in Council; for the merits, and essential services, of the individual; and one where I was more strongly impressed with the belief, that the memorialist could establish a positive right, which would be held sacred, were it subjected to investigation in our own Courts, and decided by our own regulations.

DELHI RESIDENCY,
22nd January 1821.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) DA. OCHTERLONY,
Resident.

APPENDIX XI.

TO MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DAVID OCHTERLONY, BART., G.C.B.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of 22nd ultimo, containing a memorial from Captain Deremao.

2. The documents now submitted by the memorialist, consisting of letters from Lord Lake, and Mr. Edmonstone; which did not appear to have been produced before Mr. Portecue; and the facts and circumstances stated in your despatch, having satisfied His Excellency in Council of the just claim of Captain Manuel Deremao to hold his lands in Fareedabad, Altamgha, according to former usage, His Lordship in Council has been pleased to revise the orders passed on his case; and to resolve that the lands in question shall be continued to his heirs after his demise. Indeed this resolution may be considered as an anticipation only of the decision which would have been passed, when his heirs should have brought forward their claims, grounding it on the documents now produced by Captain Deremao; who appears to have misunderstood the orders of the Government with regard to the resumption of his Altamgha. It was not declared by the orders as stated in his memorial, that the lands should not descend to his heirs, but that their claims would be considered after his death.

3. You will be pleased to make the necessary communication on the subject to Captain Deremao, and to the Deputy Superintendent.

FORT WILLIAM,
The 10th February 1821.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. SWINTON,
Secretary to Government.

APPENDIX XII.

(Imperial Record Office, Calcutta: Political Consultations, dated 26th December 1828).
No. 15.

TO GEORGE SWINTON, ESQUIRE,
*Chief Secretary to the Government,
Political Department at Fort Williams.*

SIR,

I have the honour to transmit for the orders of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council copy of a letter from Lieutenant D. Deremao of the late Maharashtra Service, requesting to be allowed to draw his Pension for the future at the Presidency.

DELHI RESIDENCY,
CAMP PANEPUT.
7th December 1828,

I have, &c.,
(Signed) ED. COLEBROOKE,
Resident.

To SIR E. COLEBROOKE, BART,
*Resident,
 Dehlee.*

SIR,

My continued indisposition inducing me to remove to Calcutta for my health, I beg you will obtain the Permission of Government for my drawing my Pension at the Presidency, where I propose to reside.

DHULEE :
 5th December 1828.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) D. DEREMAO,
 LIEUTENANT.

A true copy.
 (Signed) C. E. TREVELYAN,
 ASSISTANT RESIDENT.

Ordered that the following reply be returned to Sir Ed. Colebrooke.
 No. 16. To

SIR J. E. COLEBROOKE, BART,
Resident at Dehlee.

SIR,

I am directed to acquaint you in reply to your letter of the 7th instant that Lieutenant D. Deremao, late of the Marhatta Service, will be permitted to draw his Pension at the Presidency on his producing a certificate from you of the amount and of the period up to which it has been paid at Dehlee.

You will be pleased to report whether Monsr. Deremao's Pension has hitherto been paid in Furruckabad or Sleca Rupees, in order that its corresponding amount may be paid to him at the Presidency.

FORT WILLIAM :
 26th December 1828.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) GEO. SWINTON,
 CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT.

APPENDIX XIII.

(Imperial Record Office, Calcutta : Political Consultations, 26th June 1829).
 No. 1. To

G. SWINTON, ESQUIRE,
*Chief Secretary to Government,
 Political Department,
 Fort William.*

SIR,

I have the honour to inform you that Captain Manuel Deremao— a Pensioned Officer formerly of the Marhatta Service receiving a monthly allowance from Government of Rupees 400—died yesterday at this place and that the payment of his allowance will accordingly be discontinued.

DELHI RESY. :
 6th June 1829.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) E. COLEBROOKE,
 RESIDENT.

Ordered that a copy of the foregoing letter from the Resident at Delhi be sent to the Civil Auditor for his information.

APPENDIX XIV.

TO SIR J. E. COLEBROOKE, BART.,
Resident at Delhi.

SIR,

Having been present at the reading of the Will of the late Captain Manuel Deremao, I deem it my duty to inform you that the testator has therein expressed himself to the following purport. "Further in consideration of the Services rendered by me to the British Government I entreat the Resident at Delhi for the time being or other Civil or Military Chief to be guardian to my Estate, and to see all and every part of my Will rightly administered."

2. Copy of the said Will shall be forwarded as soon as it can be prepared.

DELHI:

JUDGE AND MAGISTRATE'S OFFICE.

8th June 1829.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) T. T. METCALFE,

Judge and Magistrate.

APPENDIX XV.

TO GEORGE SWINTON, ESQUIRE,
*Chief Secretary to Government,
 Political Department, Fort William.*

Dated Delhi Residency, 9th June 1829.

SIR,

I do myself the honour to submit the annexed copy of a letter from the Magistrate of Delhi and to solicit the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, whether I am at liberty to take upon myself the official administration of the late Captain Deremao's Will as requested by him. The Estate which he wishes to place under the guardianship of the Residency is an hereditary Jagher of 12 villages which has already been the subject of correspondence with the Government in regard to the powers which he claims to exercise in it.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. E. COLEBROOKE,

Resident.

APPENDIX XVI.

TO J. E. COLEBROOKE, ESQUIRE,
Resident at Delhi.

Dated Fort William, 26th June 1829.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 9th instant, reporting the death of Captain Deremao and to state that the Governor-General in Council has no objection to your undertaking the official administration of such provisions of the Will of the deceased as are consistent with the law and usage. It will doubtless have occurred to you that the Jagher being Hereditary, Captain Deremao's interest in it ceased with his life and he could have no right to regulate by Will its disposal after his death, or otherwise to interfere with the legal and established course of succession thereto.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. STIRLING,

Deputy Secretary to Government.

APPENDIX XVII.

From Commissioner of Delhi Division.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit the accompanying application made through the Officiating Collector of Delhi from Lieutenant Deremao, the holder in Altumgha of three villages:

Bhopany

Khanpur

Bichputti

to transfer his Jagoor to the management of the Local Officers to be assessed by us and the Revenues after deducting all expenses of collection to be paid to him and his heirs.

This arrangement I beg to recommend for the sanction of superior authority.

I have, &c.,

DELHI:

(Signed) J. METCALFE,

COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE.

Commissioner.

9th January 1843.

Submits application from Lieutenant Deremao received through the Officiating Collector of Delhi to transfer his Jagoor to the management of the Local Officers, the Revenue to be paid to him and his heirs after deducting expenses on account of collections, &c.

NOTE.

I desire to express my gratitude to Mrs. Pratt, great-grand-daughter of Captain Manuel Deremao, for assistance given me in the compilation of this paper.

PANJAB UNIVERSITY HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

(Incorporating the *Punjab Historical Society*).

FINANCIAL STATEMENT.

The old Punjab Historical Society was in January 1932 merged in the newly organised Panjab University Historical Society. The funds of the old society which amounted on 31st December 1931 to Rs. 1,380-6-10 were handed over to the new Society. The life members of the old society are members of the new Society, and other members of the old society are invited to join the new Society. There are at present two life members, and 21 annual members. Out of these 21 annual members 14 are ordinary members and 7 student members. The income of the society during the current year is given below :—

	Rs.	a.	p.
14 Ordinary members subscription	..	130	0 0
7 Student members subscription	..	17	8 0
Grant from Panjab University	..	250	0 0
Total	..	397	8 0

The expenditure during the same period, including the expenditure on account of the old society merged in the new one is shown thus :—

	Rs.	a.	p.
Clerk and peon	..	86	8 0
Printing	..	48	10 0
Postage and contingencies	..	45	11 3
Exchange on realisation of cheque	..	0	4 0
Total	..	181	1 3

The balance at present in hand is Rs. 1,572-13-7. This includes Rs. 1,380-6-10 the amount we received from the old Society. The stock consisting of the previous copies of the Journal is not valued yet.

LAHORE : J. F. BRUCE, GULSHAN RAI,
 Dated 13th April 1932. PRESIDENT. HONY. TREASURER.

AUDIT REPORT.

I have checked the accounts of the Punjab Historical Society from 1928 to 1931 inclusive and the accounts of the Panjab University Historical Society for 1932, to to-day, April 13th, 1932. I suggest

- (1) The accounts each year should be submitted to a general meeting or executive committee and approved and then signed by the President.
- (2) All vouchers with receipts should be numbered.
- (3) Receipts for all payments should be obtained.
- (4) I note that with one exception there is no income from the sale of the Journal of the Punjab Historical Society from 1928—1932.

J. F. BRUCE,
PRESIDENT.

LAHORE :
Dated 13th April 1932.

J. E. PARKINSON,
PRINCIPAL,
Central Training College, Lahore,
Honorary Auditor.

12/62

"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book
clean and moving.